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Large airports and hubs often provide landing systems as ILS and GLS. Therefore, the 
commercial air transport aircrafts are equipped with respective receivers to use the 
systems. These systems provide very accurate guidance to the aircraft, but they are 
also very expensive and for that reason not affordable for small airports. For that 
purpose, an SBAS to GBAS converter called GLASS was developed to provide SBAS 
service to GBAS receivers. However, to take that system at ground into operation, its 
software needs to be approved according to DO-278A. 
For this purpose, a software approval concept according to DO-278A is developed so 
that the software development process can be structured according to that concept. 
To develop that concept, an assurance level is inferred with a conclusion by analogy 
because the system development process does not offer it at this time. Eventually, the 
approval concept is based on assurance level 3.  
The approval concept mentions and sequences the required activities as well as the 
resulting data items to gain an effective approval procedure. However, the correctness 
of that concept could not finally be determined because the development and the 
approval process of GLASS had not been completed at the time this thesis was written.  
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Aviation is a demanding area of engineering as the safety aspect is particularly 
important. Therefore, several standards are released for ensuring that the aviation 
related systems are developed according to the potential safety impact on the aircraft. 
For that purpose, the RTCA published several standards to ensure that safety needs 
are appropriately considered during the development process. For example [1]: 
• DO-254, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware 
• DO-178C, Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certification 
• DO-278A, Software Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, 
Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems 
• DO-289, Minimum Aviation System Performance Standards (MASPS) for 
Aircraft Surveillance Applications (ASA) 
• DO-296, Safety Requirements for Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) 
Datalink Messages 
DO-178C and DO-278A are important standards of aviation related system 
development since many devices consist not only of hardware, but also of software, 
for instance: 
• Cockpit Systems 
o Primary Flight Display 
o Automatic Landing Systems 
o Air Conditioning System 
• Cabin Systems 
o Entertainment Systems 
o Air Conditioning System 
o Emergency Oxygen System 
• Ground Systems 
o Ground Based Augmentations System (GBAS) Ground Stations 
o Satellite Based Augmentation System (SBAS) Ground Stations 
o Air Traffic Management (ATM) Systems 
GLASS is a new technique that convert SBAS data into GBAS data that can be used 
by aircrafts that are only equipped with GBAS but not with SBAS. The converted data 
can be received by the airborne multi-mode receiver (MMR) and used by the autopilot 
enabling automated landings. For this reason and because GLASS would be much 
more affordable than GBAS, it might be a good solution for airports that are currently 
not providing the capability of an Instrument Landing System (ILS) or GBAS Landing 
System (GLS). [2] 
1.1 Task Description 
Since the GLASS project should result in a ground station, the software needs to meet 
DO-278A as it is regarded as an acceptable means of compliance (AMC) for software 
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assurance. Therefore, this thesis proposes a concept how the software approval 
process can be conducted for obtaining the approval for a GLASS ground station 
according to DO-278A. Therefore, the following tasks must be conducted: 
• Determination of an appropriate assurance level for the GLASS software. 
• Analysis of the approval requirements of DO-278A for the GLASS software. 
• Development of a GLASS-specific guideline for approving the software. 
1.2 Initial Point 
At the beginning of this project, there was a prototype that was able to perform the 
desired functionality of GLASS as described in [3]. As mentioned there, it was possible 
to perform multiple GLASS approaches with an Airbus A319. However, this prototype 
system or its software was not released for operational use. That prototype mainly 
consisted of a C++ calculation program that ran on a 64-bit Linux PC, an Septentrio 
AsterRx3 GNSS receiver and a Telerad VDB Transmitter [2]. 
The original goal of this project was to improve the software for making it approvable, 
so that f.u.n.k.e. AVIONICS GmbH (hereafter referred to as “project partner”) only had 
to include the code for building an approvable system. Consequently, the project part 
in the scope of this thesis should be finished before the project partner enters the 
project.  Throughout the project it appears that it is not possible to approve the software 
as a unique stand-alone product because the approval authority recognized the 
software as a part of the whole system [4, p. 69]. For that reason, the scope of this 
thesis changes into describing an approval process according to DO-278A and this 
thesis overlaps with the development activities of the project partner.  
1.3 Limitations 
The scope of this thesis is the description of an approval process for the software of 
GLASS according to DO-278A. For that reason and because the current system is only 
a prototype, system level considerations are only considered as far as possible as they 
are not final. Moreover, there are legal uncertainties because the German law 
stipulates in §4 of the Air Traffic Control Equipment and Device Type Approval 
Regulation 1  that requirements concerning devices for air navigation services are 
published in an official journal called News for Aviators2 [5]. GLASS is an entirely new 
system and therefore there are no legal requirements for that system published. This 
leads to an enhanced legal risk for taking that system into operation. However, legal 
issues are out of scope of this thesis and for this reason not further considered. 
1.4 Literature Overview 
The lists below provide an overview of the most important literature that was used to 
create the software approval concept and further literature that was helpful to 
 
1 In German: Flugsicherungs-Anlagen- und Geräte-Musterzulassungs-Verordnung (FSMusterzulV) 
2 In German: Nachrichten für Luftfahrer 
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understand the character of the certification respective approval process and how this 
is embedded in the respective system process. 
Important literature and documents: 
• Developing Safety-Critical Software – A practical Guide for Aviation Software 
and DO-178C Compliance written by Leanna Rierson. See [6].  
This book provides many practical advices and explains the concept of 
DO-178C or DO-278A well. Since the author had the editorial committee chair 
of these standards, that book provides very useful and accurate guidance. 
• DO-278A – Software Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, 
Navigation, Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems 
published by the RTCA, Inc. See [4].  
This standard is the basis of this thesis as it defines the requirements of the 
approval process and provides guidance for it. 
• Table of contents template set. See [7].  
There is a free accessible template set available, which provides tables of 
content of the data items that must be created for a DO-178C certification. The 
templates are published by the Avionics Certification Academy that belongs to 
PATMOS Engineering Services, Inc. Its CEO, Tammy Reeve, was a member of 
the DO-278A committee. This template set is useful as it provides in detail an 
overview about which topics can be included in which document. 
• Former project documentation  
The project partner has provided the DO-178C certification related documen-
tation of a mobile radio. This documentation provides an overview of the extent 
of the data items that are required by DO-178C. That documentation is useful 
as it offers the possibility for cross-checking the proposed approval process 
documents with the documents of a successful certification process. 
Further literature and documents: 
• Avionics Certification: A Complete Guide to DO-178 (Software), DO-254 
(Hardware) written by Vance Hilderman and Tony Baghi. See [8].  
This book provides an outline of hardware and software certification aspects but 
is not detailed in software specific certification details. Nevertheless, this book 
is helpful for understanding the nature of DO-178B or the newer DO-178C. 
• ARP4754A – Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems and 
ARP4761 – Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment 
Process on Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment published by SAE 
International. See [9, 10].  
The Aerospace Recommended Practices (ARP) 4754A and 4761 provide 
guidelines for developing airborne related systems. 
• Using VectorCAST for DO-178B/C Software Verification published by Vector 
Informatik GmbH. See [11].  
This is a whitepaper that describes their verification software. For this purpose, 
14 
 
it provides several insights and explanations of verification procedures in the 
scope of their software.  
• ED-114A – Minimum Operational Performance Specification for Global 
Navigation Satellite Ground Based Augmentation System Ground Equipment to 
Support Category I Operations and ED-114B – Minimum Operational 
Performance Specification for Global Navigation Satellite Ground Based 
Augmentation System Ground Equipment to Support Precision Approach and 
Landing published by the European Organization for Civil Aviation Equipment 
(EUROCAE). See [12, 13].  
These standards give guidance for GBAS ground equipment. They also contain 
basic information about its approval process and therefore, these standards can 
be used for a better understanding of the general approval process for ground 
equipment. 
GLASS related literature and documents: 
• Extending access to localizer performance with vertical guidance approaches 
by means of an SBAS to GBAS converter written by Thomas Dautermann, 
Thomas Ludwig, Robert Geister, and Lutz Ehmke. See [3].  
This document describes in detail the functionality of GLASS and provides test 
results of the prototype system. 
• GLS Approaches using SBAS: a SBAS to GBAS converter written by Dr. 
Thomas Dautermann, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. Robert Geister, Lutz Ehmke, Max 
Fermor, Matthew Bruce, and Markus Schwendener. See [2].  
This document offers further information on the reasons for developing GLASS 
and results from tests of a prototype. However, the document does not describe 
in detail the functionality of GLASS. 
• Civil air navigation using GNSS enhanced by wide area satellite based 
augmentation systems written by Dr. Thomas Dautermann. See [14].  
This article describes the functionality of SBAS and therefore it supports the 
understanding of GLASS. 
• DO-229E – Minimum Operational Performance Standards for Global 
Positioning System/Satellite-Based Augmentation System Airborne Equipment 
published by RTCA, Inc. See [15].  
This standard specifies SBAS. For that reason, it provides specific and detailed 
information about SBAS that is beyond the scope of the previous mentioned 
article. 
1.5 Thesis Structure  
The main part of this thesis starts in chapter 2 with a description of GLASS including 
the global navigation satellite system (GNSS) for providing a basic description of the 
system that should be approved.  
Chapter 3 describes the background of the development of DO-278A and its relation 
to the similar airborne related standard DO-178C to justify the possibility of using DO-
178C related contents for a software approval according to DO-278A. Since the 
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software is considered as a part of the system, there are several other standards for 
system and hardware development. Since they are important for the system 
development but out of scope of this thesis, they are outlined and not further 
considered. Moreover, there are additional documents concerning supporting 
information, software tool qualification and supplements for clarification and guidance 
in special topics like object-oriented technologies. They are also outlined and not 
further considered as the system is not completely specified. Finally, that chapter 
describes the relation between the development of the system and its software. 
Chapter 4 describes the determination of an assurance level for the DO-278A software 
development. The contents and their extent depend on the assurance level for the 
software development. Since the system development is not finished at present, a 
conclusion by analogy is used to infer an assurance level. 
Chapter 5 presents the approval concept for the GLASS software. The concept is 
described along the chronological sequence of writing plans and performing 
development and verification processes. However, several activities can be carried out 
concurrently, which is described in its introduction and Figure 11. The approval concept 
is substantiated with several references (mainly [4] and [6]) and compared to [7] and 
the former project documentation of the project partner to be as accurate as possible. 
Furthermore, the end of each subsection provides an overview of the approval 
objectives respective the approval requirements of DO-278A that are satisfied in the 
corresponding subsection. 
Chapter 6 summarizes, discusses, and concludes the approval concept and presents 




2 Theoretical Background of GLASS 
This section describes the theoretical background of the system that should be 
approved according to DO-278A. Therefore, this section outlines the working principle 
of the global navigation satellite system (GNSS), the satellite based augmentation 
system (SBAS), and the ground based augmentation system (GBAS) in the first 
subsection. Based on this, the GLASS (acronym for GBAS Landing System (GLS) 
Approaches using SBAS) algorithm is described in the second subsection.  
2.1 Global Navigation Satellite System 
The GNSS ascertains the position and time of a user. The most successful GNSS is 
the US-American Navigational Satellite Timing and Ranging Global Positioning System 
(NAVSTAR-GPS), that is often just called GPS. There are several other systems in 
use as the Russian Globalnaja Nawigazionnaja Sputnikowaja Sistema (GLONASS), 
the Chinese Beidou and the European Galileo system. To gain a more accurate service 
for civil users, augmentation systems are launched for that purpose. There are SBAS 
like the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) or the 
US-American Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and GBAS. [16, p. 102] 
The positioning of GNSS users takes place in a cartesian earth-centered, earth-fixed 
coordinate system. To ascertain the position of the GNSS user, a technique based on 
the signal propagation time is used to infer to the distance between the sender and 
receiver. Therefore, that technique expects that both sender and receiver use the same 
base time and know the satellite positions. [16, p. 103] 
Figure 1 shows a 2-dimensio-
nal example to illustrate the 
concept of pseudo ranges. In 
this example, the vector  𝒙U represents the location of a 
GNSS user and the vectors 𝒙S,1 ,  𝒙S,2 , and 𝒙S,3  represent 
the locations of the three 
satellites. The satellites have 
the distances of 𝑅1, 𝑅2, and 𝑅3 
(dashed circle) to the GNSS 
user. Since the clock of the 
user differs from the satellite 
clocks, the measurement is 
affected by the clock bias Δ𝑡0, 
so that the measured 
distances result in the pseudo 
ranges 𝑃𝑆𝑅1, 𝑃𝑆𝑅2, and 𝑃𝑆𝑅3, 
which is represented by the 










Figure 1: Concept of Positioning with Pseudo Ranges 
Source: [1, p. 103] (modified) 
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ranges include more error terms than just the clock bias, there are also errors due to 
the signal propagation in the ionosphere and the troposphere or signal noise [16, p. 
104]. The GNSS position calculation is described below with reference to [16, p. 104]. 
The positions of 𝐽  satellites can be described with the vectors 𝒙S,𝑗 =(𝑥S,𝑗 𝑦S,𝑗 𝑧S,𝑗)𝑇 , 𝑗 ∈ ℕ≤𝐽 and the user position with 𝒙U = (𝑥U 𝑦U 𝑧U)𝑇, so that the 
real distance between satellites and user can be described as 𝑅𝑗 = |𝒙S,𝑗 − 𝒙U|= √((𝑥S,𝑗 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,𝑗 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,𝑗 − 𝑧U)2 (1) 
Regarding the clock bias Δ𝑡0 and the signal propagation speed that is assumed as the 
speed of light in vacuum c the pseudo ranges are 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗 = 𝑅𝑗 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c= √((𝑥S,𝑗 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,𝑗 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,𝑗 − 𝑧U)2 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c (2) 
Since this leads to a system of equations with three equations and four unknowns, a 
fourth satellite has to be considered. This results in the following system of equations: 
𝑃𝑆𝑅1 = √((𝑥S,1 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,1 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,1 − 𝑧U)2 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c 
(3) 
𝑃𝑆𝑅2 = √((𝑥S,2 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,2 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,2 − 𝑧U)2 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c 
𝑃𝑆𝑅3 = √((𝑥S,3 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,3 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,3 − 𝑧U)2 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c 
𝑃𝑆𝑅4 = √((𝑥S,4 − 𝑥U)2 + ((𝑦S,4 − 𝑦U)2 + ((𝑧S,4 − 𝑧U)2 + 𝛥𝑡0 ⋅ c 
In order to solve that system of equations, it will be linearized with a Taylor series, as 
mentioned in [17, p. 16], by using an estimated user position 𝒙U′ = (𝑥U′ 𝑦U′ 𝑧U′ )𝑇 and 
clock bias Δ𝑡0′  that results in the estimated pseudo range 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′ as shown below: 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗 ≈ 𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′ + (𝑥U − 𝑥U′ ) ⋅ 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′𝛿𝑥 + (𝑦U − 𝑦U′ ) ⋅ 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′𝛿𝑦+ (𝑧U − 𝑧U′ ) ⋅ 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′𝛿𝑧 + (𝛥𝑡0 − 𝛥𝑡0′ ) ⋅ c ⋅ 𝛿𝑃𝑆𝑅𝑗′𝛿(𝛥𝑡0′ ⋅ c) (4) 
This linearized system of equations results in an iterative algorithm. Therefore, the 
estimated user position 𝒙U′  and clock bias Δ𝑡0′  can be initialized with 𝒙U = (0 0 0)𝑇 
and Δ𝑡0′ = 0. Then, the system of equations can be solved iteratively until a maximum 
iteration count is reached or the difference of the calculated positions fall below a 
determined threshold between two successive iterations. 
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As mentioned before, the pseudo ranges include more errors than just the clock bias. 
Therefore, the concept of differential GPS (DGPS, see also [16, pp. 126-128]) is 
established to increase the accuracy and integrity of positioning. For that purpose, a 
reference station with a geodetic surveyed position is used as a reference locator. It 
compares the position that is ascertained on the basis of the signal propagation time 
of the satellites with the known reference position. That results in correction data that 
can be used by a GNSS user to correct its position. The pseudo range 𝑃𝑆𝑅RL,𝑖 between 
a satellite 𝑖 and a reference locator RL can be described as 𝑃𝑆𝑅RL,𝑖 = 𝑅RL,𝑖 + Δ𝑡RL,𝑖 ⋅ c + eRL,𝑖 (5) 
where Δ𝑡RL,𝑖  describes the clock bias and eRL,𝑖  the error of the ground and space 
segment. Thus, the range error Δ𝑅𝑖 is Δ𝑅𝑖 = 𝑃𝑆𝑅RL,𝑖 − 𝑅RL,𝑖= Δ𝑡RL,𝑖 ⋅ c + eRL,𝑖 (6) 
With the assumption that the error Δ𝑅𝑖 is equal for the reference locator and user, the 
calculated correction data can be used by the GNSS user. Therefore, DGPS is more 
accurate in the closer environment of the reference locator. As a result of that 
technique, particularly two significant GNSS augmentation systems are established to 
increase the accuracy of positioning and navigation, namely 
• Satellite Based Augmentation System  (SBAS) 
• Ground Based Augmentation System  (GBAS). 
Both SBAS and GBAS utilize the DGPS 
technique to provide correction data. The main 
difference between them is that the SBAS 
correction data covers a large area, whereas the 
GBAS correction data just covers the area 
around its facility. SBAS uses several reference 
locators distributed over a wide area to measure 
the current influences that affect the GNSS 
functionally. Then, a propagation error model will be calculated on the basis of that 
measurements and broadcasted via satellites as augmentation data. Currently existing 
systems are the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) in the USA, European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay System (EGNOS) in Europe, Multi-functional 
Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS) in Japan and GPS Aided Geo Augmented 
Navigation (GAGAN) in India (see also Figure 2). [16, pp. 127-129] 
Since the SBAS performance is not sufficient for category 3 precision approaches, a 
local area augmentation system is used for that purpose. GBAS uses the same 
concept as SBAS, but in contrast to SBAS, GBAS uses a VHF data link to broadcast 
the augmentation data and the augmented area is smaller (approx. 20 nautical miles). 
With GBAS the positioning in the near of airports can be improved and the required 
accuracy and integrity can be ensured. [16, pp. 129, 130] 





Figure 3: Schematic Representation of GBAS (left) and SBAS (right) 
Source: [2] 
Figure 3 above shows a schematic representation of GBAS and SBAS. The previously 
described differences are shown by that figure too. The left part shows a schematic 
representation of GBAS with its facilities close to an airport and the VHF data link for 
the correction data. Whereas the right part shows that the SBAS facilities are 
distributed throughout a large area and the correction data is provided by a satellite 
broadcast. 
2.2 GLS Approaches using SBAS 
The GLASS project proposes a system that 
converts SBAS correction and integrity data 
into GBAS compatible data, so that a GLS 
equipped aircraft can use them to perform 
Localizer Performance with Vertical guidance 
(LPV) approaches. Figure 4 illustrates the 
desired system concept. A GLASS control 
station is at the ground, receives the SBAS 
data and converts and rebroadcasts it via the 
very-high-frequency (VHF) radio data link to 
the respective airborne system. Due to the 
conversion process, the system availability 
decreases and the time to alert increases slightly. A prototype of that system is tested 
for one week and confirms the technical feasibility. As a result of that test week, a loss 
of 5.3 % system availability could be noticed in comparison to a standalone LPV 
service. Moreover, that system demonstrated the functionality with an Airbus 319 that 
was equipped with a standard GLS receiver. [3, p. 1] 
The use case of GLASS is rooted in the “historical” assignment of the augmentation 
systems to the airport areas. As described in [2], the augmentation systems are 
allocated to specific divisions. The commercial air transport division uses GBAS, 
whereas the general aviation and regional division uses SBAS. That allocation is 
rooted in the GBAS availability at large airports and hubs, whereas small airports 
usually do not have that service. Since the commercial air transport often approaches 
large airports, their aircrafts are equipped with GBAS landing systems. For that reason, 




the aircraft manufacturers believe that it 
is not necessary to retrofit these aircrafts 
with SBAS landing systems. By way of 
contrast, the division of general aviation 
and regional approaches often small and 
regional airports, which normally do not 
provide GBAS. For that reason, they can 
perform SBAS based approaches. To 
resolve the allocation problem for small 
and regional airports, a GLASS facility 
can be an affordable (see Figure 5) alternative to a GBAS facility, because GLASS 
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Figure 6: Block Diagram of GLASS Algorithm 
Source: [3, p. 4] (modified) 
The GLASS system is described in [3] as well as [2] and the following description is 
based on these references with support of [14]. Both the SBAS and the GBAS core 
principles are equal. They provide pseudo range corrections (PRC) for each satellite, 
so that the GNSS user can improve its positioning accuracy and integrity. Moreover, 
Figure 5: Expected Costs Comparism of ILS, GBAS and GLASS 
Source: [2, p. 30] 
21 
 
both systems offer real-time information about the GNSS signal quality for each pseudo 
range.  
The first step of the GLASS algorithm is to receive GNSS and SBAS correction data 
as well as to decode the SBAS message for each satellite 𝑖 to calculate the respective 
pseudo range correction 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖. That can be realized by a standard SBAS receiver that 
is regularly a part of a standard GNSS receiver like the Septentrio AsteRx3, which is 
used in the prototype system. Furthermore, the satellite positions are computed from 
the GNSS ephemeris data. 
Then, the ionospheric delay 𝐼𝐶SBAS,𝑖  will be interpolated from the grid ionosphere 
vertical errors (GIVE) for each satellite from the SBAS message. That errors are 
provided by the SBAS message at predefined grid coordinates that are longitudinal 
and latitudinal from 5° to 10° apart from each other. The first interim result 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′ results 
in 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′ = 𝐼𝐶SBAS,𝑖 (7) 
Thus, that method introduces an error into the PRC as it is calculated for the location 
of the GLASS ground station instead of the aircraft location. By way of contrast, the 
error decreases as the aircraft comes closer to the GLASS ground station. The 
maximum expected error is 1.33 m at a distance of 10 nautical miles, a minimum 
elevation angle and a maximum possible difference between adjacent vertical delays 
at ionospheric grid points. 
Subsequently, the SBAS troposphere delay will be computed. The correction of that 
delay depends on two components, namely a zenith delay and an elevation angle 
mapping function. The zenith delay consists of the zenith dry delay 𝑑hyd(ℎ)  that 
represents the signal delay due to atmospheric gases and on the zenith wet delay 𝑑wet(ℎ) that represents the delay owing to the humidity. Both delays depend on the 
altitude ℎ above the WGS84 ellipsoid. The elevation angle mapping function 𝑚(𝛩𝑖) 
maps the zenith elevation delay regarding the satellite elevation angle 𝛩𝑖  into the 
tropospheric correction 𝑇𝐶SBAS,𝑖(ℎ): 𝑇𝐶SBAS,𝑖(ℎ) = −(𝑑hyd(ℎ) + 𝑑wet(ℎ)) ⋅ 𝑚(𝛩𝑖) (8) 𝑚(𝛩𝑖) = 1.001√(0.002001 + sin2(𝛩𝑖)) (9) 
The GBAS tropospheric correction 𝑇𝐶GBAS,𝑖(ℎ) is calculated according to DO-253D that 
presents the following equation, where Δℎ is the height difference between the aircraft 
and the GBAS reference point, ℎ0 is the tropospheric scale height, 𝑁𝑅 is the refractivity 
index and 𝛩𝑖 is again the elevation angle of the satellite: 𝑇𝐶GBAS,𝑖(Δℎ) = 𝑁𝑅 ⋅ ℎ0 ⋅ 10−6√0.002 + sin2(𝛩𝑖) ⋅ (1 − 𝑒−Δℎℎ0 ) (10) 
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As shown above, the equation (8) with (9) is similar to (10). To achieve an accurate 
approximation of the GBAS signal, the parameters 𝑁 and ℎ0 have to be set so that the 
error 𝑇𝐶err,𝑖(ℎ) of the SBAS correction and the GBAS adjustment are as small as 
possible, as shown by the following equation:  𝑇𝐶err,𝑖(ℎ) = min𝑁𝑅,ℎ0(|𝑇𝐶SBAS,𝑖(ℎ) − 𝑇𝐶SBAS,𝑖(0) + 𝑇𝐶GBAS,𝑖(ℎ)|) (11) 
Due to the different models used in SBAS and GBAS, there is no optimal solution that 
minimizes the error for all elevation angles and aircraft altitudes. Therefore, the 
previous equation (11) was minimized by a grid search algorithm for all possible values 
of 𝑁𝑅 from 16 to 781, ℎ0 from 0 to 25500 m and 𝛩𝑖 from 5° to 90° at an aircraft altitude 
of 4000 ft. The optimal solution for a satellite at zenith is 𝑁𝑅 = 316 and ℎ0 =  8500 and 
is provided in the type two GBAS message. Hence, the second interim result 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′′ 
results in 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′′ = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′ + 𝑇𝐶SBAS,𝑖(ℎ) (12) 
Then, the long-term corrections will be mapped to the line of sight and added to the 
pseudo range correction. Long-term corrections include satellite orbit and clock 
corrections in terms of cartesian orbit coordinates Δ𝒙S,𝑖, their change rate Δ?̇?𝑆,𝑖, the 
long-term correction message reference time 𝑡0 as well as clock polynomial correction 
coefficients 𝛿𝑎𝑓0  and 𝛿𝑎𝑓1 . The clock correction coefficients lead to the following 
equation at time 𝑡: 𝑃𝑅𝐶LTC1,𝑖 = 𝛿𝑎𝑓0 + 𝛿𝑎𝑓1 ⋅ (𝑡 − 𝑡0) (13) 
To rectify the error of the position calculation from the satellite ephemeris data, the 
inner product of the line of sight 𝑟𝑖 from the GNSS user to the satellite as well as the 
orbit and clock correction terms Δ𝒙𝑖, Δ?̇?𝑖 will be added: 𝑃𝑅𝐶LTC2,𝑖 = ?̂?𝑖 ⋅ (Δ𝒙 + Δ?̇?(𝑡 − 𝑡0)) (14) 
Furthermore, the fast correction 𝑃𝑅𝐶FAST,𝑖(𝑡) and the range rate correction 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑡) 
must be considered to complete the calculation of pseudo range correction. Therefore, 
SBAS provides a valid time of applicability 𝑡ofA, so that the fast correction at 𝑡 yield to 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐶,𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐴𝑆𝑇,𝑖(𝑡𝑜𝑓𝐴) + 𝑅𝑅𝐶𝑖(𝑡𝑜𝑓𝐴) ⋅ (𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜𝑓𝐴) (15) 
Eventually, the previous mentioned terms lead to the pseudo range correction: 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖′′ + 𝑃𝑅𝐶LTC1,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶LTC2,𝑖 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝐹𝐶,𝑖 (16) 
Then, the ionospheric variance will be interpolated from the GIVE Indices (GIVEI). The 
ionospheric variance 𝜎Iono,𝑖2  of GBAS is based on the standard deviation of the 
ionospheric gradient 𝜎Iono,VerticalGradient,𝑖  between the user and the GBAS ground 
station. That gradient will be mapped with a slant mapping function 𝐹pp(𝛩𝑖) depending 
on the angle 𝛩𝑖 to the line of sight to the satellite and modified with the velocity 𝑣air of 
the user and its distance 𝑑air to the GBAS ground station: 
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𝜎Iono,𝑖 = 𝐹pp(𝛩𝑖) ⋅ 𝜎Iono,VerticalGradient,𝑖 ⋅ (𝑑air + 2 ⋅ 𝜏 ⋅ 𝑣air) (17) 
By way of contrast, SBAS interpolates the GIVEI uncertainties 𝜎GIVE,𝑖 according to the 
user location and map them to the satellite elevation angle without regarding a distance 
like 𝑑air. Due to that reason, the largest ionospheric error variance 𝜎UIRE,𝑖2  along the 
trajectory in the final approach segment will be used instead of 𝜎Iono,VerticalGradient,𝑖. 
Moreover, the SBAS troposphere variance will be computed. The tropospheric 
variance 𝜎Tropo,SBAS,𝑖 of SBAS is composed of the elevation mapping function 𝑚(𝛩𝑖) 
(9) and the constant modeling uncertainty of 𝑎 = 12 cm: 𝜎Tropo,SBAS,𝑖 = 𝑎 ⋅ 𝑚(𝛩𝑖) (18) 
However, the GBAS troposphere uncertainty is similarly calculated to the troposphere 
correction function in (10) as the refractivity uncertainty 𝜎𝑁 is used Instead of 𝑁𝑅: 𝜎Tropo,GBAS,𝑖 = 𝜎𝑁 ⋅ ℎ0 ⋅ 10−6√0.002 + sin2(𝛩𝑖) ⋅ (1 − 𝑒−Δℎℎ0 ) (19) 
Eventually, 𝜎Tropo,GBAS,𝑖 is replaced with 𝜎Tropo,SBAS,𝑖. 
Subsequently, 𝜎flt,𝑖2  will be calculated. SBAS provides a user differential range error 𝜎UDRE,𝑖 that is used to compute 𝜎flt,𝑖, which represents the residual user differential 
range error relating to the orbit and clock. Given the previous mentioned results, the 
final error 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖 results as 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖2 = 𝜎flt,𝑖2 + 𝜎Tropo,SBAS,𝑖2 + 𝜎UIRE,𝑖2  (20) 
Then, an inflator is used to expand the resulting 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖. As mentioned before, the core 
principles of SBAS and GBAS are similar, but there are slight differences between 
them. Firstly, SBAS calculates a horizontal protection level (HLP) in the direction of the 
largest horizontal error, whereas GBAS calculates the lateral protection level (LPL) in 
the cross-track direction to the final approach path. Secondly, SBAS simply adds the 
vertical error, whereas GBAS adds the projection of the along-track error to the vertical 
protection level (VPL). Therefore, the VPL of GBAS is already larger than the VPL of 
SBAS. However, the LPL of GBAS is usually less or equal to the semimajor axis 
component and needs to be increased. Hence, it is necessary to inflate the 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖 
before broadcasting it to the airborne GBAS receiver as follows: 
1. Eigenvector  
The first inflation component Γ is based on the relation between 𝜎Semimajor that 
results from the eigenvector with the largest eigenvalue of the SBAS HPL, which 
is the semimajor axis and 𝜎Lateral that is a part of the LPL computation of a 
regular GBAS receiver. As 𝜎Semimajor is always greater or equal than 𝜎Lateral, the 
inflation can be realized as follows:  
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Γ = 𝜎Semimajor𝜎Lateral  (21) 
Since the GBAS receiver is not obliged to use every satellite for which it has 
correction data, the maximum Γ of a resulting position of a satellite subset will 
be used. 
2. 𝐾 multipliers  
Secondly, the allocation of the protection levels in SBAS and GBAS requires 𝐾 
multipliers that are corresponding to the integrity risk of the appropriate system. 
To consider these values, the broadcasted sigma is further inflated with 𝐾H𝐾ffmd = 1.028 (22) 
where 𝐾H = 6 is SBAS related and 𝐾ffmd = 5.84 is GBAS related. 
3. Sigma air  
Due to geometric differences in error propagation, the broadcasted uncertainty 
needs to be increased even further. At first, the error propagation 𝜎air,𝑖(𝛩𝑖) of 
both SBAS and GBAS is calculated identically and is maximum 0.57 m at a 
worst-case elevation of 5° . That would be too conservative as the satellite 
elevation difference between an airborne user at a maximum altitude of 10,000 ft and the system on ground level is insignificant since the GPS satellites 
altitude is approx. 22,000 km. But with respect to the conservative approach, 1° 
of the elevation will be subtracted: (Γ − 1) ⋅ σair,𝑖(𝛩𝑖 − 1°) (23) 
Eventually, the inflation of 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖 results in 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖,Brdcast = 1.028 ⋅ Γ ⋅ 𝜎pr,gnd,𝑖 + (Γ − 1) ⋅ σair,𝑖(𝛩𝑖 − 1°) (24) 
Furthermore, some data for the GBAS messages will be fixed. As mentioned before, 
not all GBAS parameters are applicable in GLASS. For instance, the GBAS ground 
receiver count 𝑀 that is set to 𝑀 = 4 and the refractivity uncertainty 𝜎𝑁 as well as the 
ionospheric gradient uncertainty 𝜎Iono,VerticalGradient,𝑖 , which will be set to 𝜎𝑁 =𝜎Iono,VerticalGradient,𝑖 = 0. 
Moreover, an FAS data block must be provided for the message builder. The final 
approach segment (FAS) provides information like lateral and vertical alert limits and 
the runway number. 
Then, the message builder builds the GBAS messages types (MT) 1, 2 and 4. 
Separated into these message types, they contain the previous mentioned information 
among others.  
Finally, these messages will be broadcasted with a conventional VHF data transmitter 




3 Introduction into DO-278A Software Development 
This section covers rationale for using DO-178C related contents in in the scope of a 
DO-278A approval process on the one hand and a description of further standards that 
might be important for the approval process on the other.  
Initially, since DO-178C related contents are used to describe and reason a possible 
software approval concept for GLASS according to DO-278A in section 5, the first two 
subsections 3.1 and 3.2 reason and describe the similarity and differences of DO-278A 
and DO-178C. Due to the similarity of large parts of both standards, it is feasible to use 
DO-178C related contents for developing an approval concept for DO-278A. 
Then, subsection 3.3 provides an overview of the relation between the system and 
software development processes as presented by DO-278A. This information is 
described generically, because a specific standard is not required. However, 
subsection 3.4 names some standards that can be used for this purpose. 
Finally, the last subsection 3.4 outlines further standards such as for the system safety 
assessment and hardware development that should be considered for developing an 
approvable GLASS ground station. Furthermore, there are complementary standards 
for DO-278A that cover special topics as model-based development and software tool 
qualification. Since this thesis focuses on DO-278A, they are not further regarded, and 
the subsection only outlines these standards for providing an overview of several 
additional standards that affect the development.  
3.1 Background of DO-278A 
Due to the rapid increase in the use of software in airborne systems in the 1980s, it 
became necessary to create a standard that provides guidance for satisfying 
airworthiness requirements. Therefore, the DO-178 “Software Considerations in 
Airborne Systems and Equipment Certification” was written to satisfy this need. Its 
scope is to discuss important aspects of software production for airborne systems like 
objectives for software life cycle processes and additional considerations (e.g., 
previously developed software). [4, p. 1] 
Around 1996, a cooperation of EUROCAE Working Groups and RTCA Special 
Committees have been assigned to ascertain the safety significance of software in 
CNS/ATM systems since there was no standard that addresses CNS/ATM systems 
outside an aircraft. Due to that need, the cooperation established a team to develop 
material for these systems based on DO-178B, which was the current version at that 
time. That team reviewed the applicability of DO-178B to CNS/ATM systems and 
decided to develop a new standard, namely DO-278. [4, pp. A-2] 
To understand the intent of DO-278 it is useful to have a look at some principles that 
this document is based on: 
• The guidance to airborne equipment certification should be equal [4, pp. A-2]. 
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• The guidance for CNS/ATM systems should provide the same software integrity 
assurance as claimed in airborne systems [4, pp. A-2]. 
• Differences in regulatory and certification requirements should be considered 
[4, pp. A-2]. 
• The mechanisms of certification and approval should not be changed [4, pp. A-
3]. 
During the preparation of DO-278 the team reviewed the DO-178B and updated its 
guidance to be applicable to CNS/ATM systems. Therefore, consideration was given 
to: 
• The regulatory environments for airborne and non-airborne systems are 
different. Thus, all references to the term “certification” were removed. [18, pp. 
A-3] 
• The operating characteristics and environment of airborne and non-airborne 
systems are different. This is due to the fact that CNS/ATM systems are largely 
scaled, operate continuously and make use of commercial services as 
telecommunication and commercial software. This led to an additional chapter 
to provide guidance for COTS software. [18, pp. A-3] 
• There is no common and accepted definition of failure conditions for non-
airborne systems. [18, pp. A-3] 
As result of the previously mentioned considerations, DO-278 contains six instead of 
five assurance levels in DO-178B. [4, pp. A-3] 
The first version of this standard was published in 2002. In 2004, the RTCA and 
EUROCAE approved the sponsorship of a joint special committee and working group 
to treat several questions about content and application of DO-278. Moreover, since 
hardware and software technology advanced, the software development metho-
dologies were no longer appropriately addressed in DO-278. [4, pp. A-3, A-4] 
As mentioned in [4, pp. A-6], the changes include, among others: 
• Standalone Document  
The DO-278 was designed to use it together with DO-178B, so that both 
documents were often used “side-by-side”. DO-278A is a standalone document 
and can be used without DO-178C.  
• Errors and Inconsistencies  
Known errors and inconsistencies of DO-278 and DO-178B were corrected in 
DO-278A and the errata of DO-178B were addressed too.  
• Supplements 
With reference to technological progress in software development techniques, 
DO-278A recognizes that future techniques can lead to new issues. That is why 
supplements can be used to add guidance to DO-278A for specific techniques.  
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3.2 Comparison of DO-178C and DO-278A 
The community of DO-178C is larger than the community of DO-278A and both 
standards are very similar [6, p. 55]. Therefore, it is useful to consider DO-178C 
specific contents too. With respect to the fact that they are still two different standards, 
the main differences (s. a. [6, p. 61]) are discussed in this section. 
• Title  
The DO-178C is named “Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and 
Equipment Certification“ [18] whereas the DO-278A is named “Software 
Integrity Assurance Considerations for Communication, Navigation, 
Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Systems“ [4]. The 
DO-278A standard is focused on ground-based CNS/ATM software, whereas 
the DO-178C is focused on software in airborne systems, which can directly 
impact aircraft safety [6, p. 56]. 
• Terms  
In addition to the previous point, both standards use different terms to address 
their specific purpose, while large passages are literally identical. 
o Airborne Software vs. CNS/ATM Software  
The DO-178C addresses airborne software components and the 
DO-278A addresses ground-based CNS/ATM software components 
that have an impact on aircraft safety [6, p. 55]. Therefore, the DO-178C 
uses “Airborne Software” and the DO-278A uses “CNS/ATM Software” 
[6, p. 61]. 
o Certification vs. Approval  
Airborne and non-airborne systems are subjected to different regulatory 
environments and therefore, the term “certification” was removed [4, pp. 
A-3]. Instead of the term “certification”, the term “approval” is used [6, p. 
61]. That term is a generic term that refers to certification, 
commissioning, qualification etc. and adds clarification for CNS/ATM 
systems [4, p. 139]. 
• Software Level vs. Assurance Level  
DO-178C uses the term “Software Level” and DO-278A uses the term 
“Assurance Level” [6, p. 61]. One principle of the development of DO-278 was 
that the standard should provide the same level of software integrity for non-
airborne systems as for airborne systems [4, pp. A-2]. All software levels can 
be associated to an assurance level, but there is an additional assurance level 
AL 4, which cannot be associated to a DO-178C software level as it is shown 
by Table 1. 
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DO-178C Software Level DO-178A Assurance Level 
A AL 1 
B AL 2 
C AL 3 
No Equivalent AL 4 
D AL 5 
E AL 6 
Table 1: Relation of DO-278A Assurance Levels with DO-178C Software Levels 
Source: [4, p. 14] 
• Different Sections  
The second section of DO-178C and DO-278A differs slightly because the 
safety assessment process is not linked identically for ground-based CNS/ATM 
and airborne aircraft systems. Moreover, the service experience section in 
DO-178C differs slightly from the product service history section in DO-278A. 
[6, p. 61] 
• Additional Sections 
DO-278A contains a chapter about commercial off-the-shelf software and short 
sections about security, adaptability post-development life cycle and cutover, 
which are not present in DO-178C. [6, p. 61] 
3.3 Relation of System and Software Development 
To understand the software approval process, it is necessary to understand the relation 
between the system life cycle and the software life cycle. The system life cycle 
processes are not part of DO-278A but can be found in other industry standards3. Thus, 
seven system aspects are related to software development and are described below. 
[4, p. 7] 
• System Requirements Allocation to Software  
The system requirements are developed from the system operational 
requirements and further considerations like reliability and performance 
requirements. The software-related requirements are developed from these and 
can include function, interface, performance, security, maintenance as well as 
approval- and safety-related requirements. [4, pp. 7, 8] 
• Information Flow between System, Software, and Hardware Life Cycle 
Processes 
As shown in Figure 7, there are three information flows related to the Software 
Life Cycle Processes. There is an information flow that passes software system 
requirements, system safety objectives, assurance levels, system description, 
hardware definitions, design constraints etc. flow from the system life cycle 
processes to the software life cycle processes. In addition, there is an inverse 
 
3 For instance, SAE ARP 4754A and SAE ARP 4761 are such standards. 
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information flow from the software to the system life processes that passes data 
like derived requirements, a description of the software architecture or problem 
and change documentation. Finally, the information flow between software and 
hardware life cycle processes exchanges data like identified incompatibilities 
and derived requirements such as timing constraints and addressing schemes. 
[4, pp. 8-11]  



































Figure 7: Information Flow between System, Hardware and Software Life Cycles 
Source: [4, p. 9] 
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• System Safety Assessment Process and Assurance Level  
The assurance level of a software component is determined by the system 
safety assessment process and based on the impact of an error to the failure 
conditions and its severity. The software can be partitioned to assign a separate 
assurance level for each component. [4, p. 11]  
These assurance levels are shown by Table 2 below. 
Failure 
Category 




• Multiple Fatalities 
• Loss of aircraft 
AL 1 
Hazardous 
• Large reduction of safety margins/functional 
capabilities 
• Higher workload: the crew cannot perform 
tasks accurately/completely 




• Significant reduction of safety 
margins/functional capabilities 
• Significant workload: the crew cannot 
perform tasks accurately/completely 
• Physical distress to passengers/cabin crew 
AL 3 
- • Not associated with a failure condition AL 4 
Minor 
• Slight reduction of safety margins/functional 
capabilities 
• Slight increase of crew workload 





• Slight reduction of safety margins/functional 
capabilities 
• Slight increase of crew workload 
• Physical discomfort to passengers/cabin 
crew 
AL 6 
Table 2: Relation of Failure Categories and Assurance Level with Examples 
Source: [4, pp. 13-14] 
• Architectural Considerations  
It is possible to limit the impact of failures by using several architectural 
strategies like partitioning, multiple-version dissimilar software or safety 
monitoring. Partitioning is a technique to separate software components from 
other components to isolate faults. This can be realized by allocating unique 
hardware per software component or making partitioning provisions to run 
multiple software components on the same hardware. If this technique is used, 
there are some constraints like each component must not be allowed to effect 
data storage areas of other components. Moreover, a multiple-version dissimilar 
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software approach can be used to generate several components providing the 
same function, but with different functional principles. That should avoid sources 
of common errors. Additionally, a safety monitor can be implemented to protect 
against specific failures. [4, pp. 15-17] 
• Additional System Considerations  
Additional considerations compromise requirements in system communication, 
security, adaptability, cutover/hot swapping, and post-development life cycle. [4, 
pp. 17, 18] 
• Software Considerations in System Life Cycle Processes  
Some software-related issues should be considered during the system life cycle 
processes, namely adaptation data items, user-modifiable software, COTS 
software, option-selectable software, field-loadable software, and software 
considerations in system verification. Adaption data items are data sets that 
have an influence on the software behavior but are not a part of the executable 
object code. That are configuration tables which can activate or deactivate 
software components or databases that provide computational data. User-
modifiable software is software that can be modified by the user without an 
approval authority review, for instance a software component that provides 
maintenance functionality. COTS software is software like operating systems or 
real-time kernels and must satisfy the same level of confidence as software for 
ATM/CNS systems. Option-selectable software are software components that 
can be activated or deactivated using software-programmed options instead of 
connecting hardware connector pins. Field-loadable software is software that 
can be loaded onto the system without removing it from its installation. [4, pp. 
18-21, 98, 36] 
• System Considerations in Software Life Cycle Processes  
It can be possible that DO-278A objectives can be satisfied due to system 
processes. If that is the case, it must be proven that the system process is able 
to meet these objectives. [4, p. 22] 
3.4 Relation to other Standards 
Software development is regularly not a self-contained activity that is independent from 
other constraints, for instance a compiler tool chain is often necessary to use the 
developed software. Moreover, the used tool chain depends on the purposed 
processor that is selected for the intended system. Therefore, it is necessary to 
consider the software in the scope of the intended application. However, depending on 
the intended application and its context, several other standards must be satisfied too. 
For example, hardware development standards, software tool qualification standards 
and a system safety assessment. Since DO-278A is a standard that will be used in 
aviation, an aviation related system safety assessment is normally done to obtain 
system related software requirements as the software assurance level. 
DO-178C and DO-278A can be called “core documents” since they are intended to be 
as technology-independent as possible and other documents, like technology specific 
supplements, are built upon them. In the scope of these standards, there are five 
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documents that are closely related. At first, there are three technology supplements 
that extend the core documents, namely DO-331 for model-based development, DO-
332 for object-oriented technologies and DO-333 for formal methods. Second, there is 
DO-330 for tool qualification if development related tools must be qualified. Finally, 
there is DO-248C for frequently asked questions and discussion papers. [6, pp. 54, 55] 
3.4.1 System Safety Assessment 
As remarked in [4, pp. 7, 11], the system safety assessment process is a part of the 
system life cycle, which can be found in other industry documents, and not a part of 
DO-278A. Typical standards for the safety assessment process are the SAE 
ARP4754A “Guidelines for Development of Civil Aircraft and Systems” and SAE 
ARP4761 “Guidelines and Methods for Conducting the Safety Assessment Process on 
Civil Airborne Systems and Equipment” [6, pp. 13, 33]. For example, to gain the type 
approval for a GBAS ground station in Germany it is possible to use SAE ARP4761 
[19]. This section outlines the system safety process of SAE ARP4761 by reference to 
its examples. 
The system safety assessment process of SAE ARP4761 is a qualitative one and can 
be a quantitative process that includes the generation and verification of requirements 
[9, p. 12]. That standard considers processes and analysis methods as shown below 
[9, pp. 1, 2]. 
• Safety Assessment Process 
o Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 
o Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA) 
o System Safety Assessment (SSA) 
• Safety Assessment Analysis Methods 
o Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
o Dependence Diagram (DD) 
o Markov Analysis (MA) 
o Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
o Failure Modes and Effects Summary (FMES) 
o Common Cause Analysis (CCA)  
▪ Zonal Safety Analysis (ZSA) 
▪ Particular Risks Analysis (PRA) 
▪ Common Mode Analysis (CMA) 
This process begins with the FHA that identifies and classifies failure conditions 
associated with single or combined functions. Its objective is to identify every failure 
condition with rationale for its classification and to establish corresponding safety 
objectives. Then, the PSSA examines the proposed system architecture to determine 
how failures can cause the functional hazards identified by the FHA and establishes 
safety requirements to meet the safety objectives that are identified by the FHA. For 
that purpose, the PSSA usually consists of an FTA, DD, or MA, and should include an 
CCA. Finally, when the system is implemented, the SSA evaluates if the safety 
objectives and requirements of the FHA and PSSA are met. The SSA is based on the 
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methods that are used in the PSSA and verifies that all significant effects are 
considered. [9, pp. 12, 15] 
The FHA, PSSA with an FTA and the SSA are outlined below according to the 
ARP4761 example of the wheel braking capability of an aircraft. That standard requires 
further assessments on aircraft and subsystem level, but they are similar to the system 
level assessments. Therefore, they are disregarded in the outline below. 
The wheel brake system does not only decelerate the wheels on the ground, but also 
provides the capability of differential braking for directional control or prevent the 
aircraft from moving when it is parked. Moreover, the deceleration of the wheels on the 
ground can be activated manually or automatically. The example FHA examines the 
deceleration function of the wheels on the ground as shown in the first column of Table 
3. Therefore, several functional failure conditions for that function can be determined 
like the total loss of the wheel braking capability, inadvertent wheel brake applications 
or an asymmetrical loss of the wheel braking capability. The former two failure 
conditions are listed in the second column and are subdivided again. Furthermore, the 
third column lists the different phases where the failure can occur. Possible phases are 
taxi, takeoff to rotation, landing roll and rejected takeoff (RTO). The fourth column 
shows the effect of the failure condition on the aircraft, crew, and occupants. In 
addition, in the fifth and sixth column these effects are classified with reference to the 
aircraft, crew and occupants. Finally, the last column lists references to requirements 
and analysis for the verification of safety objectives. [9, pp. 184-185] 
The purpose of the PSSA is to complete the safety requirements and derive safety 
requirements to be considered in the design of lower-level items. In the scope of this 
example the assessment is performed in the concept and preliminary design phases 
of the wheel braking system. [9, p. 190]
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Function Failure Condition 
(Hazard 
Description) 
Phase Effect of Failure Condition on 
Aircraft/Crew 









Total loss of 
wheel braking 
 
a) Unannunciated Landing or 
RTO 
Crew detects the failure when the 
brakes are operated. The crew uses 
spoilers and thrust reversers to 
maximum extent. This may result in a 
runway overrun. 
Hazardous  S18 Aircraft 
FTA 
b) Annunciated  Landing Crew selects a more suitable airport, 
notifies emergency ground support, 
and prepares occupants for landing 
overrun. Crew uses spoilers and thrust 
reversers to maximum extent. 
Hazardous Crew 
procedures for 












The crew stops the aircraft on the 
runway. 
Minor  S18 Aircraft 
FTA 




Potential burst of all tires and loss of 
braking efficiency. 
Hazardous  S18 Aircraft 
FTA 
c) With all wheels 




Crew cannot takeoff or safely RTO 
resulting in a highspeed overrun. 
Catastrophic  S18 Aircraft 
FTA 
Table 3: Wheel Brake System FHA 




Safety Requirement Design Decisions Remarks 
Loss of all wheel braking 
(unannunciated or 
annunciated) during landing 
or RTO shall be less than  5 ⋅ 10−7 per flight. 
More than one hydraulic 
system required to achieve 
the objective (service 
experience). Dual channel 
BSCU and multimode 
brake operations. 




this requirement. See 
PSSA FTA below. 
Inadvertent wheel braking 
with all wheels locked during 
takeoff roll before V1 shall be 
less than 5 ⋅ 10−7 per flight. 
None Requirement 4 is 
more stringent and 
hence drives the 
design. 
Inadvertent wheel braking of 
all wheels during takeoff roll 
after V1 shall be less than 5 ⋅ 10−9 per flight. 
No single failure shall 
result in this condition. 
None 
Table 4: Aircraft Wheel Brake System PSSA 
Source: [9, p. 194] 
Table 4 shows a snippet of the wheel brake system safety requirements and the design 
decisions to comply with them. These requirements are derived from the aircraft and 
system FHAs and common cause analysis [9, p. 193]. Since that design decisions lead 
to a redundant wheel braking system, additional derived safety requirements are 
established to consider common mode failures like failures of the electrical system [9, 
p. 194]. 
The FTA below (see Figure 8) is developed from the first safety requirement of the 
PSSA above and examines the unannunciated loss of all wheel braking during landing 
or RTO. That risk shall be less than 5 ⋅ 10−7 per flight. The FTA can be replaced with 
equal analysis methods like DD, MA, or others [9, p. 19]. 
As shown by Figure 8, the allowed risk of 5 ⋅ 10−7  of the failure condition 
“Unannunciated Loss of All Wheel Braking” is subdivided into two failure conditions, 
namely the case of “Loss of Annunciation Capability” with a risk of 1 and the case “Loss 
of All Wheel Braking” with a risk of 5 ⋅ 10−7. Only the combination of both failures leads 
to that failure. Therefore, both conditions are coupled with an AND gate to the main 
condition. In this example the condition “Loss of Annunciation Capability” is an external 
event that happens to the system. Thus, that event is marked with a house symbol and 
the probability of 1. The “Normal Brake System Does Not Operate” case is coupled 
with an OR gate to the next lower conditions, meaning it is sufficient that one of the 
lower conditions like “Loss of Green Hydraulic Supply” happens. That condition is 
marked with a rhombus indicating that this condition is not developed further, for 
instance because of necessary details for further development that are not readily 
available. The probabilities of the AND and OR conjunctions can be calculated with 
regard to their dependence or independence. More information about FTA symbols 
and probabilities are provided in [9, pp. 50-103]. 
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3.3 ⋅ 10−5 PROB: 3.3 ⋅ 10−5 
Budgeted Prob. 
1 ⋅ 10−4 
Budgeted probability per 
flight is operational goal. 
5 ⋅ 10−7 
Requirement is 
per 5 hour flight 
PROB: 5 ⋅ 10−3 
Budgeted Prob. 
PROB: 1 
No Credit Taken 
PROB: 1 
No Credit Taken 
Unannunciated Loss of All 
Wheel Braking
Loss of Annunciation 
Capability
Loss of All Wheel Braking
Normal Brake System Does 
Not Operate
Alternate Brake System Does 
Not Operate
Emergency Brake System 
Does Not Operate
Loss of Green Hydraulic 
Supply
Loss of Normal Brake System 
Hydraulic Components
Loss of BSCU Ability to 
Command Braking
BSCU Failure








5 ⋅ 10−7 
Requirement is 
per 5 hour flight 
PROB: 3.3 ⋅ 10−5 
Budgeted Prob. 
PROB: 3.3 ⋅ 10−5 
RATE:  5.5 ⋅ 10−6/h 
EXPO:  5 h 
Budgeted FA 
PROB: 1 ⋅ 10−7 
Historical Data 
 
Figure 8: Wheel Brake System FTA (PSSA) 
Source: [9, p. 199] 
The common cause analysis (CCA) supplements the output of the FTA to emphasize 
the top failure effects at the next lower system level. Moreover, the CCA results in 
further design requirements, development assurance level and reliability requirements. 
That analysis is subdivided into three analysis types, namely zonal safety analysis 
(ZSA), particular risks analysis and common mode analysis (CMA). The ZSA ensures 
that the equipment meets the safety requirements with regard to the installation, 
intersystem interferences and maintenance errors. Particular risks are events or 
influences that are outside the system and could violate failure independence claims. 
Typical particular risks are fire, bird strike or tread separation from tires. The CMA 
examines the independence of the ANDed events of FTA, DD and MA. Typical 
common mode faults are among others hard- and software errors, production and 
repair flaws or common external source faults. [9, pp. 19, 27, 28] 
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The following Table 3 shows a part of the wheel brake system common mode errors 
in relation to their source and category as well as their justification. 
Common Mode 
Source 






Common point in the 
electrical supply leading 
to a complete loss of 
power for control and 
monitoring of the 
Normal and Alternate 
brake. 
Normal system equipment (e.g., 
BSCU, servo valve) is electrically 
supplied by Main Bus 1 and 2. 
Alternate system equipment (e.g., 
metering valve is electrically supplied 








equipment installed in 
both systems. 
Same manufacturer for servo valves 
(normal/alternate) and components. 









the Normal and the 
Alternate brake system 
operation. 
Normal and Alternate brake systems 
are protected against lightning 
effects. 
Equipment is qualified to sustain 
runway pollution. 
Table 5: Wheel Brake System CMA 
Source: [9, pp. 328-331] 
After the system PSSA is completed, it provides documentation as well as input for the 
lower level PSSAs and the SSA. The documentation includes information from the 
PSSA like an updated FHA, a failure condition list and lower-level safety requirements 
including assurance levels. Moreover, since a system can consist of several 
subsystems, the system PSSA provide safety requirements, budgeting probabilities 
etc. as input for the lower level PSSAs. Finally, the PSSA outputs are the SSA inputs, 
with the result that for each PSSA there exists a corresponding SSA. [9, p. 45] 
Eventually, the SSA is a systematic and comprehensive evaluation that the 
implemented system meets the qualitative and quantitative safety requirements of the 
FHA and the PSSA. The activities of the SSA are very similar to the PSSA, but they 
regard the implemented architecture instead of the purposed architecture. [9, p. 21] 
As shown by Figure 8 and 9, the FTA of the SSA is very similar to the PSSA FTA and 
shows the actual failure rates instead auf the budgeted failure rates. Moreover, the 
failure condition “Loss of all Wheel Braking” is subdivided into the “Loss of all Wheel 
Braking Due to Normal, Alternate & Emergency System Faults” and the “Loss of Blue 
and Green Hydraulic Systems Due to Tire Burst” that refers to a PRA, which is part of 
the CCA. Furthermore, some rhombuses are changed to circles. The circle is a basic 
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event that is internal to the system and requires no further development. Whereas the 
triangle points to another FTA for that event. 
PROB: 1.05 ⋅ 10−4 
RATE:  2.1 ⋅ 10−5/h 
EXPO:  5h 
PROB: 1.2 ⋅ 10−4 
RATE:  2.4 ⋅ 10−5/h 
EXPO:  5h 
PROB: 1.3⋅ 10−8 1.5 ⋅ 10−6 
1.52 ⋅ 10−6 
2.27 ⋅ 10−4 PROB: 7.32⋅ 10−2 PROB: 1.8⋅ 10−3 
PROB: 2.2 ⋅ 10−9 2.98 ⋅ 10−9 
3.2 ⋅ 10−8 
Probability is per 
5 hour flight. 
Loss of All Wheel Braking
Loss of Blue and Green 
Hydraulic Systems Due to Tire 
Burst (See PRA)
Loss of Wheel Braking Due to 
Normal, Alternate & 
Emergency System Faults
Normal Brake System Does 
Not Operate
Alternate Brake System Does 
Not Operate
Emergency Brake System 
Does Not Operate
Loss of Green Hydraulic 
Supply
Loss of Normal Brake System 
Hydraulic Components
Loss of BSCU Ability to 
Command Braking
BSCU Fault Causes Loss of 
Braking Commands
Loss of Aircraft Electrical 







Page 2  
Figure 9: Wheel Brake System FTA (SSA) 




3.4.2 Hardware Development 
As mentioned in [4, p. 69], the approval authority does not approve software as an 
independent component. Thus, the authority considers the software as a part of a 
system. This is even more clearly described in [8, p. 37]: “The FAA doesn’t certify 
software, they certify systems”. Therefore, it is useful to have a brief look at hardware 
development. Since there is no standard for non-airborne ATM-CNS hardware, it could 
be possible to use DO-254 with some adaptions by analogy to ED-114B [13, p. 23]. To 
gain an insight into this topic, the selection process for the hardware design assurance 
strategy is shown in Figure 10. The numbers of the listed items below can be found in 
that figure. That process should be used for each hardware function [20, p. 17]. 
1. Begin Assessment Process  
2. Determine FFP Design Assurance Level  
The design assurance level should be determined with common safety 
assessment techniques. Thus, the functional failure paths (FFP) are examined 
and documented with that level for each hardware item. 
3. Is the Hardware Implementation of the FFP simple or complex?  
For FFPs that are determined to be developed according to design assurance 
level A or B it should be determined, if the FFP is simple4 or complex5. 
4. Develop Design Assurance Strategy for Level A or Level B Complex FFPs  
If the FFP is complex, the usage of additional strategies and advanced analysis, 
product service experience or architectural mitigation should be considered. 
5. Is the Strategy Adequate?  
If the design assurance strategies are deficient, the strategy must be modified 
to correct these deficiencies. If the strategy is acceptable, the design assurance 
strategy has to be documented and should address certification authority 
participation aspects like schedule milestones and program reviews. 
6. Document the Applicable Fail-Safe Aspects  
As an appropriate fail-safe design architecture is determined, an analysis of the 
availability and integrity requirements should confirm the system requirements. 
That design aspects and its common mode and probability analysis etc. should 
be documented. 
7. Document the Design Assurance Approach and Strategy  
The design assurance approach, strategy and its approval of the certification 
authority should be documented in the certification plan. 
8. Approach Implementation  
 
4  Simple hardware is defined in [15, pp. C-7] as “A hardware item is considered simple if a 
comprehensive combination of deterministic tests and analysis can ensure correct functional 
performance under all foreseeable operating conditions with no anomalous behavior.”. 




















Assurance Strategy for 











































Figure 10: Decision Process for Hardware Design Assurance Strategy Selection 
Source: [20, p. 18] 
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3.4.3 Supporting Information (DO-248C) 
The supporting information document provides frequently asked questions (FAQs), 
discussion papers (DPs), and rationale for both the industry and authorities. Each of 
these topics is covered by a separate section. They do not provide additional guidance, 
but clarification to the guidance of the core documents. The FAQ section provides short 
and concise answers to frequently asked questions that can be answered in up to two 
pages. If a question needs more than a short answer, that topic is covered in the 
discussion paper section. The rationale section provides background information to 
support the understanding of DO-178C and DO-278A. [21, p. 1] 
As described in [21, p. 2], it is recommended to use DO-248C by the following ways: 
• Keyword  
Appendix C provides an index of keywords that are linked to sections that use 
that word. That references can be accessed by a hyperlink. 
• Reference  
Appendix D provides a mapping between the sections of DO-178C and 
DO-278A to the relevant FAQs and DPs. That references can be accessed by 
a hyperlink. 
3.4.4 Software Tool Qualification (DO-330) 
Software tools are widely used in the context of software development. Typical tools 
are compilers, code or documentation generators, test, and modification management 
tools. These tools can improve system safety, but also can have a negative impact on 
system safety if the tool is erroneous. Thus, these tools should be qualified to ensure 
the functional correctness and to avoid risks. [22, pp. 1, 5] 
As mentioned in [4, p. 88] a “Qualification of a tool is needed when processes of this 
document are eliminated, reduced, or automated by the use of a software tool without 
its output being verified as specified in section 6.”. Due to the wide range of this 
requirement, there are three criteria and five tool qualification levels established to 
regard the potential safety impact of the software tool.  
Criteria 1: Tools that affect the resulting software directly [4, p. 89].  
Examples: Code or configuration file generators, compilers, linkers and 
requirements management, design and modeling tools [6, p. 320]. 
Criteria 2: Tools that automate verification processes and could fail to detect an error. 
Its output is used to justify the elimination or reduction of verification or 
development processes. [4, p. 89]  
Example: Static code analyzers that replace source code review 
(verification step) and reduces design mechanisms like overflow detection 
(development step) [6, p. 322]. 
Criteria 3: Tools that can fail to detect an error in its intended use [4, p. 89].  
Examples: Test case generators, structural coverage tools and static code 





1 2 3 
AL 1 TQL-1 TQL-4 TQL-5 
AL 2 TQL-2 TQL-4 TQL-5 
AL 3 TQL-3 TQL-5 TQL-5 
AL 4 TQL-4 TQL-5 TQL-5 
AL 5 TQL-4 TQL-5 TQL-5 
Table 6: Relation of Assurance Levels (AL) and Tool Qualification Levels (TQL) 
Source: [4, p. 89] 
3.4.5 Supplements (DO-331, DO-332, DO-333) 
As mentioned earlier, the core documents are as technology independent as possible 
and can be extended with three technology specific supplements. Moreover, the 
structure of them is very similar to the structure of the core documents DO-178C and 
DO-278A. Therefore, the supplements can be used as “side-by-side” documents as 
they provide additional guidance to the corresponding section. This section outlines 
the supplements concisely to provide an overview.  
Potential Benefit Description 
V life cycle to Y life 
cycle 
The development complexity could be reduced by focusing on 
the system requirements and using automation techniques for 
implementation. 
More focus on 
requirements 
Erroneous requirements often cause software related 
problems. The later an error is detected, the more expensive 
its correction will be. Modelled requirements could provide a 
clearer view than a textual description. Moreover, (qualified) 
code generators can allow the development team to focus on 
requirements instead of implementation details. 
Earlier verification 
If qualified code generators are used, the development is 
more focused on the model instead of the code. By using 
model simulation and automatic test case generation, the 
verification of requirements and error detection can be 
realized earlier. 
Table 7: Potential Benefits of Model-based Development 
Source: [6, pp. 345-347] 
At first, there is DO-331 for model-based development. As mentioned in [23, p. 82], a 
model is “An abstract representation of a given set of aspects of a system that is used 
for analysis, verification, simulation, code generation, or any combination thereof. A 
model should be unambiguous, regardless of its level of abstraction.” The main reason 
for using model-based development is to reduce the development time, cost, and 
potential human errors as the complexity of the life cycle will be reduced due to the 
use of models and (qualified) code generators [6, p. 345]. Model-based development 
differs from conventional software development and presents several potential 
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advantages as outlined in Table 7 above. To use that technique, the related 
supplement addresses several topics that must be considered to approve software that 
meets the DO-278A standard. The following list outlines some of these topics as 
described in [6, pp. 353-355]. 
• Model Planning  
In addition to the regular software planning, it must be explained how the models 
fit into the software life cycle. Therefore, the model standards and the relation 
between the models and the software life cycle data should be explained as well 
as the intended verification approach. 
• Model Standards  
There must be standards that describe the modeling technique, constraints, and 
instructions for each type of model that is used. 
• Model Element Libraries  
Each library element that will be used must be developed under the appropriate 
assurance level according to DO-178C or DO-278A. That includes plans, 
standards, requirements, design, code, verification etc. as regular safety-critical 
software.  
• Model Simulation  
Models can be verified with simulation cases and procedures. Therefore, the 
cases and procedures must be verified for correctness and the results must be 
reviewed. 
Secondly, there is the DO-332 supplement for object-oriented technology and related 
techniques. That document characterizes OOT as “a paradigm for system analysis, 
design, modeling, and programming centered on objects.” [24, p. 3]. OOT is a well-
known software development technique that is used in many systems including safety-
critical systems. Since that technique has advantages like reusability and a strong tool 
support, it can be desirable to use it in aviation [6, p. 360]. In order to use this technique, 
the related supplement addresses several topics and aspects that must be regarded 
in the context of a DO-278A approval. The following list outlines some of these topics 
as described in [6, pp. 363-365]. 
• Vulnerabilities  
DO-332 Annex OO.D discuses two vulnerabilities categories of systems that 
use OOT or related techniques, namely key features, and general issues. The 
key features topic includes inheritance, polymorphism, overloading, type 
conversation, exception management, dynamic memory management and 
virtualization. Additionally, the topic of general issues includes traceability, 
structural coverage, component usage and resource analysis as they can be 
more complicated in OOT and related techniques. 
• Planning  
The supplement adds additional considerations to the software planning 
process such as the above-mentioned vulnerabilities and the reuse of existing 
software components.  
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• Development  
The supplement adds OOT-specific guidance to the development process. That 
includes guidance in class hierarchy, type consistency, memory management 
etc. 
• Verification  
The verification procedure must additionally consider the local type consistency 
and the consistency of class hierarchy with requirements as well as the 
consistency of memory management and exception management with the 
architecture and requirements. 
Finally, there is the DO-333 supplement for formal methods. That document defines 
formal methods as “Descriptive notations and analytical methods used to construct, 
develop, and reason about mathematical models of system behavior. A formal method 
is a formal analysis carried out on a formal model.” [25, p. 58]. As a result of that 
definition, the application of a formal method is comprised of two activities, namely 
modeling and analysis. Hence, both terms are further defined. A formal model is “an 
abstract representation of a given set of aspects of a system that is used for analysis, 
simulation, code generation, or any combination thereof.” [25, p. 58]. Additionally, the 
model is described in a mathematical form [25, p. 58]. A formal analysis is “The use of 
mathematical reasoning to guarantee that properties are always satisfied by a formal 
model.” [25, p. 58]. In consequence, formal methods can improve the software 
development process as they can guarantee the software complies with the 
requirements [6, p. 372]. For that reason, DO-333 mainly affects the following 
processes as described in [6, pp. 376-379]. 
• Planning and Development  
The planning and development processes are basically unchanged but DO-333 
provides model-specific clarification. 
• Verification  
Since formal analysis can prove the correctness of formal models, the 





4 Assurance Level Determination 
This thesis proposes a concept for approving the GLASS software according to DO-
278A. As mentioned earlier, the software approval process is associated with the 
system approval process. However, the system development is not in the scope of this 
thesis, but there are requirements that depend on the system development process. 
For that reason, chapter 3.3 discussed several topics that should be considered to 
cope with the system-software relation. Since the final system concept is not complete 
at present, there is neither a system safety assessment nor a complete system 
description available. For that reason, some assumptions about the system must be 
made like the software assurance level that determines the extent of work to create 
DO-278A compliant software. The extent of work is represented as objectives that must 
be satisfied for DO-278A compliance. As shown in Table 8, the more rigorous the 
assurance level, the more objectives must be satisfied and the extent of work 
increases. 
Assurance level AL 1 AL 2 AL 3 AL 4 AL 5 AL 6 
Number of objectives 71 69 62 41 26 0 
Table 8: Number of Objectives for DO-278A by Assurance Level 
Since there is no reliable allocation of assurance levels to system components, it is 
necessary to use an alternative method to determine an assurance level that can be 
used. Therefore, several analogies are made to infer an assurance level. That is 
acceptable because the focus of this thesis is the software approval procedure of DO-
278A in the context of the GLASS project. Furthermore, due to missing integrity and 
continuity assignments to system or software components, it is assumed that the 
software is responsible for both. 
To substantiate the conclusion, the following four different analogies will be made. 
• GBAS Ground Station Approval Process  
Since GLASS is an entirely new technique to generate GBAS signals, there is 
no particular approval process available to approve a GLASS ground station. 
Due to the fact that a GLASS ground station should provide the same data as a 
GBAS ground station, it can be assumed that the approval procedure of both 
will be similar. Accordingly, the assurance level of GLASS will be similar too. 
• ICAO Annex 10 and EASA Certification Specification 25  
The tenth Annex to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of the ICAO 
has defined maximum integrity risks for various approach types and the EASA 
has linked classifications of failure conditions with a qualitative and quantitative 
probabilities respective integrity risks. DO-278A uses classifications of failure 
conditions to indicate software assurance levels. Since ED-114 uses this 
document chain (see [12, pp. 25, 27]) to determine assurance levels for GBAS 
ground stations and GLASS should provide a similar service, the assurance 
level for GLASS can be determined this way too. 
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• SBAS Equipment Standard  
Since GLASS calculates the augmentation data from SBAS and should provide 
the capability to support LPV approaches, the assurance level will be similar to 
SBAS standards that support LPV approaches too.  
• Similar Products  
Due to the fact that SBAS and GBAS are established augmentation systems, 
there are already products available that provide a similar service or are used 
in the causal chain of their service. Given that the entire chain must satisfy the 
safety requirements, the assurance level for GLASS will be similar to other 
similar products in the causal chain. 
The chosen assurance level shall satisfy two characteristics. On the one hand it is 
appropriate that the chosen level is as low as possible to reduce the resulting amount 
of work, whereas on the other hand it is essential that the level is as high as necessary 
to accomplish the approval requirements.  
4.1 GBAS Ground Station Approval Process 
This section provides a short overview of how a GBAS ground station can be approved 
in Germany to make a deduction to a GLASS ground station. As mentioned earlier, the 
German law stipulates in §4 of the Air Traffic Control Equipment and Device Type 
Approval Regulation6 that requirements concerning devices for air navigation services 
are published in an official journal called News for Aviators7 [5]. In 2008, this official 
journal published the Notification concerning the Requirements for Type-Certification 
of GBAS Ground Facilities as Aeronautical Radionavigation Stations8, which refers to 
several other standards that apply as acceptable means of compliance to this 
regulation [19]. The following standards mentioned in [19] are the most important with 
regard to this thesis: 
• SAE ARP4761 to meet safety requirements of ICAO Annex 10, Volume 1. 
• EUROCAE ED-1099 to meet software assurance. 
• EUROCAE ED-114 to meet environmental requirements of ICAO Annex 10, 
Volume 1 and to use its verification procedures and tests. 
The ED-114B10  does not only provide the stipulated environmental requirements, 
verification procedures and tests of GBAS ground equipment, but also a section about 
general design requirements that include safety requirements. This section is not 
referenced by the notification but delivers information about the safety assessment 
methodology in accordance with ARP 4754 and ARP 4761. However, ARP 4761 is 
 
6 In German: Flugsicherungs-Anlagen- und Geräte-Musterzulassungs-Verordnung (FSMusterzulV) 
7 In German: Nachrichten für Luftfahrer 
8 In German: Bekanntmachung über die Anforderungen zur Musterzulassung von GBAS-Bodenanlagen 
als Flugnavigationsfunkstelle 
9 Also known as RTCA DO-278 
10 ED-114B is the latest version of ED-114. 
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referenced by the notification as mentioned before and generally follows 11  three 
different steps [13, p. 21]: 
• Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA)  
The FHA examines system and item functions to ascertain their impact on 
integrity and continuity requirements. Its outputs are overall system safety 
objectives like the system risk level. [13, p. 21] 
• Preliminary System Safety Assessment (PSSA)  
The PSSA derives specific safety requirements to system components from the 
safety objectives ascertained from the FHA. Those requirements also include 
the design assurance levels for the various system components. [13, pp. 21, 22] 
• System Safety Assessment (SSA)  
The SSA verifies that the implemented system meets the safety objectives and 
requirements of the FHA and SSA. [13, p. 22] 
Tools to perform the previously mentioned assessments are the Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
Common Cause Analysis (CCA) [13, p. 22]. 
Moreover, the ED-114B provides guidance on hardware and software assurance. 
Primarily, it is noticed that there is no RTCA/EUROCAE standard, which offers 
development guidelines for hardware contained in non-airborne ATM/CNS systems. 
Therefore, DO-254 shall be adapted and used for the hardware development. An 
example for an adaption is that this standard assumes that a certification authority is 
available, but this is not the case for ATM/CNS systems. [13, p. 23] 
Additionally, ED-114B determines ED-109A/DO-278A as standard to provide guidance 
on software development and makes a relationship between integrity or continuity 
violations of a FAST C or D12 ground station and assurance levels [13, pp. 24, 25]. As 
FAST A and B are not covered by ED-114B [13, p. 11], only the relations of FAST C 
and D are shown in Table 9 below.  
Violation FAST Type Failure Classification Assurance Level 
Integrity 
FAST C Hazardous AL 2 
FAST D Catastrophic AL 1 
Continuity 
FAST C 
Minor AL 5 
FAST D 
Table 9: Failure Classifications and Assurance Levels of FAST C/D 
Source: [13, pp. 24, 25] 
 
11 That means that this is the minimum requirement to perform the safety assessment process.  
12 FAST C denotes a subsystem that supports GAST C and FAST D denotes a subsystem that supports 
GAST D [13, p. 11]  
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As shown by Table 9, the lowest accepted assurance level covered by ED-114B is AL 
2 for integrity violations and AL 5 for continuity violations. Regarding the assumption 
that software will be responsible for both, the chosen assurance level is AL 2. 
4.2 ICAO Annex 10 and EASA Certification Specification 25 
The previous version of ED-114B, ED-114A, provides a short explanation of how the 
assurance level was established. At first, the section about hardware and software 
segmentation of the chapter about system design assurance references the tenth 
annex of ICAO GNSS Standards and Recommended Practices13  (SARPs) to allocate 
an integrity risk. To relate that risk with a failure classification, the ED-114A refers to 
EASA CS 25 AMC 1309 which provides the connection between failure classifications 
and acceptable risks. That failure classifications are used to determine the assurance 
level for the software development in DO-278A. [12, pp. 25-27] 
That document chain is explained in this section with regard to a GLASS ground 
station. As mentioned before, the ICAO GNSS SARPs offer various integrity risk 
requirements for different approach types, as it is shown in Table 10. GLASS provides 
capability for LPV approaches, that are APV-I approaches. Therefore, the acceptable 
integrity risk is 2 ⋅ 10−7 per approach. 
Approach Type Integrity Risk Integrity Risk Type 
Non-precision approach 1 ⋅ 10−7 per hour 
Signal-in-Space 
Approach operations with 
vertical guidance (APV-I) 2 ⋅ 10−7 per approach 
Category 1 
GAST A/B/C/D 1,5 ⋅ 10−7 per approach Ground Subsystem 
Signal-in-Space 
GAST D 1 ⋅ 10−9 per approach GBAS Ground Subsystem 
Table 10: Integrity Risks for different Approach Types 
Source: [26, pp. 3-72, APP B-122] 
Then, the EASA CS 25 AMC 1309 provides the relation of the failure classification and 
the acceptable risk probability as shown in Table 11 below. At this point, it is to note 
that there is an inconsistency in this document chain. The ED-114A references the 
integrity risk for Category I approaches of the ICAO GNSS SARPs in [12, pp. 25, 27] 
without base units, but in [12, p. 201] it is clarified that “per approach” (s. a. Table 10) 
is meant. By way of contrast, the referenced AMC 1309 use the base unit “per flight 
hour” and this is not consistent to “per approach”. Additionally, there is no clarification 
or guidance in this topic, but the usage of these references implies that both base units 
can be used equally. With respect to the previous explained inconsistency, the integrity 
risk of 2 ⋅ 10−7 per approach is classified as a major failure.  
 













Minor Probable < 10−3 per flight hour 
Major Remote < 10−5 per flight hour 
Hazardous Extremely Remote < 10−7 per flight hour 
Catastrophic Extremely Improbable < 10−9 per flight hour 
Table 11: Classification of Failure Condition and its Allowable Probability 
Source: [27, pp. 2-F-49, 2-F-50] 
Finally, DO-278A provides a relation between the classification of failure conditions 
and the required assurance level for that classification as shown by Table 12. To meet 
the requirements of major failures, the assurance level AL 3 must be satisfied. 
However, ED-114A requires the software development under AL 2 for Category 1 
GBAS ground stations because the integrity risk of 2 ⋅ 10−7 per approach is very close 
to the most rigorous end of the acceptable risk [12, p. 27]. 
Assurance Level AL 1 AL 2 AL 3 AL 4 AL 5 AL 6 
Classification of 
Failure Condition 
Catastrophic Hazardous Major - Minor 
No safety 
effect 
Table 12: DO-278A Assurance Level and its referenced Failure Classifications 
Source: [4, p. 14] 
In summary, this section has shown the document chain how to infer the assurance 
level from the integrity risk of annex 10. Subsequently, if that document chain is 
applicable to a GLASS ground station, its software must be developed at least to AL3. 
Since ED-114A explicitly mentioned that its software must be developed under the 
more rigorous assurance level 2, it is recommended to apply this to GLASS too.  
4.3 SBAS Equipment Standard 
Due to the fact that a GLASS ground station is based on SBAS correction data and 
should perform LPV approaches like it is possible with conventional SBAS equipment, 
the software assurance level can be determined analogously to that SBAS equipment 
standards. There are two important standards for SBAS equipment, namely RTCA DO-
229E and EUROCAE ED-259. It is to notice that ED-259 references several sections 
of DO-229E [28].  
The DO-229E provides minimum operational performance standards for single 
frequency airborne navigation equipment that uses SBAS augmented GPS and is 
intended to be applicable to SBAS provided by WAAS or EGNOS [15, p. 1]. ED-259 
delivers the minimum operational performance standards for dual-frequency 
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GPS/SBAS airborne equipment and is intended to support prototyping activities on 




Probability of Misleading Information 
Software 
Design Assurance Level 
En Route 
10−5 per flight hour C Terminal 
LNAV 
LNAV/VNAV 
LP 10−7/150 s  B 
LPV 
Table 13: Safety Requirements of DO-229E for Hardware and Software 
Source: [15, pp. 43, 48, 54, 63] 
DO-229E offers guidance for development assurance organized to the navigation 
modes in the chapter “General Requirements” to obtain hardware and software 
compliance. This standard references DO-254 and DO-178B/C to show that the 
hardware and software comply with airworthiness requirements. Therefore, the safety 
requirements of Table 13 above has to be satisfied with the exception that the software 
requirement can be substantiated alternatively in the safety assessment. [15, pp. 25-
63] 
Navigation Mode 












Table 14: Safety Requirements of ED-259 for Hardware and Software 
Source: [28, pp. 14, 15], [18, p. 14] 
In contrast to the segmentation of navigation modes in DO-229E, ED-259 provides 
only one short section about design assurance and link classification of failure 
conditions resulting in misleading information with navigation modes as shown in Table 
 
14 DO-178C does not know the classification “Severe-Major”, but its previous version DO-178B knows 
“Hazardous/Severe-Major” and relates it to assurance level B. 
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14. Since this standard references DO-178C as AMC for software, the major 
classification is related to DAL C and the hazardous classification is related to DAL B 
[18, p. 14]. 
In conclusion, the software of SBAS airborne equipment, that can perform LPV 
approaches, has to be certified at least to software level B. Due to the relation of 
software level in DO-178C with assurance level in DO-278A (s. a. [4, p. 14]) and the 
analogy from SBAS equipment to a GLASS ground station, that station has to be 
approved at least to AL 2. 
4.4 Similar Products 
This section provides a selection of available products in the context of navigation and 
landing support for pilots. Since GLASS provides approach and GNSS augmentation 
data, the software assurance level will be similar to products that provide this service 
too or are in the causal chain of providing or processing this data. 
Firstly, there is the SmartPath SLS-4000 GBAS from Honeywell, which is certified to 
Category I precision landing and Category 2 is currently in development. Moreover, 
that ground station can broadcast 48 unique approaches at an airport and is developed 
to DO-278 level B15 standard. [29] 
Secondly, CMC Electronics provides several airborne receivers that process SBAS 
and GBAS data to provide navigation or landing data and control panels for them. A 
selection of these products is listed below.  
• IntegriFlight™ - CMA-6024 GPS/SBAS/GBAS Receiver System  
The CMA-6024 receiver system combines Automatic Dependent Surveillance – 
Broadcast (ADS-B) and RNP navigation as well as SBAS LPV/LP and GBAS 
Category I precision approach guidance for aircrafts. This receiver is certified to 
software level A of DO-178C. [30] 
• IntegriFlight™ - CMA-5024 Aviation SBAS Receiver  
The CMA-5024 is a SBAS receiver which provides ADS-B compliance and 
SBAS approach capability for aircrafts. That receiver is certified to software level 
B of DO-178B. [31] 
• IntegriFlight™ – CMA-5025 Satellite Landing System Control Panel  
The CMA-5025 is an optional control panel for the CMA-5024 SBAS receiver 
and it is not allowed to connect this control panel with other avionics systems. 
This control panel is certified to software level C of DO-178B. [32] 
Additionally, there are the Global Landing Units GLU-9xx from Rockwell Collins that 
are based on an ARINC Characteristic 755 Multi-Mode Receiver. These units provide 
GNSS navigation data and path guidance for final approach and landing. The flight 
path guidance data can be provided by ILS, MLS, GLS, FLS or combined ILS-FLS. 
 
15 It is to remark that the referenced document uses the term “Level B”. That is not correct in the context 
of DO-278. But the assurance level 2 of DO-278 is associated and equivalent to software level B of DO-
178B [40, p. 4], so that the term “Level B” indicates assurance level 2. 
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That unit is certified to DO-178 software level A and B as shown in the table below. 
[33, pp. 10, 164] 
Function Hazard Classification DO-178B Software Level 
Precision Approach  
ILS Critical A 
MLS Critical A 
GLS CAT 1 Hazardous B 
Non-Precision Approach  
FLS, ILS-FLS Hazardous B 
Table 15: Hazard Classification of GPU-9xx from Rockwell Collin 
Source: [33, p. 164] 
In summary, the previously mentioned systems are certified/approved to software 
level C/assurance level 3 or greater. By excluding the optional control panel from this 
comparison, the minimum level increases to software level B/assurance level 2. Since 
GLASS is most similar to the systems except the optional control panel, it should be 
developed according to assurance level 2. 
4.5 Summary and Result 
In summary, this chapter shows four analogies to infer as probable as possible an 
assurance level. An overview of that analogies and their minimum required assurance 
levels are listed in Table 16. As shown by that table, three out of four analogies lead 
to assurance level 2 and only one to assurance level 3. However, the analogy that 
requires the software development under assurance level 3 recommend developing 
the software under the more rigorous level 2. In view of these considerations, 
assurance level 2 is the most suitable assurance level for developing the GLASS 
software.  
Analogy Minimum Required 
GBAS Ground Station Approval Process AL 2 
ICAO Annex 10 and EASA Certification Specification 25 AL 3 
 SBAS Equipment Standard AL 2 
Similar Products AL 2 
Table 16: Overview of the required Assurance Levels by Analogy 
This conclusion by analogy determines the assurance level by assuming that the 
software is responsible for both integrity and continuity. However, it can be possible to 
use a less rigorous assurance level for the software development if the integrity 
responsibility can be ensured otherwise. For instance, the analogy of the GBAS ground 
station approval process mentions the possibility of allocating different assurance 
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levels for integrity or continuity related components. During the project, the project 
partner f.u.n.k.e. AVIONICS, who is responsible for the system development, suggests 
allocating the responsibility of integrity to a hardware component and developing the 
GLASS software under the assurance level 3. For that reason, the approval concept 
for GLASS will be developed according to assurance level 3. Further information about 




5 Software Approval Concept for GLASS 
To describe an approval concept that is as accurate as possible, DO-178B/C-related 
contents like [6] and [8] as well as DO-278A itself are used to create this chapter. The 
usage of DO-178C contents is acceptable as the airborne-related DO-178C standard 
is almost equivalent to DO-278A as mentioned in chapter 3.2. Therefore, it is possible 
to base the approval concept on the traditional “five-plans-and-three-standards 
suggestion” that is mentioned in [6, p. 74]. However, it is possible to use an agile 
software development process if the DO-278A objectives are addressed adequately, 
but this can lead to challenges with the approval authority [6, p. 74]. 
Since this is the first approval process according to such a standard as DO-278A for 
the department of the German Aerospace Center that is supervising this thesis, the 
missing experience is compensated by referring to literature as well as communicating 
with the project partner and checking the concept against a former project 
documentation that already passed the approval. Moreover, [7] provides a free 
accessible template set that contains several tables of content for the documents that 
must be created. That reference is also used to crosscheck the concept. 
As shown in Figure 11, the approval concept is structured in previous system 
processes, software planning, software realization, and software verification phases. 
Before the software will be developed, there are previous processes that are performed 
on system level, e.g., selection of hardware and the like. When these processes are 
finished, the software can be planned, and the plans can appropriately consider the 
specific hardware characteristics as interrupts and interfaces. If the software is 
planned, the Plan of Software Aspects of Approval (PSAA) is submitted to the approval 
authority and, if authorized, the software realization processes can be started. Finally, 
during the software verification phase the main part of software verification will be 
performed.  
Generally, the verification process is an ongoing process that already starts in the 
planning phase because it is recommended to review the plans prior to submitting them 
to the authority. Further, the realization phase includes several reviews to verify their 
activities. Even if it is possible to do the review in the verification phase, it is reasonable 
to review the realization activities after they are finished. This is similar to the software 
configuration management (SCM) as it also continues during all activities until the 
retirement of the software because the SCM activities include archiving all 
development data. In order to provide a clear structure in the approval concept as well 
as in Figure 11, the structure of the concept is aligned to the main parts of the activities 










































Figure 11: Block Diagram of Approval Procedure 
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The first two boxes of Figure 11 are grayed because the conception or proof of concept 
phase and the system development are not a part of the software approval, but they 
are preprocesses to the software development. Nevertheless, the software 
development is connected to the system development processes and therefore the 
system description/approval aspects box shows that relation. Since the PSAA is the 
first document that must be submitted to the approval authority, the first activities of 
the approval procedure are aligned to complete that document first. For that reason, it 
is appropriate to begin with the parts of DO-278A that are referenced, included, or 
summarized in the PSAA as shown by Figure 11. Then, the PSAA can be written based 
on the previously created documents and submitted to the approval authority. After 
that, the remaining plans that are not directly relevant to the approval process can be 
created. That could be, e.g., an internal test equipment scheduling plan. If all plans are 
written, the development activities of requirements, design, and code can be performed 
including the respective review. Eventually, the main part of the verification process 
can be conducted to test the resulting software product and verify that activity. Then 
the Software Accomplishment Summary (SAS) can be written, based on the 
implemented system and its data outputs, and submitted to the approval authority. If 
the software is approved by the authority the software can be taken into operation.  
To provide a good overview of how and where the objectives of DO-278A according to 
assurance level 3 are satisfied, the concept provides two reference sources. At first, 
all objectives of DO-278A that are required for the GLASS software are listed in the 
appendix from page 138 onwards with a reference to DO-278A and to the section of 
the approval concept that met the objective or is significant to meet it. Secondly, each 
section provides at its end an overview of objectives that are satisfied or participate at 
satisfying that objective. In addition to that references, Table 17 below provides a first 
overview of the data items that will be created during the approval concept. Not each 
data item leads to a standalone document because it is possible to combine several 
data items in a document. 
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Plan for Software Aspects of Approval PSAA 11.1 1 See 5.8 
Software Development Plan SDP 11.2 2 See 5.4 
Software Verification Plan SVP 11.3 2 See 5.5 
Software Configuration Management Plan SCMP 11.4 2 See 5.2 
Software Quality Assurance Plan SQAP 11.5 2 See 5.7 
Software Requirements Standards SRS 11.6 2 See 5.4.1 
Software Design Standards SDS 11.7 2 See 5.4.2 
Software Code Standards SCS 11.8 2 See 5.4.3 
Software Requirements Data SRD 11.9 1 See 5.11 
Design Description DD 11.10 1 See 5.12 
Source Code SC 11.11 1 See 5.13 
Executable Object Code EOC 11.12 1 See 5.13 
Software Verification Cases and 
Procedures 
SVCP 11.13 2 See 5.14 
Software Verification Results SVR 11.14 2 See 5.14 
Software Life Cycle Environment 
Configuration Index 
SECI 11.15 1 See 5.3 
Software Configuration Index SCI 11.16 1 See 5.3 
Problem Reports PR 11.17 2 See 5.3 
Software Configuration Management 
Records 
SCMR 11.18 2 See 5.3 
Software Quality Assurance Records SQAR 11.19 2 See 5.7 
Software Accomplishment Summary SAS 11.20 1 See 5.15 




Adaptation Data Item File ADIF 11.22 1 See 5.13 
Table 17: Data Items Overview 
5.1 System Description/Approval Aspects 
At the beginning of the software approval procedure, other processes on system level 
were already performed (e.g., system safety assessment) that provide high-level 
system descriptions, proposed system functions that are allocated to the software and 
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the like. Since there already exists documents contain relevant data, it is useful to 
collect and reuse them in the PSAA. This can include use case diagrams, timing 
diagrams, communication/collaboration diagrams, sequence diagrams, activity 
diagrams, state machines etc. The extent of diagrams and descriptions should 
increase according to the system complexity and its safety impact. An example of a 
use case diagram (Figure 4), the preliminary system architecture (Figure 13) and the 
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Figure 12: GLASS Use Case Diagram 
Generally, the use case diagram provides an overview of the desired system or 
software functionality depending on the abstraction level. It shows what the system 
does and is created according to the Unified Modeling Language (UML) 2 standard. 
Due to the fact that UML is a well-known modeling standard in software or software-
related system development, it is a proper method to describe the system. See [34] for 
further information about UML. Anyway, the use case diagram needs to be described 
further, since it describes what the system does but not how the system does it. For 
that purpose, other diagram types like state machines and sequence diagrams can be 
































Figure 13: Preliminary System Architecture with Assurance Level Assignment 
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Figure 13 is a non-standardized system architecture concept diagram with assurance 
level assignments, which was created by the project partner during the first approval 
considerations of GLASS. This diagram is acceptable for preliminary considerations 
but should standardized for a software or system approval. Moreover, an accurate 
description of each box is needed. As mentioned in section 4, the recommended 
assurance level is AL2. But due to the preliminary system architecture concept that 
outsource the integrity responsibility to an FPGA, a less rigorous assurance level can 
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Figure 14: Microcontroller-related Hardware Architecture 
Figure 14 shows a generic high-level microcontroller hardware architecture related to 
the µC box of the GLASS system architecture in Figure 13. The required diagram for 
the approval process can be an output of the hardware development process or 
created during that process, but the shown abstraction level corresponds 
approximately to an appropriate level for the software approval process. Finally, if there 
are further standards that might be considered, they should be determined before 
creating the PSAA and to consider them in the further development process. 
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5.2 Software Configuration Management Plan 
The Software Configuration Management (SCM) process begins in the planning phase 
and continues during the development phase and ends with the phase-out of the 
software [6, p. 86]. Therefore, the SCM plan describes the methods that should be 
used to satisfy the objectives of the software configuration management [4, p. 74]. 
DO-278A defines several objectives, which are summarized in Table 44, to be satisfied 
for the SCM process. For this purpose, the SCM plan should include guidance for the 
following activities as described in [4, pp. 56-61, 74-75] and [6, pp. 86-88]: 
• Configuration Identification  
Each data item that will be created during the software life cycle should be 
uniquely identified. This includes all data that is related in any manner to the 
software processes, e.g., plans, source code, test files etc. They must be 
registered according to the SCM before they are used in any other software 
process. 
• Baselines and Traceability  
Baselines should be established for data items that are used for obtaining the 
approval. Further baselines can be optionally established for supporting the 
software lifecycle activities. The SCM plan describes how they will be identified, 
established, and traced. 
• Problem Reporting  
The SCM plan should provide a problem report (PR) process to report life cycle 
processes that are not compliant to the respective plans, abnormal software 
behavior, and deficiencies of software life cycle data. For this purpose, a PR 
should include the affected data items, a problem description, a proposed 
solution and, the current PR status (e.g., open, in work, closed etc.). The SCM 
plan should describe how a PR can be initiated, verified, and closed. If a PR 
leads to a correction of a data item, the change activity should involve the 
change control.  
• Change Control  
The purpose of change control is that changes of data items will be approved 
before they are performed as well as traced and recorded when they are 
performed, including each change can be uniquely identified. 
• Change Review  
The change review ensures that changes are approved, planned, performed, 
verified, and closed. For this purpose, the impact of the proposed change will 
be assessed, the involved data items are identified, and a feedback procedure 
is established. A review board can be used for monitoring that process. 
• Configuration Status Accounting  
The SCM plan describes the contents for project status reports. This includes 
data item identification, problem reports, change history, baselines, and the 
release status. 
• Archival, Release, and Retrieval  
The SCM plan should describe how data items will be archived, which data 
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items will be released and how the long-term retrieval ability including media 
compatibility will be ensured. That includes, among others, preventing the data 
from unauthorized changes, storing duplicates to minimize the risk of loss, 
verifying that duplicates are faultless etc. 
• Software Load Control  
A method that describes how the machine code will be correctly loaded into the 
target computer that should be included. 
• Software Life Cycle Environment Control  
It must be defined how the software life cycle environment will be controlled. 
The used tools are defined during the planning process and will be listed in the 
Software Life Cycle Environment Configuration Index (SECI). This ensures that 
all team members use the defined environment and the reproducibility of the 
software life cycle processes.  
• Software Life Cycle Data Control  
The SCM plan should define all data items that must be created and assign their 
control category. These control categories define the extent of SCM activities. 
DO-278A defines Control Category 1 (CC1) and Control Category 2 (CC2). CC2 is the 
less rigorous control category and defines the minimum required SCM activities, 
whereas CC1 is the more rigorous category that extends CC2 with additional activities 
as shown in Table 18 and 19 below. An overview of the relation between control 
categories and data items is provided in Table 17 and between the control categories 
and the approval objectives of DO-278A for GLASS is provided in the appendix. 
SCM Process Activity Reference to DO-278A 
Control Category 2 
Configuration Identification 7.2.1 
Traceability 7.2.2.f – g 
Change Control - integrity and identification 7.2.4.a – b 
Retrieval 7.2.7.a 
Protection against Unauthorized Changes 7.2.7.b.1 
Data Retention 7.2.7.e 
Table 18: Overview of DO-278A Control Category 2 
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SCM Process Activity Reference to DO-278A 
Control Category 1 
Baselines 7.2.2.a – e 
Problem Reporting 7.2.3 
Change Control – tracking 7.2.4.c – e 
Change Review 7.2.5 
Configuration Status Accounting 7.2.6 
Media Selection, Refreshing, Duplication 
7.2.7.b.2 – 4 
7.2.7.c 
Release 7.2.7.d 
Table 19: Overview of DO-278A Control Category 1 
Besides the activities, the SCM should describe the starting criteria for the SCM 
process, its environment including tools, methods, standards, procedures, 
responsibilities, and interfaces, as well as the data that is produced during the SCM 
process. Finally, it should be described how it will be ensured that suppliers, which are 
involved in the software life cycle activities, apply the SCM activities. [4, pp. 74-75] 




What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software configuration management plan of the GLASS 
project. Therefore, this document provides guidance for conducting the software 
configuration management process. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SCM  Software Configuration Management. 
SCMR Software Configuration Management Records. 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SCM plan? 
The following external documents are referenced. 





The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[12] [xx.yy.xyz_PSAA]   Plan for Software Aspects of Approval 
[…] 
2 SCM Environment 
2.1 Organizational Responsibilities  
Who is responsible for the SCM processes? 
The GLASS project manager, Mr/s. [name], is responsible for the correct conduction 
of the SCM processes. He/she records these processes and releases the SCM tasks 
to the respective responsible developers. Therefore, … 
2.2 Tools and Methods 
Which tools and methods are used to perform the SCM activities? 
2.2.1 Version Control System 
For ensuring that all project related data items can be tracked, Subversion (SVN) will 
be used. SVN is a program that …  
2.2.2  Issue Tracking System 
To enable an appropriate problem report system, the issue tracking tool BugZilla will 
be used. This is a program that … 
2.2.3 Docker 
For ensuring that all developers use the same development environment including IDE, 
compiler, test environment, editors etc., each computer is equipped with Docker. This 
tool provides all required software for developing the GLASS software. Furthermore, 
… 
3 SCM Activities 
3.1 Transition Criteria 
The SCM process starts when the SCM plan is released. This is the first activity of the 
software planning process. First activities are to setup the used tools (Docker, SVN, 
BugZilla, …) and to create the basic folder structure in the version control system. 
Moreover, … 
3.2 Configuration Identification 
To ensure that each data item is unambiguously identifiable, each item must use the 
project identification number as prefix for the file name. Further, … 
3.3 Baselines and Traceability 
3.4 Problem Reporting 
3.5 Corrective Actions 
[…] 
4 Supplier Control 
How will be ensured that the SCM activities will be applied to suppliers involved? 
5 SCM Data 
Which SCM data will be produced? 





       1.  Change log of all files in SVN. 
       2. List of problem reports in BugZilla. 
[…] 
Figure 15: Example SCM Plan Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
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sequencing, feedback mechanisms, and transition 









Additional considerations are addressed. 4.1.d 
Table 20: Corresponding Objectives to SCM Plan 
5.3 Software Configuration Management Process 
The first activity of the approval concept is to establish the SCM process because it 
enables basic activities that must be performed during the project. For instance, it is 
useful to provide a problem report process for the planning phase to report and remedy 
inconsistencies between the plans. Moreover, owing to the need of basic tools like 
word processing programs to write the plans, it is appropriate to define these tools 
before they will be used to write the plans. For this purpose, the Software Life Cycle 
Environment Configuration Index (SECI), Software Configuration Index (SCI), and 
SCM Records (SCMR) should be created or initialized.  
The SECI document describes the software configuration identification of the project. 
It is possible to integrate this data item into the SCI [4, p. 80]. As mentioned in [4, pp. 
79-80] and [6, p. 257], this should include the following: 
• Hardware and operating system of the development environment. 
• Tools that are used in the development process. 
• Tools that are used to verify and test the software. 
• Tools that are used in the SCM and Software Quality Assurance (SQA) process. 
• Tools that must be qualified including their documentation.  
Given these points, the SECI document can have the structure as suggested in 






What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software life cycle configuration identification of the 
GLASS project. For this purpose, this document describes in detail which software is 
used during the project. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SCM  Software Configuration Management. 
SECI  Software Life Cycle Environment Configuration Index. 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SECI document? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A   Software Integrity Assurance …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SCMP]   Software Configuration Management Plan 
[…] 
2 Software Life Cycle Environment 
Which hardware and operating systems are used to run the tools?  
2.1 Hardware 
All programs that are used in this project run on Dell Workstations with the following 
specification: 
[specification of hardware] 
2.2 Operating System 
Microsoft Windows 10 build [build number] will be used to run the programs. That 
operating system …  
3 Software Tools  
3.1 Software Planning Tools  
Which tools will be used to write the plans? 
3.1.1 Microsoft Word 2019 
Microsoft Word 2019 will be used to write the software plans. This program … 
3.1.2 Internal Checklist Set for Software Approval according to DO-278A 
The internal checklist set [name] will be used to provide guidance for creating the 
software plans and project specific standards. This template set … 
3.2 Software Development Tools  




DOORS [version of DOORS] will be used to ascertain the requirements. Therefore, the 
following plugins are used: [plugin list] 
[…] 
3.2.2 Eclipse 2020-12 
Eclipse 2020-12 will be used to write the source code. For this purpose, the eclipse 
build [build version] will be used with [plugin list]. 
[…] 
3.2.3 Safety Compiler 
To generate the object code, the compiler [safety compiler] from [manufacturer] will be 
used with the options as described below: 
• [Optimizing flags] 
[…] 
3.3 Software Verification and Test Tools  
Which tools will be used to verify and test the software? 
3.3.1 VectorCAST  
VectorCAST [build version] with the DO-278A software verification tool set will be used 
to satisfy the DO-278A objectives. This software ... 
Figure 16: Example SECI Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
The SCI document describes the configuration identification of the software product. 
As mentioned in [4, p. 80] and [6, pp. 257-258], this description should contain the 
following information: 
• The identification of the software product (part number) including the software 
life cycle data, source code, executable object code, and adaption data item 
files if they are used. 
• Previously developed software if the project contains it. 
• Instructions to build the executable object code (compiling and linking) and to 
load the object code into the target. 
• Integrity check procedures for the object code if it is used. 
• Instructions and tools for using user-modifiable software if it is used. 
• A reference to the SLCI. 
• Archive and release media. 
Given these points, the SCI document can have the structure as suggested in 
Figure 17 below. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software configuration of the GLASS software. For this 
purpose, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 




What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SCM  Software Configuration Management. 
SCI  Software Configuration Index. 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of this document? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A   Software Integrity Assurance …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SCMP]   Software Configuration Management Plan 
[…] 
2 Software Product 
3 Source Code 
4 Executable Object Code 
5 Software Life Cycle Environment Configuration Index 
[…] 
Figure 17: Example SCI Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
The SCMR document describes outputs of the SCM process. As mentioned in [4, p. 
81] and [6, p. 258], this can include baselines, change history reports, records of 
archives, releases and libraries, and status accounting reports. This data depends on 
the SCM data that is listed in the SCM plan. Given these points, the SCMR document 
can have the structure as suggested in Figure 18 below. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains all data that is created during the SCM process as mentioned 
in SCM plan. Therefore, … 
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SCM  Software Configuration Management. 
SCMR Software Configuration Management Records. 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of this document? 
The following external documents are referenced. 




The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SCMP]   Software Configuration Management Plan 
[…] 
2 Baselines 
3 Change History Reports 
4 Archive and Release Records 
[…] 
Figure 18: Example SCMR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
In addition to the data items that should be directly created or initialized, the PRs are 
a part of the SCM process, but they will be created only when they are needed. 
DO-278A proposes to include contents as mentioned in the respective SCM plan 
chapter. Since issue tracking systems are often used for problem reporting, they 
provide input masks that are querying the necessary data and generate the problem 
report. However, to provide an example, a PR can have the structure like Figure 18 
below. 
PROBLEM REPORT NO.: [number] 
Problem Report  
Program:  _______________________ 
Program Version: _______________________ 
Reporter:  _______________________ 
Date:   _______________________ 
Report Type:   Coding Error  Design Error  Requirement Error 
    Documentation  Hardware   … 
Severity:   Minor   Serios   Fatal 
Problem summary: ___________________________________________________ 
Problem description and how to reproduce it: ______________________________ 
Suggested fix (optional): ______________________________________________ 
Development Team Section 
Responsible Developer: ___________________ 
Comments:   ______________________________________________ 
Involved data items: ______________________________________________ 
Status:   Open  In Work  Closed 
Priority:   High  Medium  Low 
Resolution:   Pending  Fixed  Irreproducible  Not a problem 
    …  
Resolved by:   ___________________  Date: ______ 
Verified by:   ___________________  Date: ______ 
Figure 19: Example PR Outline 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 










Configuration items are identified. 7.1.a 
Table 44 
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Baselines and traceability are established. 7.1.b 
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No. 3 
Problem reporting, change control, change review, 





Archive, retrieval, and release are established. 7.1.g 
Table 44 
No. 5 
Software load control is established. 7.1.h 
Table 44 
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Table 21: Corresponding Objectives to SCM Process 
5.4 Software Development Plan 
If the system-related information is collected, plans relating to the software 
development can be created. As mentioned in [6, p. 81], the goal of the Software 
Development Plan (SDP) is to provide guidance for developers who will write the 
requirements, design, and code. Therefore, the SDP offers developing standards for 
requirements, design and code, a software life cycle model, and a description of the 
software development environment. It is possible to integrate the SDP in the plan of 
software aspects of approval (PSAA) [4, p. 73]. This is useful to reduce redundancy 
and avoid inconsistencies between the documents as the PSAA requires otherwise a 
summary of the SDP. 
Firstly, there are standards for ascertaining software requirements, establishing 
software design, and writing code. These standards are regularly just referenced and 
not included although this is possible. For instance, this can be useful for very small 
software projects. The intent of these standards is to provide guidelines for project 
specific activities. Given that, it is not possible to reference an arbitrary industry 
standard like an IEEE or a companywide standard, because they do not consider 
project specific needs as the software assurance level. However, it is possible to use 
them as an input for developing the project specific standards. [6, pp. 81, 90, 91] 
Secondly, the applied software life cycle needs to be explained to provide a clear 
project management structure for the developers. In addition, the entry and exit criteria 
for each phase must be described too. [6, p. 82] 
Finally, the software development environment needs to be described. This includes 
all tools that are used within the scope of the project, for instance, requirements, design 
and code development tools as well as the used tool chain (compiler, linker etc.) for 
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generating the object code. The focus of the description is to explain how to use the 
development environment in the scope of the project. To reduce the redundancy 
further, it is possible to reference the Software Life Cycle Environment Configuration 
Index (SECI) instead. [6, pp. 82, 83] 
Since it is possible to separate the software standards in stand-alone documents, it is 
suggested to reference them in the SDP. Moreover, as the software standards are 
separated, the SDP is short enough to include it in the PSAA. For that reason, the 
suggested SDP outline in Figure 20 is shown as a part of the PSAA in Figure 32. Given 
these points, the SDP can have structure as suggested in Figure 20 below. 
5 Software Development Plan 
5.1 Software Development Standards 
5.1.1 Software Requirements Standards 
This section only provides a reference to the corresponding document. See 5.4.1. 
The Software Requirements Standards describe in detail how the requirements will be 
determined. Its purpose is that …  
5.1.2 Software Design Standards 
This section only provides a reference to the corresponding document. See 5.4.2. 
The Software Design Standards describe in detail how to design the software. Its 
purpose is that …  
5.1.3 Software Code Standards 
This section only provides a reference to the corresponding document. See 5.4.3. 
The Software Code Standards describe in detail how the code will be written. Its 
purpose is that …  
5.2 Software Life Cycle 
This section includes the software life cycle. See 5.4.4. 
5.3 Software Development Environment 
This section only provides an outline of the software development environment and 
reference the SECI for a detailed description. See 5.4.5. 
Figure 20: Example SDP Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 
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Additional considerations are addressed. 4.1.d 
Table 22: Corresponding Objectives to SDP Outline 
5.4.1 Software Requirements Standards 
Software Requirements Standards (SRS) are project specific standards of the SDP 
and define methods, rules, and tools that must be used to develop the high-level 
requirements [4, p. 76]. As mentioned in [6, p. 91], the purpose of the requirements 
standards is to provide guidance to the developers who ascertain the requirements. 
Therefore, the SRS describes how to write effective and implementable requirements, 
handle derived requirements, perform traceability, and create requirements that meet 
the respective safety criteria as well as the usage of the requirements management 
tool.  
Furthermore, the standard DO-278A distinguishes the following four requirement 
types: 
Software requirement  “A description of what is to be produced by the software 
given the inputs and constraints.” [4, p. 147] 
High-level requirements  "Software requirements developed from analysis of system 
requirements, safety-related requirements, and system 
architecture.” [4, p. 143] 
Low-level requirements “Software requirements developed from high-level 
requirements, derived requirements, and design 
constraints from which Source Code can be directly 
implemented without further information.” [4, p. 144] 
Derived requirements  “Requirements produced by the software development 
processes which (a) are not directly traceable to higher 
level requirements, and/or (b) specify behavior beyond that 
specified by the system requirements or the higher level 
software requirements.” [4, p. 142] 
Concerning these definitions, the SRS focuses on the high-level requirements, 
whereas the low-level requirements are developed from the software design. The 
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standard DO-278A recommended four topics in [4, p. 76] that should be covered in the 
SRS. The SRS should describe the used methods for developing software 
requirements and notations that can be used to document requirements as flow 
diagrams. Furthermore, if tools are used for supporting the requirements development, 
its constraints should be described. Finally, if derived requirements are developed, a 
method should be provided to offer them to the system processes. In addition, to write 
a proper SRS, [6, p. 92] suggests including the following aspects in the SRS, among 
others. 
• Approval objectives of DO-278A, Table A-3 to proactively address them. 
• Definitions and examples of high-level, low-level, and derived requirements. 
• Traceability approach and instructions. 
• Instructions, constraints, and limitations of the requirements management tool. 
• Quality attributes and characteristics of requirements. 
• Criteria to  
o identify requirements, 
o develop robust requirements, 
o handle tolerances, 
o distinguish requirements from explanatory content. 
• Examples of applied rules and guidelines. 
Furthermore, [6, pp. 109-122] provides a procedure for writing proper High-Level 
Requirements (HLRs). Since this procedure provides several aspects that can be 
captured the SRS, this procedure is explained below. 
1. Methodology  
There are many different approaches to document and ascertain requirements. 
These approaches range from text-only to all-graphic methods with CAD support. 
For that reason, one approach must be determined and explained. Commonly used 
are approaches that combine both textual and graphical elements. The description 
of the determined method should address the relation between textual and 
graphical representations. For example, several diagrams can be used to 
document requirements, like use case, flow chart or sequence diagrams and an 
additional description to specify its meaning. 
2. Software Requirements Document (SRD) Layout.  
The result of the requirements process is the SRD document that describes the 
software and its limitations in detail. For that purpose, its layout should be 
determined early in the requirements development process to provide a template. 
3. Division of Software Functionality into Subsystems and/or Features  
To break down the planned software into manageable groups, the software can be 
divided into subsystems and features by reference to the relating requirements. 
4. Requirements Priorities  
For several reasons it can be useful to prioritize the requirements. For instance, it 
is reasonable to begin with start-up routines and then to realize integral and safety 
relevant components before optional functionalities. 
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5. Requirements Documentation 
Depending on the extend of the system requirements, the detail level of the high-
level requirements must be chosen. The level should provide an adequate level of 
detail for the software design effort. There are several different types of high-level 
requirements and aspects that must be considered: 
a. Functional Requirements  
The functional requirements are the most often ones. They describe what 
the software does, which inputs are expected, what outputs will be 
generated etc.  
b. Non-functional Requirements  
This requirement type concerns software requirements that are not specific 
part of the resulting software. That concerns, for instance, performance, 
safety, security, efficiency, portability, testability, or usability requirements. 
c. Interfaces  
Since there are several different types of interfaces, their requirements 
should be considered in an adequate way. For that purpose, the SRS should 
describe how to document the interface requirements according to its type. 
For instance, different interface types are user interfaces like displays, 
hardware interfaces like communication protocols and software interfaces 
like library interfaces. 
d. Unique Identifier 
Each requirement should be uniquely identified. Hence, a requirement can 
be identified by using the term “shall” and given an individual unique tag to 
each one.  
e. Rationale  
Included rationale can have a positive influence on the requirements quality 
owing to an improved comprehension of the reader and writer. Furthermore, 
the rationale reduces the time to understand the requirement and improve 
the comprehension of the proposed software functionality. For example, the 
rationale can include the reason for the requirement, explain specific values 
and assumptions about environmental conditions. 
f. Requirements Tracing  
Several high-level requirements are broken down into other higher-level 
requirements. To ensure traceability between them, the traceability should 
be ensured as the requirements are written. 
g. Uncertainties and Assumptions  
Since not all information is available during the requirements process, 
existing uncertainties and assumptions should be marked with a clear 
notation, e.g., TBD for To Be Determined. These points should be clarified 
before they are reviewed and before the implementation process starts. 
Moreover, it is useful to note who is responsible to clarify each point. 
h. Data Dictionary  
It can be suitable for data-intensive systems to start a data dictionary, which 
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promotes data consistency and integration. That document will be 
completed during the design process. 
i. Characteristics of Good Requirements  
Generally, a requirement should be atomic, complete, concise, consistent, 
correct, implementation-free, necessary, traceable, unambiguous, verifiable, 
and viable. 
6. Feedback on the System Requirements  
Since the generation of software requirements involves an examination of the 
system requirements, the software team can find erroneous, conflicting or missing 
requirements. Consequently, these requirements should be addressed in a 
problem report against the system requirements.  
Given these points, the SRS can have structure as suggested in Figure 21 below. In 
addition to the methodology, it is useful to use a well-known and standardized modeling 
approach to create appropriate diagrams. Therefore, the UML is a suitable standard to 
create these diagrams. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software requirements standards of the GLASS project 
and is related to its SDP. The SRS instructs …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array. An FPGA is a device that … 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
Software Requirements is “A description of what is to be produced by …” [1, p 147]   
High-level Requirements are “Software requirements …” [1, p 143]   
Low-level Requirements are “Software requirements …” [1, p 144]   
Derived Requirements are “Requirements produced by the software …” [1, p 142]  
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the SRS context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [Req. tool]  Manual of [Req. tool] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 




1.5 Approval Objectives of DO-278A 
For proactively considering the approval objectives of DO-278A, the objectives of its 
Table A-3 can be listed in the SRS. 
To approve the GLASS software, the following objectives of DO278A, Table A-3 have 
to be satisfied. 
1. High-level requirements comply with system requirements. (DO-278A, 6.3.1.a) 
2. High-level requirements are accurate and consistent. (DO-278A, 6.3.1.b) 
[…] 
2 Software Requirements Tool 
Often special tools (e.g., DOORS) will be used to create, manage, trace, and verify 
requirements. Which tool will be used? How will it be used? 
The requirements will be created, managed, traced and verified by using [req. tool]. 
That program uses an object-oriented approach for requirements management… 
The use of [req. tool]is limited by … 
A requirement can be created with the following procedure: [1st step], [2nd step], … 
3 Traceability Approach 
The SRS should include guidance for the traceability approach. How will be ensured 
that the high-level requirements are traceable to the system and low-level 
requirements? 
The traceability will be performed by referencing the high-level requirements with the 
system and the low-level requirements in [req. tool]. For that purpose, … 
4 Requirements Documentation 
4.1 Requirements Identification 
Which technique/methodology will be used to identify requirements? E.g., interview, 
UML diagrams etc. 
Since GLASS is a supplier-driven product that provides a well-defined service, it is 
appropriate to document the desired functionality with UML 2.0 diagrams. For that 
purpose, a use case diagram shall describe the functionality, a sequence diagram shall 
describe the calculation procedure, a state machine shall describe the processor 
states, a … 
[Explanation and examples of UML diagrams] 
4.2 Requirements Development 
Identified requirements shall be “well” developed. If a special requirements tool is used, 
this section should be described in the context of that tool. How to develop a good 
requirement? What is to consider due to different requirement types? 
4.2.1 Requirement Types 
Functional requirements  
Functional requirements should be organized in logical groups that can lead to 
a software subsystem or feature and can regularly be verified by testing. 
Further, … 
Non-functional Requirements  
Non-functional requirements are often verified by analysis instead of testing 
(e.g., testability, interoperability). Therefore, … 
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Interface Requirements  
Interface requirements have to be documented according to its kind. Hardware 
interfaces must include physical parameters as baud rate, timing, [parameters]. 
API requirements must include dependencies as … 
4.2.2 Properties of good Requirements 
Generally, each requirement needs a unique identifier, rationale, and an outline. 
Further, to ensure bidirectional requirements tracing, each high-level requirement 
needs a reference to the low-level and the system level requirements. Moreover, each 
requirement needs to be atomic, implementation free, verifiable, … 
Atomic: A requirement must be a single requirement. For instance, the 
requirement “Calculate the tropospheric delay” is a single 
requirement, whereas “Calculate the tropospheric and 
ionospheric delay” is a multiple requirement. 
Implementation free: A requirement must be free of implementation. For example, the 
requirement “Calculate the tropospheric delay by invoking the 
tropospheric delay calculator class” is not implementation free as 
it assumes that there will be a tropospheric delay calculator class. 
However, the requirement “Calculate the tropospheric delay with 
[algorithm]” is implementation free, but the algorithm must be 
described. 
[…] 
To write good requirements, the requirements should implement the following pattern: 
 Name:   ___________ 
 Summary:   ___________ 
 Priority:   ___________ 
 References:   ___________ 
 Rationale:   ___________ 
 Requirement:  ___________ 
5 Examples 
Examples are useful to show how to implement “good” requirements. 
Name:Req-401 Inflation Factor Calculation 
Summary: Calculate the horizontal error from the lateral error provided by SBAS. 
Priority: Required. 
References: SYS-REQ-42 Conversion Algorithm   
Req-401-11 Lower Inflation Factor Limit  
Req-401-12 Upper Inflation Factor Limit  
[further LLRs] 
Rationale: A GBAS ground station broadcasts error indicators with them the GBAS 
receiver computes the LAL. However, a SBAS satellite broadcasts error 
indicators and the SBAS receiver calculates the HPL with them. Due to 
the different PL types, the SBAS error indicator must be converted into 
the GBAS error indicator. 
Requirement: When GBAS broadcasts correction data, there is always an error 
indicator included. That error indicator is used to calculate the protection 
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level and the error will be calculated by the following procedure: 
1.  Initialization of variables  
  -> Rotation matrix  
   [description]  
  -> …  
2.  Do for each receivable satellite:  
 -> Get satellite position  
   [description]  
 ->  Rotate satellite position  
  [description]  
 -> …  
3. If there are more than three useable satellites, calculate the 
inflation 
  factor with the following formula:  
  [formula]  
4. Check errors  
  [description]  
5. Return 
Figure 21: Example SRS Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Software development standards are defined. 4.1.e 
Table 23: Corresponding Objectives to SRS Outline 
5.4.2 Software Design Standards 
The Software Design Standards (SDS) are further project specific standards of the 
SDP and define methods, rules, and tools that must be used to develop the software 
architecture and the low-level requirements [4, p. 76]. As mentioned in [6, p. 93], the 
purpose of the design standards is to provide guidance to the developers who create 
the design. Therefore, the SDS describes how to develop an effective and 
implementable design, explain the design tools, and provide instructions to the 
designers. Often companies provide design standards, but they are ineffective for the 
specific project. However, the project-specific standards can base on the company 
standards. 
In contrast to regular software design development, DO-278A distinguishes between 
Low-Level Requirements (LLRs) and software architecture. The standard defines the 
software architecture as “The structure of the software selected to implement the 
software requirements” [4, p. 146], whereas the LLR is defined as “Software 
requirements […] which Source Code can be directly implemented without further 
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information.” [4, p. 144]. Consequently, the architecture describes the composition of 
the software components and the LLRs describe the designated functionality of these 
components.  
The software architecture is an integral component of the software design process. 
Generally, for developing DO-278A compliant software architecture, the architecture 
must be compatible with the requirements. That can be attested by the trace data or a 
mapping between them. In addition, the architecture documentation should be clear, 
consistent, updateable and preferability implementable in iterations. Moreover, if a 
functional structure should be established, the components and connectors of the 
architecture represents functions and their interfaces. [6, p. 142] 
The LLRs are a breakdown of the HLRs so that the code can be developed from them 
without further information. For that reason, a proper design process leads to a 
straightforward coding process. LLRs are like HLRs, but they focus on implementation 
or design details that describe how the software will implement the functionality as 
determined in the HLRs. Hence, the LLRs should be verifiable and identifiable as well 
as have similar quality attributes like the HLRs. They are regularly represented as a 
textual description, but it is also possible to use formal models according to DO-331 or 
use pseudo code. In addition to the LLRs representation, it is to remark that the level 
of detail should correlate with the software criticality. [6, pp. 142-144] 
Further, DO-278A provides a list of topics and aspects that should be covered in the 
SDS. First, the design description methods, naming conventions and constraints on 
the use of the tools for the design development should be determined. Moreover, 
conditions for the use of design methods as global data and the use of interrupts should 
be determined. In addition to this, constraints as exclusion of recursion or dynamic 
objects should also be determined. Finally, the complexity of the program should be 
restricted. That includes restrictions like a maximum level of nested calls or conditional 
structures. [4, pp. 76-77] 
In addition to the recommendations of DO-278A, [6, p. 93] also suggests the aspects 
below. 
• Approval objectives of DO-278A, Table A-4 to proactively address them. 
• Traceability approach between HLRs and LLRs. 
• Quality attributes and characteristics as mentioned in the software requirements 
standards. 
• Criteria to develop robust design and document derived LLRs with its rationale. 
• Guidelines for an effective architecture development that describes the 
applicable diagrams. 
• Guidance for documenting deactivated code. 
The structure-based and the object-oriented design approach are typically used in 
aviation software, but it is also possible to combine concepts of both approaches for 
modeling the software architecture and behavior [6, p. 145]. Since the used design 
techniques depend on project specific needs as the used programming language and 
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desired software functionalities, the following list provides an overview of important 
representation types as described in [6, pp. 145-147].  
• State Diagram  
The state diagram shows the system behavior that depends on states and how 
the system changes its state. 
• Flowchart Diagram  
This diagram graphically shows the workflow of software functions. 
• Textual Details  
Implementation details as the LLRs can be described textually. 
• Use Case Diagram  
The use case diagram is a graphical and textual representation that describes 
the interaction of the actors with the system. 
• Sequence Diagram  
This diagram shows the communication flow between objects. 
• Class Diagram  
A class diagram provides a static or structural overview of a system by modeling 
the relations of the classes. 
In addition to the list above, the UML is a suitable standard that is well-known and 
covers these diagrams. The UML provides several standardized diagrams to model 
the behavior and structure of software. Owing to the description of the software 
architecture and the LLRs, the UML can be used to describe both. For that purpose, 
[35] provides in detail chapters about structure diagrams that can be used to describe 
the software architecture and behavioral models to describe the software behavior. For 







GPS Receiver SBAS Decoder ...
 
Figure 22: Example Package Diagram for GLASS 
Moreover, a package diagram can describe the dependencies between the packages 
of the software architecture. Therefore, this diagram type allows to map the relations 
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as “import” or “merge” of the packages. Figure 22 shows an outline of the packages 

























Figure 23: Example Activity Diagram for Inflation Factor Calculation 
Figure 23 shows an example of an activity diagram that describes the procedure to 
calculate the inflation factor. Depending on the software architecture approach, the 
actions either must be more specific or further specified with LLRs. On the one hand, 
that diagram can be a part of a LLR, but then it must be exhaustive. For example, the 
condition “[Inflation Factor is correct]” is quite generic and must be more accurate like 
“[Inflation Factor is greater than 1 and less than infinity]”. On the other hand, it is 
possible to acknowledge the diagram to the software architecture and create LLRs that 
specify the range of possible inflation factors. Both solutions are compliant to DO-278A, 
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but the SDS needs to explain the correct usage as well as the required level of detail 
of the diagrams that can be applied to the software architecture or the LLRs. 
Given these points, the SDS can have the structure as suggested in Figure 24 below.  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software design standards of the GLASS project and is 
related to its SDP. Therefore, this document provides guidance to create the software 
architecture and to develop the LLRs. Further, the SDS instructs …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
OOT  Object-Oriented Technology. The OOT is an approach to develop … 
UML  Unified Modeling Language. UML provides techniques to model … 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
Software Requirements is “A description of what is to be produced by …” [1, p 147]   
High-level Requirements are “Software requirements …” [1, p 143]   
Low-level Requirements are “Software requirements …” [1, p 144]   
Derived Requirements are “Requirements produced by the software …” [1, p 142]   
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SDS? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [Design tool]  Manual of [Design tool] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
1.5 Approval Objectives of DO-278A 
For proactively considering the approval objectives of DO-278A, the objectives of its 
Table A-4 can be listed in the SDS. 
To approve the GLASS software, the following objectives of DO278A, Table A-3 must 
be satisfied. 
1. Low-level requirements comply with high-level requirements. (DO-278A, 6.3.2.a) 







2 Software Design Tools 
Special tools or a combination of them are often used to document the software design. 
The collaboration of them should be explained with their limitations. Which tool/-s will 
be used? How will it/they be used? Is there an interface to the requirements 
management tool? 
The design will be created and documented with [design tool]. Therefore, [design tool] 
supports the generation of UML diagrams and can be integrated into the [req. tool] that 
supports the development of the software design too. However, the [design tool] is 
limited to the generation of diagrams and pseudo code, so that supplementary textual 
descriptions and traceability must be performed with the [req. tool]. 
[…] 
3 Traceability Approach 
The SDS should include guidance for the traceability approach. How will be ensured 
that the low-level requirements are traceable to the high-level requirements? Is it 
possible to use the requirements management tool for that purpose? 
The traceability will be performed with a bi-directional reference between the high-level 
requirements and the low-level requirements in [req. tool]. For that purpose, the design 
data can be integrated into [req. tool] and … 
[req. tool example] 
4 Design Documentation 
4.1 Low-Level Requirements Development 
This subsection provides guidance for developing and documenting LLRs “well” like 
the respective section of the SRS. If a special tool for LLRs should be used, this section 
needs to be described in its context. How to develop a good low-level requirement? 
Which diagrams can be applied?  
Low-level requirements are a breakdown of the high-level requirements. For that 
reason, each LLR that is related to a HLR must include its identifier and be 
complemented by a unique consecutive number. Further, each LLR needs a rationale, 
and an outline. 
[…] 
For writing good low-level requirements, they should implement the following pattern: 
 Name:   ___________ 
 Summary:   ___________ 
 Priority:   ___________ 
 References:   ___________ 
 Rationale:   ___________ 
 Requirement:  ___________ 
For improving the comprehensibility of the LLRs, the following diagrams can be used 
as described below. 
4.1.1 Activity Diagram 
The activity diagram can be used to model procedures. That diagram… 





4.2 Software Architecture Development 
This subsection provides guidance how to develop and document the software 
architecture “well”. If a special tool should be used for developing the software 
architecture, this section should explain the development in its context. Which 
diagrams can be used to describe and document the architecture? Which level of detail 
is appropriate? 
For developing the software architecture, the following diagrams can be used as 
described below … 
4.2.1 Package Diagram 
The package diagram can be used to show the relations between the provided or 
developed packages. That diagram can be applied if …  
[package diagram explanation] 
4.3 Deactivated Code 
This subsection provides guidance how the design covers deactivated code. For 
instance, the deactivated code of unused library functions can be excluded from the 
build with compiler options. How should the design handle deactivated code? 
Design that contains interchangeable functionality must be configurable, so that the 
unused functionality can be excluded from the build. Therefore, … 
5 Examples 
5.1 Low-Level Requirements Examples 
Examples are useful to show how to implement “good” low-level requirements. 
Name: Req-401-11 Lower Inflation Factor Limit 
Summary: The inflation factor must be greater than 1. 
Priority: Required. 
References: Req-401 Inflation Factor Calculation  
  [source code, when developed] 
Rationale: The inflation factor must be greater than 1, because of [reason]. 
Requirement: The inflation factor is only valid if it is greater than 1. If the inflation 
factor is less or equal to 1, the respective function must return the error 
code 4 and output an error message to the console. 
 
Name: Req-401-12 Upper Inflation Factor Limit 
Summary: The inflation factor must be less than infinity. 
Priority: Required. 
References: Req-401 Inflation Factor Calculation  
[source code, when developed] 
Rationale: The inflation factor must be greater less than infinity, because of 
[reason]. 
Requirement: The inflation factor is only valid if it is less than infinity. If the inflation 
factor is infinity, the respective function must return the error code 1 






5.2 Software Architecture Examples 
Examples are useful to show how to create a “good” software architecture. Therefore, 
Figure 22 can be included and further described. 
The following figure shows an example package diagram. It shows an overview of the 
packages that … 
[package diagram] 
Figure 24: Example SDS Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 









Software development standards are defined. 4.1.e 
Table 24: Corresponding Objectives to SDS Outline 
5.4.3 Software Code Standards 
The Software Code Standards (SCS) are standards of the SDP and define the 
programming language, methods, rules, and tools that must be used to implement the 
software [4, p. 77]. As mentioned in [6, p. 94], the purpose of the design standards is 
to provide guidance to the developers who implement the design and therefore, the 
SDS describes how to use the selected language, restrict its safety adverse features, 
explain naming conventions and how to develop readable code. For example, the SCS 
can base on a standard from the Motor Industry Software Reliability Association for C 
(MISRA-C) if C will be used. 
DO-278A subdivides the software implementation process in the coding and 
integration process. The source code will be written from the software architecture and 
the LLRs during the coding process, whereas compiling, linking, and loading are part 
of the integration process [4, p. 37]. Since the SCS provides guidance for coding, the 
integration process will be dealt in section 5.4.4. Typical programming languages that 
are used in safety-critical systems are C, Ada, and assembly [6, p. 158]. Since the 
finally used programming language is not determined yet, this section provides general 
programming aspects that should be considered for writing a SCS. 
DO-278A provides a list of topics and aspects that should be covered in the SCS. 
Initially, the SCS should determine the applied coding languages or subsets and limit 
their features as needed. For this purpose, a corresponding language standard can be 
referenced, which defines its syntax, side-effects, control, and data behavior. 
Moreover, the code presentation and documentation should be defined. This includes 
the maximum line length, indentation usage, blank line usage, naming conventions for 
(sub-)components, variables and constants, revision history, in- and outputs, involved 
global data and names of authors. Furthermore, coding conventions as the maximum 
allowed complexity of logical or numerical expressions should be determined as well 
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as rationale for their use. Finally, the use and constraints of the coding tools should be 
explained. [4, p. 77] 
In addition to the recommendations of DO-278A, [6, p. 94] also suggests the following 
aspects: 
• Approval objectives of DO-278A, Table A-5 to proactively address them. 
• Traceability approach between LLRs and source code. 
• Guidelines for module structure and function design. For instance, header 
format, module sections, function layout, entry and exit rules. 
• Rules for using macros, pointers, recursive functions, conditionally compiled 
code etc. 
As already mentioned, this section covers general aspects of programming that should 
be considered for writing a SCS. The following list presents further aspects from [6, pp. 
164-177] of programming that could be applicable for outlining the contents of the SCS. 
• Code Layout  
Code readability is an important aspect of programming as it affects the 
understandability, reviewability, and maintainability of code. Furthermore, this 
affects the error rate, quality, and cost of the written code. 
o Logical Structure  
Statements that logically belong together should be kept together. 
o Whitespaces 
Whitespaces and blank lines support showing the logical structure. 
o One Statement per Line  
Although several programming languages allow multiple statements per 
line, it is difficult to read. 
o Statement Length Limit  
Long statements of 80 characters or more are difficult to read. 
o Line Breaks for Long Statements  
If a statement is very long, it can be wrapped into several lines at 
readable places. 
o Parentheses  
The usage of parentheses prevents misunderstanding of expressions 
that involve more than two terms. 
• Code Comments  
Good comments are important to support the understanding of the code and 
thereby the code in general. 
o Intentions  
Comments should summarize the purpose of the code and not its 
functionality, because proper code shows its functionality itself. 
o Routines  
A brief description of inputs, outputs, and important assumptions as well 
as the purpose of every routine should be commented at its top. Special 
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comments should be close to the corresponding code in the function 
body. 
o Opaque Code  
If the functionally is opaque and it is not possible to write it more 
comprehensibly, the code should be explained. For instance, the code 
can be difficult to understand when it is optimized for performance 
reasons. 
• Limitation of complexity  
The complexity limitation is already a topic of the software design development, 
but it should be controlled. If the code becomes complex, it will be unstable and 
unmanageable. Typical approaches for limiting the complexity are to increase 
the modularity and divide the code into manageable parts, to use appropriate 
naming conventions, to reduce the number of nested decisions etc. 
• Deterministic code  
A code that might lead to a nondeterministic behavior should be avoided or 
controlled. For instance, the usage of dynamic memory (de-)allocation, 
recursion, or an extensive usage of pointers that could lead to nondeterministic 
behavior can be restricted. Therefore, most certification projects forbid dynamic 
memory allocation. 
• Recommended Practices  
Typical practices should be standardized. That includes naming conventions, 
function header, usage of global data, conditionals, loop control etc. 




What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software code standards of the GLASS project and is 
related to its SDP. Therefore, this document provides guidance for writing the source 
code. Moreover, the SCS instructs …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
IDE  Integrated Development Environment. The IDE is a software that… 
C  C is a procedural programming language, which can… 
C++  C++ is a programming language that supports object-oriented… 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SCS? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
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[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [IDE]   Manual of [IDE] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
1.5 Approval Objectives of DO-278A 
For proactively considering the approval objectives of DO-278A, the objectives of its 
Table A-5 can be listed in the SCS. 
To approve the GLASS software, the following objectives of DO278A, Table A-5 must 
be satisfied. 
1. Source Code complies with low-level requirements. (DO-278A, 6.3.4.a) 
2. Source Code complies with software architecture.  (DO-278A, 6.3.4.b) 
[…] 
2 Programming Languages 
This section lists all used programming languages and describes where they are used. 
Which languages are used? Where are they used? Which version? Which language 
manual can be used? 
2.1 C 
C is used in the version C99 for writing the source code of GLASS. The manual of C99 
can be found at [manual source]. Further, … 
2.2 Assembler 
Assembler will only be generated from the source code for verification purposes. Its 
usage is prohibited. Its manual can be found at [manual source]. Moreover, … 
3 Source Code Representation  
3.1 Naming Conventions 
3.1.1 Function Names 
Since each function does something, its name should explain what it does to improve 
its comprehensibility. Moreover, consistently written function names facilitate their 
comprehensibility. Generally, the following rules should be applied: 
1. Underbars must be used to separate name components. 
 E.g.:  compute_position() instead of computeposition() 
  approximate_range() instead of approximaterange() 
2. Function names must not contain upper case letters. 
 E.g.: compute_sbas_pl()   instead of  compute_SBAS_PL() 
  compute_sigma_air   instead of  compute_Sigma_Air() 
3. The following prefixes should be used if applicable. 
   is - “is” asks something that can be true or false.  
      E.g.: is_valid()    instead of  valid() 
   get - “get” reads a value and returns it.  





4. The following suffixes should be used if applicable. 
   max - “max” stands for a maximum of something. 
     E.g.: get_value_max()   instead of  get_highest_value() 
   cnt - “cnt” stands for a count of something. 
      E.g.: get_cnt()    instead of  get_num_of_elements() 
5. Function names must be concrete. 
 E.g.: quick_sort()    instead of  pretty_fast_quick_sort() 
[…] 
3.1.2 Variable Names 
Since each variable contains something, its name should explain what it contains to 
improve its comprehensibility. Moreover, consistently variable names facilitate their 
comprehensibility. Generally, the following rules should be applied: 
1. Variable names must not contain the name of variables that are already used in 
the standard libraries. 
E.g.: error_num    instead of  errno 
2.  Variable names must include its unit. 
 E.g.:  distance_m    instead of  distance 
  altitude_ft    instead of  altitude 
[…] 
3.2 File Names 
3.3 Formatting 
3.4 Comments 
3.5 Control Structures 
3.6 Functions 
[…] 
4 Traceability Approach 
The SCS should include guidance for the traceability approach. How will be ensured 
that the source code is traceable to the LLRs?  
The traceability will be performed by referencing the source code in the respective 
LLRs and vice versa. For that purpose, the LLRs name the respective files and 
functions and each function references the corresponding LLR in the comment on its 
top. 
[Code comment example] 
[Req. tool example] 
Figure 25: Example SCS Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 









Software development standards are defined. 4.1.e 
Table 25: Corresponding Objectives to SCS Outline 
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5.4.4 Software Life Cycle 
The software life cycle should be identified in the SDP, which is typically based on a 
life cycle model. The selection of a life cycle model is only restricted by usage of a 
model that will be verified top-down. That means that the requirements verification is 
performed before the design verification etc. Moreover, the life cycle model should be 
described including its transition (entry and exit) criteria for each development phase 
and produced data. [6, pp. 81-82] 
Additionally, DO-278A distinguishes the life cycles of the software planning, 
development, and verification processes. The life cycle of the planning process covers 
the activities to define and coordinate the development and integral processes. 
Furthermore, the life cycle of the development process covers the software 
requirements, design, coding, and integration process. Finally, the life cycle of the 
integral processes covers the software verification, configuration management, quality 
assurance and approval liaison process. [4, p. 23] 
As mentioned in the introduction of section 5, the approval concept is based on a 
traditional approach and agile software development approaches can lead to 
challenges with the approval authority. Therefore, the traditional V-model approach for 
developing the software is suggested. However, it is also possible to use other models 
like waterfall or an iterative development model. The suggested V-model is shown in 
Figure 26, based on the V-model as described in [36, pp. 33-34] and adjusted to the 
specific needs of DO-278A and the approval concept. For instance, the referenced V-
model provides a manual assessment of the coding results against the software design 
but DO-278A does not require that explicitly. Instead of the manual assessment, the 
approval concept plans a review stage that examines the correctness and project-
specific standard conformity etc. However, an examination against the previous stage 



















Figure 26: Proposed Software Life Cycle Model for GLASS 
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The description of the life cycles of the software verification, configuration 
management, quality assurance and approval liaison processes must also be included. 
However, because the SDP will be integrated into the PSAA and that plan includes a 
summary of the software verification, configuration management and quality assurance 
plan as well as a description of the approval liaison process, their life cycles can be 
excluded from this section. 
The proposed life cycle in Figure 26 starts at the system requirements process and 
ends at the system integration test. These are processes that are only included to show 
that there are system processes prior to the software development, which can affect it. 
The other stages are described in the respective section of the approval concept. In 
addition, the software life cycle description should include transition criteria that define 
the entry and exit criteria of each development phase [4, p. 24]. Given these points, 
the SDS can have the structure as suggested in Figure 27 below. 
5.2  Software Life Cycles 
5.2.1  Software Planning Process 
Entry: The software planning process can be started if the software is assigned with 
assurance level. Moreover, … 
Exit: The software planning process is finished if [list of plans] is released. 
Moreover, the PSAA must be submitted to the approval authority and … 
5.2.2  Software Development Process 
Figure 26 should be included and described to provide an overview. 
5.2.2.1 Software Requirements Process 
Entry: The software requirements process can be started if the system requirements 
are stable, the PSAA is approved by the approval authority, the SRS released, 
and … 
Exit: The software requirements process is finished if the HLRs are developed and 
reviewed, the SRD document is released, … 
5.2.2.2 Software Design Process 
Entry: The software design process can be started if the SRD document is released, 
the PSAA is approved by the approval authority, the SDS released, and … 
Exit: The software design process is finished if LLRs and software architecture are 
developed and reviewed, the DD document is released, … 
5.2.2.3 Software Coding Process 
[…] 
5.2.2.4 Software Integration Process 
[…] 
5.2.3  Integral Processes 
The life cycles of the integral processes can be included in the summary of the 
respective plan in the PSAA. 
The life cycle of software verification, configuration management, quality assurance, 
and the approval liaison process are included in the respective summaries. See section 
4, 6, 7, and 8.  
Figure 27: Example Software Life Cycle Section of SDP Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
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This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








The software life cycle(s), including the inter-
relationships between the processes, their 
sequencing, feedback mechanisms, and transition 
criteria, is defined. 
4.1.b 
Table 26: Corresponding Objectives to Live Cycle Section of SDP Outline  
5.4.5 Software Development Environment 
The software development environment is a part of the SDP and declare the selected 
tools that are used for developing the software to reduce their potential risk to the 
software that should be developed. This includes developing methods and tools for 
developing the requirements, design, and code as well as the compiler, linker, loader, 
and the used hardware platform. Further, if tools like compilers and auto code 
generators support optional features, they should be defined. Moreover, it should be 
described how it will be ensured that errors, which are introduced by a tool, will be 
detected. [4, pp. 30, 73] 
The environment identification ensures that it is possible to consistently reproduce the 
software later. It is also possible to reference the Software Life Cycle Environment 
Configuration Index (SECI) instead of describing in detail the software development 
environment, but then an initial version of the SECI should be released with the plans 
and updated during the software development. This can be useful as several details of 
the development environment can be undetermined during the planning phase like 
used libraries or compiler options and versions. [6, pp. 82-83, 255] 
Therefore, the software development environment section of the SDP basically 
describes the used tools and reference the SECI that contains the details of the used 
software. Given these points, the software development environment section of the 
SDP can have the following structure as suggested in Figure 32 below.  
5.3 Software Development Environment 
The detailed descriptions as part numbers, versions and specific options are listed in 
[SECI document]. This section contains a brief description of the tools that are used in 
the software development environment. 
5.3.1 Requirements Development Methods and Tools  
This section contains all methods and tools that are used to develop the requirements 
and explains how they will be combined. 
The requirements will be developed, traced, and documented with [req. tool]. 
Moreover, the Unified Modeling Language (UML) will be used to create standardized 
diagrams for the HLRs. Microsoft Visio with [name of UML plugin] will be used with to 




5.3.2 Software Design Methods and Tools  
This section contains all methods and tools that are used to develop the design and 
explains how they will be combined. 
The LLRs will be developed, traced, and documented with [req. tool], whereas the 
software architecture will be created with [software architecture tool]. Moreover, the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) will be used to create standardized diagrams for 
the LLRs. [Drawing tool] with [name of UML plugin] will be used with to create these 
diagrams. Furthermore, … 
5.3.3 Programming Languages and Tools  
This section contains all methods and tools that are used to write the code and explains 
how they will be combined. 
The software will be developed in C and compiled with [safety compiler tool chain]. 
That compiler supports the following standard libraries: [std. lib. 1], [std. lib. 2], … 
Furthermore, the following external libraries will be used: [ext. lib. 1], [ext. lib. 2], … 
In order to write the code, the [IDE] with the following plugins will be used: [plugin 1], 
[plugin. 2], … 
5.3.4 Hardware Platforms  
This section contains all tools that are used to use the hardware and explains how they 
will be combined. 
The developed code will be ran and debugged on [processor] and flashed with 
[programmer]. For this purpose, the computers use the [programmer plugin] in the 
[IDE]. Additionally, … 
Figure 28: Example Development Environment Section of SDP Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 









Software life cycle environment is selected and 
defined. 
4.1.c 
Table 27: Corresponding Objectives to Development Environment of SDP Outline 
5.5 Software Verification Plan 
The Software Verification Plan (SVP) is a plan that describes how the software 
verification will be performed to detect and report errors. The error removal is a part of 
the development process. Therefore, the SVP describes the verification procedures 
that are used to satisfy the software verification process objectives. [4, p. 41] 
As described in DO-278A [4, pp. 73-74], it is recommended to include the following 
topics in the SVP: 
• Organization  
The organizational responsibilities of the verification process and its interfaces 
to the other lifecycle processes should be described. 
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• Verification Methods  
The verification method for each verification activity should be included. Typical 
verification methods are reviews (e.g., checklists), analysis (e.g., tracing and 
coverage analysis) and testing (e.g., test procedures, criteria, and data). 
• Verification Environment  
The verification environment should be defined. That includes the required 
software and hardware equipment for test environment as well as the target 
computer. 
• Transition Criteria  
The transition criteria for beginning the software verification process should also 
be included. 
• Partitioning Considerations  
If the software will be partitioned, the verification approach for partitioned 
software should be explained. 
• Compiler Assumptions  
The SVP should include assumptions about the compiler like its correctness 
owing to optimization features. 
• Reverification Method  
A reverification method should be included to reverify software modifications. 
That concerns the identification, analysis and verification of the affected areas. 
• Previously Developed Software  
If already existing software should be reused, a verification method must be 
established to ensure that the software complies with the SVP.  
• Multiple-Version Dissimilar Software  
If the usage of multiple-version dissimilar software is planned, the SVP should 
address this topic too. 
The SVP includes typically a section that is subjected to verification independence. 
However, verification independence is not required for GLASS because this is not 
relevant for assurance level 3 (AL3). Nevertheless, independence is required for the 
software quality process and explained in section 5.7. 
5.5.1 Development Review 
The software verification process offers guidance for analysis and review of high-level 
requirements (HLRs), low-level requirements (LLRs), software architecture, source 
code and the software integration process as well as software testing [4, p. 41]. 
Furthermore, as mentioned in [6, pp. 123, 153, 178], the verification methods for 
requirements, design, and code are similar, but with different aspects. Hence, it is 
useful to separate the description of the basic verification methods from the specific 
aspects to reduce redundancy. Moreover, the verification of LLRs and software 
architecture can be summarized as they are related to the verification of the software 
design process. In consequence, the development review related section of the SVP 
can be structured as described below. 
94 
 
• Description of Verification Method/-s  
A generic verification method description explains the verification methods. For 
instance, that can be a description of the review and analysis process. 
• Software Requirements Verification  
The requirements verification section specifies the designated verification 
method/-s for its verification, e.g., requirements specific review checklists. 
• Software Design Verification  
The design verification section specifies the designated verification method/-s 
for its verification, e.g., design specific review checklists. 
• Software Code Verification  
The code verification section specifies the designated verification method/-s for 
its verification, e.g., code specific review checklists. 
Initially, according to the structure above, the verification methods will be determined 
and described. Since many verification objectives of DO-278A can be satisfied by 
review, a formal peer review process can be established as described in [6, p. 125]. 
For that purpose, [37] describes several review methods, but due to the verification 
and tracing effort of DO-278A, the inspection review is the most suitable review 
process for the software requirements, design, and code verification. With reference to 
the software life cycle of the SDP, the review processes relate to the “Review” stages 
in Figure 26. Besides the review process, it can be necessary to use additional analysis 
methods to support the review process. Since [6, p. 84] mentioned that all requirements 
and design objectives as well as the most objectives of the code and integration 
verification can be satisfied by review, this thesis excludes further verification methods 
such as analysis. 
The inspection review involves three different parties, namely the inspection team, the 
inspection moderator and the authors of the documents that will be reviewed. At first, 
the inspection team reads these documents to identify defects and prepare them for 
the review meeting. For that purpose, it is useful that each reviewer is responsible for 
one aspect as well as the review process is standardized and supported with 
checklists. After the reviewers have reviewed the documents, they discuss the defects 
with the authors in a meeting that is chaired by a moderator. The moderator must 
ensure that the meeting is constructive and discussions that take too long will be kept 
short or tabled. Finally, the discussed defects and their responsibilities should be 
documented to ensure that the defects will be remedied. [37, pp. 73-84] 
Based on the previously described verification method, the aspects that must be 
considered for software requirements, design, and code verification will be described. 
For this purpose, [6, pp. 123-125, 153-154, 178-179, 181] suggests several aspects 
for checklists that should be included in the SVP. These aspects can be divided into 
two groups, namely the verification objectives of DO-278A and additional aspects that 
should be considered to satisfy the objectives of that standard. Regarding this and that 
this thesis is focused on a DO-278A approval for GLASS, the following list describes 
the GLASS related DO-278A objectives. 
95 
 
• Requirements Verification Objectives  
The HLR review should detect and report errors that arise during the software 
requirements process [4, p. 43]. Therefore, the requirements review process for 
GLASS should consider the following objectives according to AL 3 [4, p. 128] 
as described in [4, pp. 43-44] and [6, pp. 123-124]. 
o HLRs comply with system requirements.  
It must be ensured that the software-related system functions are well 
defined. That includes functional, performance and safety requirements.  
o HLRs are accurate and consistent.  
This objective focuses on the requirement quality. A requirement shall be 
accurate, unambiguous, sufficiently detailed and do not conflict with other 
requirements.  
o HLRs are verifiable.  
A requirement should include tolerances and consist of quantifiable 
terms to be verifiable. 
o HLRs conform to standards.  
The requirements shall be determined according to the SRS. 
o HLRs are traceable to system requirements.  
All functional, performance and safety related requirement that are 
allocated to software must be traceable to the HLRs. Further, as all traces 
are bi-directional, the HLRs must be traceable to the system 
requirements. 
o Algorithms are accurate.  
The used algorithms must be accurate, and its behavior must be well 
known. It must be ensured that the inputs and outputs are well defined in 
normal as well as abnormal conditions. 
• Design Verification Objectives  
The design review should detect and report errors that arise during the software 
design process and the development of the software architecture [4, p. 44]. 
Therefore, the design review process for GLASS should consider the following 
objectives according to AL 3 [4, p. 129] as described in [4, pp. 44-45] and [6, 
pp. 153-154]. 
o LLRs comply with high-level requirements.  
The LLRs must implement the HLRs completely and accurately. 
o LLRs are accurate and consistent.  
This objective focuses on the requirement quality. A requirement must 
be accurate, unambiguous, and do not conflict with other requirements. 
o LLRs conform to standards.  
The LLRs must be developed according to the SDS.  
o LLRs are traceable to high-level requirements. 
It must be ensured that the HLRs are developed into the LLRs as this 
supports the compliance of LLRs to HLRs. Therefore, this is a bi-
directional trace between the HLRs and the LLRs.  
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o Algorithms are accurate.  
The used algorithms must be accurate, and its behavior must be well 
known [4, p. 44]. For this purpose, the algorithms should be reviewed by 
someone with an appropriate background, e.g., mathematical algorithms 
should be reviewed by a mathematician.  
o Software architecture is compatible with high-level requirements.  
This objective ensures that the proposed software architecture does not 
conflict with the HLR, e.g., partitioning schemes. 
o Software architecture is consistent.  
It must be ensured that the data and control flow between the software 
components is correct. 
o Software architecture conforms to standards.  
The software architecture must be developed according to the SDS. 
o Software partitioning integrity is confirmed.  
That objective ensures that there is no partitioning breach. This objective 
applies only to systems that use partitioning. 
• Code and Integration Objectives   
The code and integration review should detect and report errors that arise during 
the software coding and integration process [4, pp. 45-46]. Therefore, the code 
and integration review process for GLASS should consider the following 
objectives according to AL 3 [4, p. 130] as described in [4, pp. 45-46] and [6, 
pp. 178-179, 181]. 
o Source Code complies with low-level requirements.  
The source code must be developed accurately and completely 
according to the LLR. Moreover, there is no source code implemented 
that cannot be traced back to an LLR. 
o Source Code complies with software architecture.   
The source code is consistent with the software architecture. Hence, it is 
ensured that the data and control flow of the source code are consistent 
with the software architecture. 
o Source Code conforms to standards.  
To satisfy this objective, it must be ensured that the source code is 
implemented according to the SCS. 
o Source Code is traceable to low-level requirements.  
It must be ensured that the LLRs are developed into the source code as 
this supports the compliance of source code to LLRs. Therefore, this is a 
bi-directional trace between them. 
o Source Code is accurate and consistent.  
To verify the accuracy and consistency of the source code, several 
aspects must be considered. For instance, this includes the examination 
of stack and memory usage, fixed point arithmetic overflow and 
resolution, worst-case timing, cache management, and data corruption. 
o Output of software integration process is complete and correct.  
This objective can be satisfied with an examination of compiling, linking, 
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loading data, and memory map. For instance, typical error sources are 
compiler warning, incorrect hardware addresses, memory overlap and 
missing software components. 
o Adaption Data Item File  
There are two verification objectives that apply to the Adaption Data Item 
File (ADIF). Its verification can be separated from the software 
verification. In order to verify them separately, it must be ensured that the 
EOC can handle and is robust to all adaption data corresponding to the 
defined structures and attributes, that the behavior of the EOC resulting 
from the adaption data can be verified and that the software life cycle 
allows this. 
▪ ADIF is correct and complete.  
The ADIF should be verified according to the HLRs. Hence, it must 
be ensured that the file does not contain elements that are not 
defined by the HLRs. 
▪ Verification of ADIF is achieved.  
The verification of the ADIF covers all elements. 
In addition to the verification objectives that are required by DO-278A, further 
objectives as mentioned in [6, pp. 123-125, 181] should be considered. The objectives 
of the requirements process can also be applied to the design process. 
• Requirements and Design Process 
o Entry criteria for the review process is achieved. 
o HLRs and LLRs meet the criteria for good requirements (accuracy, 
unambiguousness etc.). 
o Derived HLRs and LLRs are appropriate, justified and provided to the 
safety team. 
o HLRs and LLRs are documented for each operating mode. 
o The HLRs and LLRs must include performance criteria, timing 
requirements and constraints, memory size constraints, hardware and 
software interfaces, failure detection and safety monitoring requirements, 
partitioning requirements. 
• Integration Process 
o Review of the compile, link, and load data like scripts for the build and 
load process. 
o Review of the build and load instructions for ensuring completeness and 
repeatability. 
o Analysis of link data, load data and memory to ensure that hardware 
addresses are correct and there are neither memory overlaps nor 
missing software components. 
5.5.2 Software Testing 
Besides the verification objectives that ensure the development was performed 
accurately, there are further objectives for software testing to demonstrate the software 
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compliance to all requirements and that the errors identified by the system safety 
assessment are removed. For this purpose, it must be confirmed that the EOC 
complies and is robust with the HLRs and LLRs. Furthermore, the compatibility of the 
EOC with the target computer must be confirmed. [4, p. 46] 
DO-278A offers guidance on requirements-based testing methods and which test 
types should be used for them as mentioned in [4, pp. 48-51] and [6, pp. 198-200]: 
• Requirements-Based Testing Methods 
o Software and Hardware Integration Testing  
The tests will be executed on the target computer to detect errors that 
only arise or can be tested in the target environment, e.g., interrupt 
handling, timing, or field-loading mechanisms. This method is typically 
used for tests against HLRs. 
o Software Integration Testing  
The tests focus on the relation of software requirements and their 
implementation by the software architecture. Hence, these tests ensure 
that the software components work correctly together as well as comply 
with the software requirements and architecture. This method typically 
finds incorrect variable initializations, data corruptions etc. and is 
accomplished when the software and hardware integration test starts.  
o Low-Level Testing  
The tests concentrate on ensuring that the software components meet 
the LLRs. Subsequently, typical errors are incorrect loop operations or 
logic decisions and the like. 
• Test Types 
o Normal Range Test Cases  
This kind of tests examines the code and demonstrates the respond 
under normal or expected conditions and inputs. For instance, typical 
activities are to examine functions with valid inputs, time-related 
functions like filters and delays, state transitions and logic equations. 
o Robustness Test Cases  
Robustness tests examine the software and demonstrate the capability 
of respond to abnormal or unexpected inputs and conditions. For 
instance, typical activities are to examine functions with invalid inputs and 
the behavior of loops with a out-of-range loop count. 
In addition, DO-278A requires bi-directional traceability between the software 
requirements and their test cases to support the requirements-based test coverage 
analysis. Moreover, the test cases should be bi-directionally traced to test procedure 
to show that all test cases are developed into test procedures. Finally, the test 
procedures should be bi-directionally traceable to the test results for showing that all 
test procedures were executed. For this purpose, the SVP should offer a section for 
the traceability like in the SDP. 
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5.5.3 Verification of Software Testing 
When the software testing is performed, it needs to be verified that the verification 
procedures are adequate and correct. For this purpose, DO-278A requires a test 
coverage analysis as well as reviews and analysis of test cases, procedures, and 
results to satisfy the following objectives according to AL 3 [4, p. 132] as described in 
[4, pp. 51-53, 141-147] and [6, pp. 217-227]. 
• Test procedures are correct.  
This objective ensures that the test cases are correctly developed into test 
procedures and can be satisfied by reviewing the test cases and procedures 
analogously to the review processes of the requirements, design, and code. 
Typical issues that will be found during this review are untested requirements, 
inadequate robustness tests and the like. 
• Test results are correct, and discrepancies explained.  
This objective ensures that the test results are correct or adequately addressed, 
e.g., with a problem report of the software or the test cases and can be satisfied 
by reviewing the test results. 
• Test coverage of HLRs and LLRs are achieved.  
This objective ensures that all requirements are tested and can be satisfied by 
checking the trace data between the test cases and the requirements. 
• Test coverage of software structure (statement coverage) is achieved.  
This objective requires that each statement of the program is executed during 
the requirements-based software testing. That does only confirm that all 
statements are executed, but not that all possibilities of evaluating the code are 
covered. For instance, a function containing an if-then instruction must be tested 
if its condition is true, but not with the case that the condition is false. 
• Test coverage of software structure (data coupling and control coupling) is 
achieved.  
This objective ensures that the data and control coupling of the code 
components is tested. To satisfy this objective, the software architecture must 
be well-documented and consistent with the code. Then the requirements-
based integration tests must be developed and analyzed to confirm that the data 
and control coupling is covered by these tests. 
5.5.4 Software Verification Plan Suggestion 
Given these points, the proposed approach to establish a verification process reads as 
follows. The SRS, SDS and SCS already address the objectives of DO-278A and the 
SVP should explain how to satisfy them. These reviews will be performed during the 
review stages in the software life cycle model to reduce the risk that errors propagate 
through the project until its final verification. After the implementation is finished, the 
resulting software should be tested against the respective development stage to 
ensure that the software meets all requirements and satisfy the software testing 
process. Given that, the software verification plan can have the structure as suggested 





What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software verification standards of the GLASS project The 
SVP instructs …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SVP  Software Verification Plan 
HLR  High-Level Requirement. 
LLR  Low-Level Requirement 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
What documents are important or referenced in the SVP context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [Verification tool] Manual of [Verification tool] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
2 Organization of Verification Activities 
2.1 Responsibilities 
Who is part of the verification activities and what he is responsible for? 
The following [ref. to table] shows the verification related responsibilities. 
[…] 
2.2 Transition Criteria  
What is the entry and exit criteria for each verification phase? See also 5.4.4 for further 
examples. 
2.2.1 Requirements Review Process 
Entry: The requirements review process can be started if the requirements are fully 
developed. For this purpose, the following documents must be written: 
Software Requirements Standards, Software Requirements document, … 
Exit: The requirements review process is finished if all requirements pass their 
examination. For this purpose, … 
2.2.2 Design Review Process 
Entry: The design review process can be started if the design description (DD) and 
the LLRs are fully developed. For this purpose, the following data items must 
be written: Software Design Standards, DD document, … 
Exit: The design review process is finished if the DD and the LLRs pass their 
examination. For this purpose, … 
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2.2.3 Code and Integration Review Process 
Entry: … 
Exit: … 
2.2.4 Low-Level Testing Process 
[…] 
3 Verification Environment 
The environment that is used to verify the software product can be defined in the 
Software Life Cycle Configuration Management Index. Nevertheless, a description of 
the programs should be included here as well as important information about the 
compiler correctness and the target computer. See also 5.4.5. 
4 Verification Methods  
4.1 Review Method 
How will a review be performed? See 5.5.1. 
4.2 Testing Method 
Which testing methods should be performed during the software testing? How will they 
be performed? For example, this can include unit, manual, or flight tests. 
The software testing will be performed by using unit test and manual tests. Unit tests 
will be used to test the software product again LLRs and software architecture. Manual 
tests will be used to test the software product against the system or software 
requirements. Moreover, to check the test coverage a test coverage analyzer will be 
used. Therefore, … 
5 Review Checklists  
This section offers short checklist outlines. The examination items should be more 
concrete and more detailed in the written SVP. Further, the representation of these 
checklists depends on the used review approach because the review can be supported 
by respective management programs or other tools. 
5.1 Requirements Checklist 
Program:  _______________________ 
Examiner:  _______________________ 
Date:   _______________________ 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Are the HLRs compliant to the SRS?  Yes  No 
 2 Unambiguousness Are all requirements unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Verifiability Contain each requirement a condition   
  to be verifiably?  Yes  No 
 4 Consistency Are the HLRs consistent with other HLRs?   Yes  No 
 5 Completeness Are the HLRs complete?  Yes  No 
[…]  
Comments:   ______________________________________________ 
Involved data items: ______________________________________________ 





5.2 Design Checklist 
The checklist for the LLRs is almost the same as for the HLRs. Therefore, the following 
checklist focuses on the system architecture. 
Program:  _______________________ 
Examiner:  _______________________ 
Date:   _______________________ 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is software architecture compliant to the SDS?  Yes  No 
 2 Unambiguousness Is the software architecture unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Consistency Is the software architecture consistent?   Yes  No 
 4 Completeness Address the software architecture all LLRs?  Yes  No 
[…]  
Comments:   ______________________________________________ 
Involved data items: ______________________________________________ 
Result:    Successful  Unsuccessful 
5.3  Code and Integration Checklist 
Program:  _______________________ 
Examiner:  _______________________ 
Date:   _______________________ 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is code compliant to the SDS?  Yes  No 
 2 Unambiguousness Is the software architecture unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Consistency Is the code consistent with LLRs and software  
  architecture?   Yes  No 
 4 Completeness Are all LLRs implemented into Code?  Yes  No  
[…]  
Comments:   ______________________________________________ 
Involved data items: ______________________________________________ 
Result:    Successful  Unsuccessful 
5.3  Verification Checklist 
Program:  _______________________ 
Examiner:  _______________________ 
Date:   _______________________ 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is the verification compliant to the SVP?  Yes  No 
 2 Completeness Are all HLRs and LLRs addressed?  Yes  No  
 3 Correctness Are all verification procedures correct?  Yes  No  
[…]  
Comments:   ______________________________________________ 
Involved data items: ______________________________________________ 
Result:    Successful  Unsuccessful 
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6 Verification of Software Testing 
6.1 Verification Review 
Since the verification review can be performed with checklists, the respective checklist 
can be used. 
6.2 Verification Analysis 
Since the test coverage including statement coverage must be examined, the 
procedure should be explained here. Additionally, the traceability approach should be 
explained here as it supports the verification analysis. 
7 Reverification Method  
A reverification method must be provided if the software will be modified. For instance, 
this can be a repletion of the complete verification process or a partial verification. 
Figure 29: Example SVP Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 














The software life cycle(s), including the inter-
relationships between the processes, their 
sequencing, feedback mechanisms, and transition 









Additional considerations are addressed. 4.1.d 
Table 28: Corresponding Objectives to SVP Outline 
5.6 Tool Qualification Planning 
If a software tool should be used that automates, reduces, or removes processes of 
DO-278A and its output will not be verified according to the verification procedure of 
the standard, it needs to be qualified according to DO-330. A tool qualification is only 
valid for a specific system if the qualification is covered by the Plan for Software 
Aspects of Approval. Hence, if an already qualified tool should be reused, it needs to 
be requalified in the scope of the project. [4, pp. 88-89] 
Further information relating to the software tool qualification are in section 3.4.4. 
5.7 Software Quality Assurance Plan 
The Software Quality Assurance (SQA) process begins in the planning phase and 
continues during the software life cycle [4, p. 63]. For this purpose, the SQA plan 
describes the methods that should be used to satisfy the objectives of the software 
configuration management [4, p. 75]. DO-278A defines several objectives, which are 
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summarized in Table 45, to be satisfied for the SQA process. For this purpose, the 
SQA plan should include guidance for the following topics and activities as described 
in [4, pp. 56-61, 75-76] and [6, pp. 89-90]: 
• Environment  
The SQA environment including scope, responsibilities, tools, standards etc. 
should be described.  
• Authority  
The plan should contain a statement about the SQA independence, authority, 
responsibility, and approvability of software products. 
• Activities  
The SQA team performs reviews, audits, reports, inspections etc. for each 
software life cycle process. That includes reviewing the plans and standards, 
participating in the review processes to ensure that they are properly performed, 
closing problem reports and the like. 
• Transition Criteria and Timing  
The SQA process timing in relation to the software life cycle processes and the 
transition criteria for starting the SYQ process should be included. 
• SQA Records  
Since the SQA activities produce SQA records, it should be defined what they 
will contain. 
• Supplier Oversight  
If external developers participate in the development process, it should be 
explained how their processes comply with the project-specific plans and 
standards. 
As shown by Table A-9 of DO-278A [4, p. 134], all SQA objectives must be satisfied 
with independence. Independence means that the objective verification will be 
performed by a person or tool that was not responsible for developing the 
corresponding data and particularly to the SQA process apply that it must include the 
ability to ensure corrections with independence from the developers [4, pp. 143-144]. 
Given that, the SQA plan can have the structure as suggested in Figure 30 below. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document describes the software quality assurance plan of the GLASS project. 
Therefore, this document provides guidance for conducting the software quality 
assurance process. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SQA  Software Quality Assurance 
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AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SQA plan? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A   Software Integrity Assurance …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[12] [xx.yy.xyz_PSAA]   Plan for Software Aspects of Approval 
[…] 
2 SQA Environment 
2.1 Organizational Responsibilities  
Who is responsible for the SQA processes? 
The DLR has a SQA Department, which takes the responsibility to conduct the SQA 
processes. Therefore, this department is authorized to make all software quality related 
decision and … 
2.2 Tools and Methods 
Which tools and methods are used to perform the SQA activities? 
2.3 SQA Manual 
For ensuring that a proper SQA process will be conducted, the DLR offers an 
organization specific SQA manual that is based on IEEE 730. This manual covers …  
2.4 SQA Management Tool  
To enable an appropriate SQA process, the SQA management tool [tool] will be used 
for conducting this process. This is a program that … 
3 SQA Activities 
3.1 Transition Criteria 
The SQA process starts when the SQA plan is released. First activities of the SQA 
process are to setup the SQA tools and to approve the software plans. Moreover, … 
3.2 Reviews 
The review will be performed by the SQA department, which uses a formal inspection 
technique. Further, … 
3.3 Audits 
3.4 Problem Reporting 
3.5 Corrective Actions 
[…] 
4 Supplier Control 
How will be ensured that the SQA activities can be applied to involved suppliers to 
check that they comply to the software plans? 
5 SQA Records 
Which SQA data will be produced? See also Figure 31. 




       1. Results of SQA Reviews 
       2. Audit reports. 
       3. …  
Figure 30: Example SQA Plan Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
The data items of the SQA process will be explained below because the SQA process 
continues during the software life cycle processes. DO-278A only defines to include 
the result of the SQA process in the SQA records like review and audit reports, meeting 
duration as well as records of conformity reviews and authorized process deviations 
[4, p. 81]. However, [6, p. 278] mentions to include information of the evaluated object, 
its evaluation criteria, date and its evaluator, compliance status, severity of findings 
etc. in the SQA records. Given these points, the SQA records document can have the 
structure as suggested in Figure 31 below. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains the results of the software quality assurance process of the 
GLASS project. For this purpose, this document describes in detail which software is 
used during the project. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
SQA  Software Quality Assurance 
SQAR  SQA Records 
AL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the context of the SQAR document? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A   Software Integrity Assurance …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SQMP]   Software Quality Assurance Plan 
[…] 
2 Results of Reviews 
3 Results of Inspections 
4 Results of Audits 
[…] 
Figure 31: Example SQAR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Software planning process related objectives 
Table 37 
No. 1 





The software life cycle(s), including the inter-
relationships between the processes, their 
sequencing, feedback mechanisms, and transition 









Additional considerations are addressed. 4.1.d 
Software quality assurance process related objectives 
Table 45 
No. 1 
Assurance is obtained that software plans and 
standards are developed and reviewed for 




Assurance is obtained that software life cycle 




Assurance is obtained that software life cycle 





Assurance is obtained that transition criteria for the 




Assurance is obtained that software conformity 
review is conducted. 
8.1.d 
Table 29: Corresponding Objectives to SQAP Outline 
5.8 Plan for Software Aspects of Approval 
The Plan for Software Aspects of Approval (PSAA) is the first means for the approval 
authority to determine if the proposed software lifecycle is appropriate to the assurance 
level [4, p. 72] and has a contract-like status between the applicant and the approval 
authority [6, p. 78]. If the PSAA is submitted late during the project, it carries a risk 
because the approval authority can assess the plans as not compliant [6, p. 78]. As 
described in [4, pp. 72-73] and [6, pp. 78-81], the PSAA contains the following: 
• System Overview  
The system overview explains the entire system and how the software fits into 
it. This includes: 
o Description of system functions 
o Allocation of system functions to the hard- and software 
o System architecture 
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o Used processors 
o Hardware and software interfaces 
o Safety features 
• Software Overview  
The software overview explains the intended software functionality and 
architecture. This includes a brief description of software functions that focuses 
on the proposed safety and partitioning concepts. For example, redundancy, 
fault tolerance, timing and scheduling strategies. 
• Approval Considerations  
The approval considerations explain the means of compliance relating to the 
software approval. Especially, the proposed assurance levels of the safety 
assessment and the utilized supplements. For this reason, a summary of the 
safety assessment is included. 
• Software Life Cycle  
This section outlines the proposed software life cycle and is typically a summary 
of the respective plans, namely: 
o Software Development Plan 
o Software Verification Plan 
o Software Configuration Management Plan 
o Software Quality Assurance Plan 
• Software Life Cycle Data  
This section lists the data items that will be generated during the development 
process and indicates which ones will be submitted to the approval authority 
and which ones will only be available. 
• Schedule  
This section describes the purposed time plan to enable time and resource 
planning to both the applicant and the approval authority. That can be the most 
important high-level milestones of the project. 
• Additional Considerations  
The additional considerations include every aspect that could affect the 
approval like Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) software, user-modifiable 
software, deactivated code, or adaption data items.  
• Suppliers Oversight 
The supplier oversight describes how to ensure that the processes and outputs 
of suppliers meet the approved plans. 
Given these points, the PSAA can have the following structure as suggested in the 
following Figure 32 that is supplemented with key points and questions: 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
This document describes the software development processes for the software 
approval according to DO-278A of GLASS. The PSAA is the document for …  
1.2 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? 
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µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array. An FPGA is a device that … 
DAL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.3 Project Organization 
Who is part of the project and what he is responsible for? 
The following figure [ref. to figure] shows the project specific organigram with 
responsibilities. 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
What documents are important or referenced in the PSAA context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] SAE ARP 4761 Guidelines and Methods for …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP] Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP] Software Verification Plan 
2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here. 
2.1 System Description 
What is the purpose of GLASS? Where is the location of a GLASS station (at an 
airport)? 
The purpose of GLASS is … A GLASS ground station will be installed at the location 
[location] of an Airport …  
2.2 Functionality  
What does it? For instance, Figure 12 can be used. 
GLASS converts SBAS into GBAS by using … 
2.3 System Architecture 
What system components are used? How they are connected? Which interfaces are 
used? For instance, Figure 13 and Figure 12 can be used. 
The GLASS ground station consists of the GPS/SBAS receiver [model] from 
[manufacturer] and is qualified to [DAL] and is connected via the [interface] to the main 
processor. Moreover, there is a [model] safety power supply from [manufacturer] 
qualified to [DAL] to provide a [voltage] supply for [component 1] and [component 2]. 
Furthermore, …  
2.4 Hardware Architecture 
Which hardware is used to run the GLASS program? For instance, Figure 14 and 
Figure 12 can be used. 
The GLASS software runs on a [microcontroller model] from [manufacturer] with a 
32-bit RISK architecture. There is a [voltage] power supply for the microcontroller and 
a [voltage] power supply for the serial converter [label] … 
3 Software Overview 
What is the function of the GLASS software? For instance, Figure 6 and Figure 12 can 
be used. Which functions takes care for safety?  
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Which strategies for redundancy, fault tolerance etc. will be applied? 
The following figure [number] shows the GLASS algorithm. [Block] reads the 
ephemeris data from the [device name] GPS receiver and converts the data into … 
To consider potential hardware- or software-related bit errors every data structure that 
is saved in the flash/heap/stack has a CRC check sum that will be proved on every 
access. The access to data structures is only with specific read/write functions possible 
that perform the CRC Check. 
[…] 
To provide a more detailed software overview, the following subchapters could be 
included if they are applicable. 
3.1 Processor States 
3.2 Redundancy 
3.3 Fault Tolerance 
3.4 Timing/Task Scheduling 
3.5 Deactivated Code 
3.6 User-Modifiable Software 
3.7 Adaption Data Files 
[…] 
4 Approval Considerations 
What are the reasons for the chosen assurance level? 
As mentioned in the [PSSA document] the criticality of GLASS is determined as 
hazardous that refers to DAL B due to …  
DAL C is allocated to the software development because the FPGA [label] is 
responsible to ensure the integrity. 
[Summary of PSSA] 
5 Software Development Plan 
A summary of the SDP should be included here. See section 5.4. 
6 Software Verification Plan 
A summary of the SVP should be included here. See section 5.5. 
7 Software Configuration Management Plan 
A summary of the SCM plan should be included here. See section 5.2. 
8 Software Quality Assurance Plan 
A summary of the SVP should be included here. See section 5.7. 
9 Software Life Cycle Data 
Which data items will be created during the approval process? See also the beginning 
of section 5 for the GLASS related data items. 
10 Schedule 
Which important milestones are intended? 
[date]  Plans are complete. 
[date]  Requirements are determined. 
[…] 





11 Additional Considerations 
Is there any additional important consideration like COTS software, user-modifiable 
software, tool qualification etc.? 
12 Supplier Oversight 
If there are external suppliers, it should be described how to ensure that their 
processes and outputs meet the approved plans. 
Figure 32: Example PSAA Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 













The software life cycle(s), including the inter-
relationships between the processes, their 
sequencing, feedback mechanisms, and transition 









Additional considerations are addressed. 4.1.d 
Table 30: Corresponding Objectives to PSAA Outline 
5.9 Software Plans Review and Application at the Approval 
Authority 
Before the PSAA will be submitted to the approval authority, the plans to be submitted 
should be reviewed to verify that the plans conform to DO-278A. If the plans passed 
the review, the communication between the GLASS project team and the approval 
authority should be established. Therefore, the PSAA can be submitted at the approval 
authority and the project team gets response if they agree with the plan or request 
further documents or rework on the plans [4, p. 67].  
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Software planning process related objectives  
Table 37 
No. 6 
Software plans comply with this document. 4.1.f 
Table 37 
No. 7 
Development and revision of software plans are 
coordinated. 
4.1.g 
Approval liaison process related objectives 
Table 46 
No. 1 
Communication and understanding between the 




The means of compliance is proposed and 
agreement with the Plan for Software Aspects of 
Approval is obtained. 
9.b 
Table 31: Corresponding Objectives to Project Application 
5.10 Further Plans 
After all plans relating to DO-278A are created and the PSAA is submitted to the 
approval authority, further plans, which are not required by DO-278A, can be written. 
That can include plans like detailed project management plans that assign tasks to 
specific project members and scheduling plans for company resources, e.g., flight test 
resources. 
5.11 Software Requirements Process  
DO-278A defines system requirements, hardware interfaces, system architecture, and 
the SDP as well as the SRS as input into the software requirements process and the 
Software Requirements Data (SRD) as its output that contains the HLRs. This process 
can be started if the planned transition criteria have been satisfied. The software 
requirements process according to DO-278A must ensure that the HLRs are 
developed and that the derived HLRs are defined and provided to the system 
development and the system safety assessment (SSA) process. [4, p. 34] 
Moreover, both previously mentioned objectives are related to several activities (see 
[4, pp. 34-35, 39, 127]), which are already covered in the HLRs writing procedure in 
section 5.4.1. With reference to the software life cycle in section 5.4.4, the respective 
review for the verification objectives should also be performed according to the SVP in 
section 5.5. According to these activities, the SRD and as well as corresponding Trace 
Data (TD) and Software Verification Results (SVR) will be created. They can be 
combined in one document or kept in different tools depending on the capabilities of 
the used tools. Since the SRS provides guidance for requirements development and 
the traceability approach, the SRD should be combined with the corresponding TD in 
one document. The corresponding verification (review and test) is described in the 




Given these points, the software requirements document can have the structure as 
suggested in the following Figure 33. However, its structure depends on the used 
software requirements engineering approach and the used tools. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains the developed high-level requirements of the GLASS project 
and provides the corresponding trace data. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array. An FPGA is a device that … 
HLR  High-Level Requirement. This term is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the SRS context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [Req. tool]  Manual of [Req. tool] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SRS]   Software Requirements Standards 
[12] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
2 High-Level Requirements 
2.1 Transmitter Requirements 
The transmitter that broadcasts the GLASS data needs to be controlled by the GLASS 
software. These requirements can be listed here. 
Name: Req-101 Transmitter Initialization Procedure 
[…] 
Name: Req-102 Transmitter Shutdown Procedure 
[…] 
Name: Req-103 Transmitter Mode Selection 
[…] 







2.2 Receiver Requirements 
The GNSS receiver needs to be controlled by the GLASS software. These 
requirements can be listed here. 
Name: Req-201 GNSS Receiver Initialization Procedure 
[…] 
Name: Req-202 GNSS Receiver Shutdown Procedure 
[…] 
Name: Req-203 GNSS Receiver Mode Selection 
[…] 
2.3 External Control of GLASS 
Since the FAS data block might be provided by an external database in the airport, the 
requirements to access the database should be ascertained.  
Name: Req-301 External Control Authentication Procedure  
[…] 
Name: Req-302 External Control Maximum Access Frequency  
[…] 
Name: Req-303 External Control Maximum Response Time 
[…] 
2.4 Algorithmic Requirements 
The GLASS algorithm needs to be described with HLRs. These requirements can be 
listed here. 
Name: Req-401 Inflation Factor Calculation 
[…] 
Name: Req-402 Maximum Calculation Time 
[…] 
Name: Req-403 Calculation Integrity Monitor 
[…] 
2.5 Interface Requirements 
The GLASS algorithm needs to be described with HLRs. These requirements can be 
listed here. 
Name: Req-501 Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
[…] 
Name: Req-502 Serial Interface for Maintenance  
[…] 
Name: Req-503 Human Machine Interface (HMI) 
[…] 
2.6 Derived Requirements 
[…] 
Name: Req-601 Brownout Detection 
[…] 






3 Trace Data 
The bi-directional traceability can be demonstrated with a requirements traceability 
matrix. 
System Requirement High-Level Requirement Low-Level Requirement  
[…] […] […] 
SYS-REQ-42-Conversion 
Algorithm 
Req-401 Inflation Factor 
Calculation 
Req-401-11 Lower Inflation 
Factor Limit 
… 




… … … 
 
 
Figure 33: Example Software Requirements Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
After the HLRs are developed completely, they should be reviewed according to the 
SVP before the design development starts. Since it is suggested that the results of the 
requirements review process should be included in a separate verification results 
document, the following requirements review example in Figure 34 is shown as a part 
of the verification results document that will be presented in section 5.14. 
2.1 High-Level Requirements Review  
Program:  GLASS 
Examiner:  [name] 
Date:   [date] 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Are the HLRs compliant to the SRS?  Yes  No  
 2 Unambiguousness Are all requirements unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Verifiability Does each requirement contain a condition   
  to be verifiably?  Yes  No 
 4 Consistency Are the HLRs consistent with other HLRs?  Yes  No 
 5 Completeness Are the HLRs complete?  Yes  No 
[…]  
Comments:   - 
Involved data items: SRS, SVP, SVR document, …  
Result:    Successful  Unsuccessful 
Figure 34: Example Requirements Review Section of SVR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Software development process related objectives 
Table 38 
No. 1 
High-level requirements are developed. 5.1.1.a 
Table 38 
No. 2 
Derived high-level requirements are defined and 
provided to the system processes, including the 
system safety assessment process. 
5.1.1.b 
Requirements verification related objectives 
Table 39 
No. 1 










High-level requirements are verifiable. 6.3.1.d 
Table 39 
No. 5 
High-level requirements conform to standards. 6.3.1.e 
Table 39 
No. 6 





Algorithms are accurate. 6.3.1.g 
Table 32: Corresponding Objectives to Software Requirements Process 
5.12 Software Design Process 
DO-278A defines SRD, SDP, and SDS as input to the software design process and 
the Design Description (DD) as its output that contains the software architecture and 
the LLRs. This process can be started if the planned transition criteria have been 
satisfied. The software requirements process according to DO-278A must ensure that 
the LLRs and the software architecture are developed from the HLRs and that the 
derived LLRs are defined and provided to the system development and the SSA 
process. [4, p. 35] 
Moreover, both previous mentioned objectives are related to several activities (see [4, 
pp. 35-37, 39, 127]), which are already almost covered in the SDS, e.g., traceability or 
robustness. Nevertheless, the remaining activities as described below can be 
accomplished without explicit guidance of the SDS. 
• If partitioning will be used for preventing failure modes, which can be caused 
due to software design activities, the assurance level assignments can be 
changed. If this is the case, corresponding derived requirements must be 
created and provided to the system process.  
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• If insufficient or incorrect inputs are detected, they should be provided to the 
corresponding process for clarification or correction. 
With reference to the software life cycle in section 5.4.4, the respective review for the 
verification objectives should also be performed according to the SVP in section 5.5. 
According to these activities, the DD as well as corresponding TD and SVR will be 
created. Owing to the same reason as mentioned in the previous section, the DD 
should be combined with the corresponding TD in one document and the 
corresponding verification (review and test) should be added to the separate SVR 
document. 
Given these points, the DD document can have the structure as suggested in the 
following Figure 35. However, its structure depends on the used software design 
approach and the used tools. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains the design description of the GLASS project that includes the 
low-level requirements and the software architecture and provides the corresponding 
trace data. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
LLR  Low-Level Requirement. This term is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the SRS context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  
[2] [Design tool]  Manual of [Design tool] …  
[…] 
The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SDS]   Software Design Standards 
[12] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
2 Low-Level Requirements 
2.1 Transmitter Requirements 
The transmitter control routines can be described in detail in the LLRs and listed here. 




2.2  Receiver Requirements 
The receiver control routines can be described in detail in the LLRs and listed here. 
Name: Req-201-1 GNSS Receiver Initialization Procedure 
[…] 
2.3 Algorithmic Requirements 
The GLASS algorithms can be described in detail in the LLRs and listed here. 
[…] 
Name: Req-401-11 Lower Inflation Factor Limit 
[…] 
Name: Req-401-12 Upper Inflation Factor Limit 
[…] 
2.4 Derived Requirements 
[…] 
2.6 Software Architecture 
[Figure 22] 
The package diagram above provides an overview of the included packages of the 
GLASS software, which are the “GLASS Core Algorithms”, […], and the “GBAS 
Message Builder”. They provide the functionalities as follows: 
GLASS Core Algorithms: This package provides all GLASS specific functions. 
[Class diagram for header/source file of the GLASS core algorithm] 
[…] 
GBAS Message Builder: This package … 
3 Trace Data 
The bi-directional traceability can be demonstrated with a requirements traceability 
matrix. 
High-Level Requirement Low-Level Requirement  Source Code 
[…] […] […] 
Req-401 Inflation Factor 
Calculation 
Req-401-11 Lower Inflation Factor Limit glass.c -> calc_inflation() 
Req-401-12 Upper Inflation Factor Limit glass.c -> calc_inflation() 
… … 
… … … 
 
 
Figure 35: Example Design Description Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
After the LLRs and the software architecture are developed completely, they should 
be reviewed according to the SVP before the implementation and integration starts. 
Since it is suggested that the results of the design review process should be included 
in a separate verification results document, the following design review example in 
Figure 34 is shown as a part of the verification results document that will be presented 
in section 5.14. 
2.2 Design Review  
2.2.1 Low-Level Requirements Review 





2.2.2 Software Architecture Review 
Program:  GLASS 
Examiner:  [name] 
Date:   [date] 
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is software architecture compliant to the SDS?  Yes  No 
 2 Unambiguousness Is the software architecture unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Consistency Is the software architecture consistent?  Yes  No 
 4 Completeness Does the software architecture address all  
  LLRs?  Yes  No  
[…]  
Comments:   - 
Involved data items: SDS, SVP, SVR document, … 
Result:    Successful   Unsuccessful 
Figure 36: Example Design Review Section of SVR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Software development process related objectives 
Table 38 
No. 3 
Software architecture is developed. 5.2.1.a 
Table 38 
No. 4 
Low-level requirements are developed. 5.2.1.a 
Table 38 
No. 5 
Derived low-level requirements are defined and 
provided to the system processes, including the 
system safety assessment process. 
5.2.1.b 
Design verification related objectives 
Table 40 
No. 1 










Low-level requirements conform to standards. 6.3.2.e 
Table 40 
No. 6 





Algorithms are accurate. 6.3.2.g 
Table 40 
No. 8 





Software architecture is consistent. 6.3.3.b 
Table 40 
No. 12 
Software architecture conforms to standards. 6.3.3.e 
Table 40 
No. 13 
Software partitioning integrity is confirmed. 6.3.3.f 
Table 33: Corresponding Objectives to Software Design Process 
5.13 Software Coding and Integration Process 
DO-278A distinguishes between the coding and integration process. The coding 
process produces the source code from the software architecture and LLRs, whereas 
during the integration process the source code will be compiled, linked and loaded into 
the target computer. Additionally, the SDP and the SCS are further inputs to the coding 
process and the integration process outputs the executable object code (EOC), 
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adaption data item files, and data related to the compiling, linking and loading process. 
[4, pp. 37-38] 
Moreover, the coding process related objective leads to several activities (see [4, pp. 
37, 127]), which are already covered in the SCS. Additionally, some information of the 
integration process like the usage of the compiler tool chain are described in the 
software life cycle environment configuration index (SECI) and the software 
configuration management plan. Since it is not useful to show examples of EOC 
respective binaries, source code and ADIF as they are too individual, they are 
characterized below according to DO-278A (see [4, pp. 78-83, 139-147]). 
• Source Code 
This code is written in source language. It needs to be compiled, linked, and 
loaded during the integration process for developing the system. For instance, 
this could be a code that is written in high-level or assembly language. 
• Executable Object Code  
The object code respective a binary is directly useable by the target computer 
and will be loaded into that system. 
• Adaption Data Item File  
The adaption data is like EOC directly useable by the target computer and 
contains data that influences the behavior of the target without changing the 
EOC. For instance, this could be a database or configuration table. 
With reference to the software life cycle in section 5.4.4, the respective review for the 
verification objectives of the source code should also be performed according to the 
SVP in section 5.5. According to these activities, the source code as well as 
corresponding TD and SVR will be created. As mentioned in the SCS, the TD 
references should be integrated into the source code. The corresponding verification 
(review and test) should be added to the separate SVR document. Therefore, the 
following code review example in Figure 37 is shown as a part of the verification results 
document that will be presented in section 5.14. 
2.3 Code and Integration Review  
Program:  GLASS 
Examiner:  [name] 
Date:   [date]  
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is code compliant to the SDS?  Yes  No 
 2 Unambiguousness Is the software architecture unambiguous?   Yes  No 
 3 Consistency Is the code consistent with LLRs and software  
   architecture?  Yes  No 
 4 Completeness Are all LLRs implemented into Code?  Yes  No  
 5 Completeness Are all software functions covered with LLRs?  Yes  No 
[…]  
Comments:   - 
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Involved data items: SDS, SVP, SVR document, … 
Result:    Successful   Unsuccessful 
Figure 37: Example Implementation Review Section of SVR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Source Code complies with low-level requirements. 6.3.4.a 
Table 41 
No. 2 



























Adaption Data Item File is correct and complete. 6.6.a 
Table 41 
No. 9 
Verification of Adaption Data Item File is achieved. 6.6.b 
Table 34: Corresponding Objectives to Software Implementation Process 
5.14 Software Verification Process 
DO-278A defines system and software requirements, software architecture, TD, 
source code and EOC as well as the SVP as input into the software verification process 
and Software Verification Cases and Procedures (SVCP), Software Verification 
Results (SVR) and TD as its output. This process can be started if the planned 
transition criteria have been satisfied. The software verification process according to 
DO-278A detects and reports errors that arise during the development processes and 
returns them to the respective development processes for removal. [4, pp. 41-42] 
The reviews for the development processes are already covered in the respective 
requirements, design, or implementation section. Therefore, this section focuses on 
software testing and its review. However, the requirements, design, and 
implementation reviews produce data that will be included in the SVR document. 
Therefore, they will be taken up later. The remaining objectives for software testing 
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should be performed according to the SVP in section 5.5. According to these activities, 
the SVCP, corresponding TD and SVR will be created. They can be combined in one 
document or kept in different tools depending on the capabilities of the used tools. 
Since the SVP provides guidance for the development of test cases and traceability, 
they should be combined in the SVCP document. According to the previously used 
separation scheme of produced data and its review, the SVCP data will be written in a 
standalone document and its review and analysis results will be gathered in a separate 
SVR document with the other reviews. 
The SVCP document describes the verification cases and procedures that will be 
developed according to the SVP and used for software testing. As mentioned in [4, p. 
79] and [6, pp. 206-207], this document should consider the following: 
• In addition to the review and test methods of the SVP, the SVCP document 
should define the scope and extent of the method for the test and procedure. 
• The inputs, conditions, expected results, coverage criteria, and pass or fail 
criteria should be defined for each test case. 
• Each test procedure should be described gradually. 
• The required equipment is identified. 
• The expected test layout is described. 
• Each test case and procedure is reviewed and has done a test run.  
Given these points, the SVCP document can have the structure as suggested in 
Figure 38 below. However, its structure depends on the used software verification 
approach and the used tools.  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains the test cases and procedures of the GLASS project and their 
test result. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array. An FPGA is a device that … 
SVP  Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the SVCP context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  




The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
2 Test Cases and Procedures 
If test suits are used to perform testing, it might be possible to export the test cases. 
Therefore, this section depends highly on the used tools. 
2.1 Low-Level Testing 
These test cases focus on software function level. 
[…] 
Program:  GLASS 
Test Case:  LL-UT-110 
Test Type:  Unit Test; Robustness Test Case 
Purpose:  Check the implementation of Req-401-11 Lower Inflation Factor 
   Limit  
Equipment:  Unit Test Suit for [programming language] 
Description:  The calculated inflation error of “lateral2horizontal()” must be  
    equal or greater than 1. The resulting inflation factor will be set to   
   0.5 after the calculation and before the valid range check. 
Expected Result: lateral2horizontal() returns the error code 4 and output “Inflation 
    Factor Error: 0.5” 
Procedure: 
No Action 
 1 Setup Unit Test Case with [data] 
 2 Execute lateral2horizontal() until the correctness check 
 3 Manipulate resulting inflation factor 
 4 Continue execution 
 5 Check for expected result 
[…] 
Program:  GLASS 
Test Case:  LL-UT-210 
Test Type:  Unit Test; Normal Range Test Case 
Purpose:  Check the implementation of [LLR] 
Equipment:  Unit Test Suit for [programming language] 
Description:  The calculated inflation error of “lateral2horizontal()” must be  
   equal or greater than 1 to inflate the protection level. This will be  
   tested with valid test data. 
Expected Result: lateral2horizontal() returns an inflation factor grater or equal to 1. 
Procedure: 
No Action 
 1 Setup Unit Test Case with [valid data] 
 2 Execute lateral2horizontal() 




2.2 Software Integration Testing 
This is similar to the examples above, but it focuses on the interactions between 
software components. 
[…] 
Program:  GLASS 
Test Case:  SIT-UT-240 
Test Type:  Unit Test; Normal Range Test Case 
Purpose:  Check the implementation of [software architecture component] 
Equipment:  Unit Test Suit for [programming language] 
Description:  It will be checked that the converting procedure calculates correct  
   GBAS messages from valid SBAS mock data. 
Expected Result: The GBAS message builder outputs the following messages: 
   [GBAS messages] 
Procedure: 
No Action 
 1 Setup Unit Test Case with [valid SBAS mock data] 
 2 Execute [respective functions] 
 3 Check the result 
[…]  
2.3 Software and Hardware Integration Testing 
This is similar to the examples above, but it focuses on the interactions between 
software components. 
[…] 
Program:  GLASS 
Test Case:  SHW-TC-140 
Test Type:  Manual Test; Normal Range Test Case 
Purpose:  Check the implementation of Req-101 Transmitter Initialization  
   Procedure. 
Equipment:  Hardware Test Suit for GLASS. 
Description:  It will be checked that GLASS correctly initialized the GBAS 
    transmitter. 
Expected Result: The GBAS transmitter is configured as follows: 
   [GBAS transmitter configuration] 
Procedure: 
No Action 
 1 Setup Manual Test Case with: 
 1. SBAS/GPS Emulator inputs [data] in [interface] 
 2. … 
 2 Execute [respective functions] 






3 Trace Data 
The bi-directional traceability can be demonstrated with a traceability matrix. 
Software Requirement Test Case Test Procedure Test Result 
[…] […] […] […] 
Req-401-11 Lower 
Inflation Factor Limit 
LL-UT-110 See Test Case 
Ref. to SVR 
document 
[…] […] […] […] 
[LLR] LL-UT-210 See Test Case 
Ref. to SVR 
document 
[…] […] […] […] 
Req-101 Transmitter 
Initialization Procedure 
SHW-TC-140 See Test Case 
Ref. to SVR 
document 
[…] […] […] […] 
 
 
Figure 38: Example SVCP Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
As mentioned before, the review of the requirements, design, and implementation is 
already covered by the respective process, but the structure of the SVR document is 
missing. Therefore, its structure is presented below and the already covered reviews 
are only referenced. The SVR document contains the results of the software 
verification activity. [4, p. 79] mentions that this document should contain the following: 
• All performed reviews, tests, and analysis including interim and final pass/fail 
results. 
• Identification of the configuration item/software version that is verified. 
Given these points, the SVR document can have the structure as suggested in 
Figure 39 below.  
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
What is the scope and purpose of this document? 
This document contains the results of all verification activities of GLASS and provides 
the trace data. Moreover, …  
1.2 System Overview 
Several information and figures of section 5.1 can be used here to provide a short 
system overview.  
1.3 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? What is a requirement? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
HLR  High-Level Requirement. This term is defined in DO-278A as … 
LLR  Low-Level Requirement. This term is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.4 Applicable Documents 
Which documents are important or referenced in the SVR document context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 




The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP]   Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP]   Software Verification Plan 
[…] 
2 Review Processes 
2.1 Requirements Review 
See Figure 34. The structure of the verification review below is also similar to this 
review. 
2.2 Design Review 
See Figure 36. The structure of the verification review below is also similar to this 
review. 
2.3 Code and Integration Review 
See Figure 37. The structure of the verification review below is also similar to this 
review. 
2.4 Verification Review  
Program:  GLASS 
Examiner:  [name] 
Date:   [date]  
[…] 
No Type Examination Item Result 
 1 Standards Is the verification compliant to the SVP?  Yes  No 
 2 Completeness Are all requirements covered by the tests?  Yes  No  
[…]  
Comments:   - 
Involved data items: SVP, SVCP document, … 
Result:    Successful   Unsuccessful 
3 Test Process 
The results of the tests of the SVCP document are documented here. 
Program:  GLASS 
Software Version: [version] 
Examiner:  [name] 
Date:   [date]  
Test Case Result Comment 
[…] […] […] 
LL-UT-110 Passed - 
[…] […] […] 
LL-UT-210 Passed - 
[…] […] […] 
SIT-UT-240 Passed - 
[…] […] […] 
SHW-TC-140 Passed - 
[…] […] […] 
 
 
Figure 39: Example SVR Document Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
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This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 






Testing process related objectives 
Table 42 
No. 1 



























Verification of testing process related objectives 
Table 43 
No. 1 
Test procedures are correct. 6.4.5.b 
Table 43 
No. 2 















Test coverage of software structure (statement 




Test coverage of software structure (data coupling 
and control coupling) is achieved. 
6.4.4.d 
Table 35: Corresponding Objectives to Software Verification Process 
5.15 Software Accomplishment Summary 
The Software Accomplishment Summary (SAS) shows that the developed software is 
compliant to the Plan for Software Aspects of Approval (PSAA) [4, p. 81]. As described 
in [4, pp. 81-82], the SAS contains the following: 
• Similar Sections  
The SAS includes the System Overview, Software Overview, Approval Consi-
derations, Software Life Cycle, Additional Considerations, and Suppliers 
Oversight sections of the PSAA and reason as well as explains their differences. 
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• Software Life Cycle Data  
The to-be-created software life cycle data items were mentioned in the PSAA. 
For this reason, they should be already created, and differences should be 
explained. Moreover, the SCI and SLCI should be included with their 
configuration identifier and version. 
• Software Identification  
The software configuration should be included with part numbers and version. 
• Software Characteristics  
Size of executable object code (EOC), timing margins, worst case execution 
time, memory margins, resource limitations and their measuring method should 
be included. 
• Change History  
A change history list should be included, focusing on changes because of safety 
defects and software life cycle process improvements over previous approvals, 
if applicable. 
• Software Status  
If there are unresolved problem reports, a summary should be added including 
potential safety affects, operational and functional restrictions etc. 
• Compliance Statement  
The statement of compliance and how the compliance was demonstrated 
according to the software plans should be included. Further, this section lists 
additional rules from the approval authority and deviations from the software 
plans and standards that are not addressed elsewhere in this document.  
Given these points, the SAS can have the structure as suggested in the following 
Figure 40. This document is the final document that must be submitted with the SCI to 
the approval authority, but the authority can request further data items like the SVR 
document before granting the approval. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Scope 
This document describes the results of the software development and verification 
processes in order to approve the software of GLASS according to DO-278A. For this 
purpose, the SAS …  
1.2 Definitions 
What abbreviations and ambiguous terms are used? 
µC  Microcontroller. A Microcontroller is an integrated circuit that … 
FPGA  Field Programmable Gate Array. An FPGA is a device that … 
DAL  Assurance Level. The term AL is defined in DO-278A as … 
[…] 
1.3 Applicable Documents 
What documents are important or referenced in the SAS context? 
The following external documents are referenced. 
[1]  DO-278A  Software Integrity Assurance …  




The following internal documents are referenced. 
[10] [xx.yy.xyz_SDP] Software Development Plan 
[11] [xx.yy.xyz_SVP] Software Verification Plan 
2 System Overview 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
3 Software Overview 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
4 Approval Considerations 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
5 Software Development Plan 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
6 Software Verification Plan 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
7 Software Configuration Management Plan 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
8 Software Quality Assurance Plan 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
9 Software Life Cycle Data 
This section can be similar to the respective one in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, 
but with an explicit description of changes, if applicable. Additionally, the SCI and SLCI 
should be particularly included with configuration identifiers and version. 
11 Additional Considerations 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
12 Supplier Oversight 
This section can be the same as in the PSAA represented in Figure 32, but with an 
explicit description of changes, if applicable. 
13 Software Identification 
This section contains a list of all needed software items. 
Software Item Version Part Number 
GLASS Software 1.00 GLASS01 
Adaption Data Item File 1 1.00 GLASS01 
[…] […] […] 
 
 
14 Software Characteristics 
Executable Size 
 The EOC size is [size] Byte and measured with [program]. 
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Memory Usage:  
 The maximum memory usage of the program is [size] Bytes of [size] Bytes on  
the µC. This is evaluated with [program]. Moreover, … 
Execution Time:  
[…] 
15 Change History 
Rev. 
No. 
Description Author Date 
1 Initial Release [author] [date] 
[…] […] […] […] 
 
 
16 Software Status 
All problem reports are closed. 
17  Compliance Statement 
The GLASS software is developed and verified according to the methods and data that 
is provided in this document. 
Figure 40: Example SAS Outline 
Remark: Editorial notes are italic, square brackets mark generic names 
This section refers to the objectives of Annex A of DO-278A as represented in the 








Compliance substantiation is provided. 9.c 




6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The goal of this thesis was to create an approval concept for the GLASS software 
according to DO-278A. For this purpose, the working principles of GNSS, GBAS and 
SBAS were presented at first and then the principle of GLASS as well as its calculation 
routines were explained. Subsequently, the background and the relation between 
DO-278A and DO-178C was shown as well as their relation to further standards that 
can also be important. Then, an appropriate assurance level was determined based 
on several conclusions by analogy. Due to the parallel system development progress, 
the assurance level (AL) was adjusted from the determined AL2 to AL3 of the 
preliminary system concept. For that reason, AL3 was used to develop the approval 
concept. In order to develop this concept, the objectives of DO-278A were analyzed 
for that assurance level. Moreover, their completion and the creation of the 
corresponding documents is explained and sequenced for creating an effective 
approval procedure.  
Generally, it was expected that the software of GLASS can be approved. Therefore, 
this thesis proposes a concept to approve the software according to DO-278A. 
However, as already mentioned in the introduction, there is a legal risk because no 
requirements are published in the News for Aviators as required by the German law. 
Nevertheless, this does not limit this thesis for two reasons. On the one hand, the legal 
risk is out of the scope of this thesis and on the other hand, it might be possible to take 
that system into operation in another country. Nonetheless, the software approval of 
GLASS can be challenging because that system is not known by the authority due to 
its novelty. 
Additionally, the approval concept needs to be expanded because not all aspects are 
detailed. This is caused by the great extent of plans and procedures required by 
DO-278A as well as the current state of development of GLASS because many aspects 
like the used design and verification tools are currently not determined. Further, owing 
to the parallel progress of GLASS system development and approval concept 
development, the inferred assurance level had to be adjusted so that the approval 
concept met the needs of the GLASS project as far as possible. 
Finally, the validity of this thesis is limited by two aspect. On the one hand, this is the 
first approval process according to such a standard as DO-278A for the department of 
the German Aerospace Center, which is supervising this thesis, and therefore practical 
experiences are not considered. However, the missing experience is compensated as 
far as possible by referring to literature and checking the concept against the former 
project documentation of the project partner that already passed the approval. On the 
other hand, the success of the approval process according to the concept of this thesis 
is unknown because the thesis is finished prior to the approval of respective authority. 
By way of contrast, the goal was to provide an initial approach to approve the GLASS 
software and not to offer a successful approval concept. 
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Due to that reasons and because the success of the approval of GLASS had not been 
completed at the time this thesis was written, the current state of the approval concept 
should be reviewed and adjusted at the end of the approval process of GLASS and 
revised if the approval process diverged from the concept.  
Eventually, this thesis has shown a concept that guides the GLASS project through the 
approval process according to DO-278A, but nonetheless the approval is not granted 
at this time. For obtaining the software approval to take a GLASS ground station into 
operation, the system concept needs to be matured until it is reliable because the 
software can only be approved as a part of the system. Moreover, the corresponding 
safety assessments need to be performed. After that, all plans as mentioned in the 
approval concept need to be written in order to submit the PSAA to the approval 
authority. If they approve the plans, the software development process can be started 
and if they do not approve the plans, they must be improved and modified as it is 
requested by them. After the software development is finished and the verification 
process confirms the correctness of the software, the SAS can be written and 
submitted with the SCI to the approval authority. Then, the authority can request further 
data and agrees or disagrees with the documents. If all approval processes including 
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DO-278A Data Item CC 
1 
The activities of the software 
life cycle processes are 
defined. 
4.1.a 
PSAA 1 See 5.8 
SDP 2 See 5.4 
SVP 2 See 5.5 
SCMP 2 See 5.2 
SQAP 2 See 5.7 
2 
The software life cycle(s), 
including the inter-
relationships between the 
processes, their sequencing, 
feedback mechanisms, and 
transition criteria, is defined. 
4.1.b 
PSAA 1 See 5.8 
SDP 2 See 5.4 
SVP 2 See 5.5 
SCMP 2 See 5.2 
SQAP 2 See 5.7 
3 
Software life cycle 
environment is selected and 
defined. 
4.1.c 
PSAA 1 See 5.8 
SDP 2 See 5.4 
SVP 2 See 5.5 
SCMP 2 See 5.2 
SQAP 2 See 5.7 
4 
Additional considerations are 
addressed. 
4.1.d 
PSAA 1 See 5.8 
SDP 2 See 5.4 
SVP 2 See 5.5 
SCMP 2 See 5.2 
SQAP 2 See 5.7 
5 
Software development 
standards are defined. 
4.1.e 
SRS 2 See 5.4.1 
SDS 2 See 5.4.2 
SCS 2 See 5.4.3 
6 
Software plans comply with 
this document. 
4.1.f SVR 2 See 5.9 
7 
Development and revision of 
software plans are 
coordinated. 
4.1.g SVR 2 See 5.9 
Table 37: Software Planning Process of AL 3 
Source: [4, p. 126] 
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Data Item CC 
1 
High-level requirements are 
developed. 
5.1.1.a 
SRD 1 See 5.11 
TD 1 See 5.11 
2 
Derived high-level 
requirements are defined and 
provided to the system 
processes, including the 
system safety assessment 
process. 
5.1.1.b SRD 1 See 5.11 
3 
Software architecture is 
developed. 
5.2.1.a DD 1 See 5.12 
4 
Low-level requirements are 
developed. 
5.2.1.a 
DD 1 See 5.12 
TD 1 See 5.12 
5 
Derived low-level 
requirements are defined and 
provided to the system 
processes, including the 




DD 1 See 5.12 
6 Source Code is developed. 5.3.1.a 
SC 1 See 5.13 
TD 1 See 5.13 
7 
Executable Object Code and 
Adaption Data Item Files, if 
any, are produced and 
loaded in the target 
computer. 
5.4.1.a 
EOC 1 See 5.13 
ADIF 1 See 5.13 
Table 38: Software Development Processes of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 
High-level requirements 
comply with system 
requirements. 




High-level requirements are 
accurate and consistent. 




High-level requirements are 
verifiable. 





conform to standards. 




High-level requirements are 
traceable to system 
requirements. 
6.3.1.f SVR 2 
See 5.11, 
5.5.1 
7 Algorithms are accurate. 6.3.1.g SVR 2 
See 5.11, 
5.5.1 
Table 39: Verification of Software Requirements Process Outputs of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 
Low-level requirements 
comply with high-level 
requirements. 




Low-level requirements are 
accurate and consistent. 





conform to standards. 




Low-level requirements are 
traceable to high-level 
requirements. 
6.3.2.f SVR 2 
See 5.12, 
5.5.15.5 




Software architecture is 
compatible with high-level 
requirements. 




Software architecture is 
consistent. 





conforms to standards. 




Software partitioning integrity 
is confirmed. 
6.3.3.f SVR 2 
See 5.12, 
5.5.1 
Table 40: Verification of Software Design Process Outputs of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 
Source Code complies with 
low-level requirements. 




































Output of software integration 








Adaption Data Item File is 









Verification of Adaption Data 
Item File is achieved. 
6.6.b SVR 2 
See 5.13, 
5.5.1 
Table 41: Verification of Software Coding & Integration Process Outputs of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 
Executable Object Code 
complies with high-level 
requirements. 
6.4.a 
SVCP 2 See 5.14 
SVR 2 See 5.14 
TD 2 See 5.14 
2 
Executable Object Code is 




SVCP 2 See 5.14 
SVR 2 See 5.14 
TD 2 See 5.14 
3 
Executable Object Code 




SVCP 2 See 5.14 
SVR 2 See 5.14 
TD 2 See 5.14 
4 
Executable Object Code is 




SVCP 2 See 5.14 
SVR 2 See 5.14 
TD 2 See 5.14 
5 
Executable Object Code is 




SVCP 2 See 5.14 
SVR 2 See 5.14 
Table 42: Testing of Integration Process Outputs of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 Test procedures are correct. 6.4.5.b SVR 2 See 5.14 
2 
Test results are correct and 
discrepancies explained. 
6.4.5.c SVR 2 See 5.14 
3 
Test coverage of high-level 
requirements is achieved. 
6.4.4.a SVR 2 See 5.14 
4 
Test coverage of low-level 
requirements is achieved. 
6.4.4.b SVR 2 See 5.14 
7 
Test coverage of software 
structure (statement 
coverage) is achieved. 
6.4.4.c SVR 2 See 5.14 
8 
Test coverage of software 
structure (data coupling and 
control coupling) is achieved. 
6.4.4.d SVR 2 See 5.14 
Table 43: Verification of Verification Process Results of AL 3 
Source: [4, p. 132] 
 





Data Item CC 
1 
Configuration items are 
identified. 
7.1.a SCMR 2 See 5.3 
2 
Baselines and traceability are 
established. 
7.1.b 
SCI 1 See 5.3 
SCMR 2 See 5.3 
3 
Problem reporting, change 
control, change review, and 
configuration status 





PR 2 See 5.3 
SCMR 2 See 5.3 
4 
Archive, retrieval, and release 
are established. 
7.1.g SCMR 2 See 5.3 
5 
Software load control is 
established. 
7.1.h SCMR 2 See 5.3 
6 
Software life cycle 




SECI 1 See 5.3 
SCMR 2 See 5.3 
Table 44: Software Configuration Management Process of AL 3 









Data Item CC 
1 
Assurance is obtained that 
software plans and standards 
are developed and reviewed 
for compliance to this 
document and for 
consistency. 
8.1.a SQAR 2 See 5.7 
2 
Assurance is obtained that 
software life cycle processes 
comply with approved 
software plans. 
8.1.b SQAR 2 See 5.7 
3 
Assurance is obtained that 
software life cycle processes 
comply with approved 
software standards. 
8.1.b SQAR 2 See 5.7 
4 
Assurance is obtained that 
transition criteria for the 
software life cycle processes 
are satisfied. 
8.1.c SQAR 2 See 5.7 
5 
Assurance is obtained that 
software conformity review is 
conducted. 
8.1.d SQAR 2 See 5.7 
Table 45: Software Quality Assurance Process of AL 3 
Source: [4, p. 134] 
 





Data Item CC 
1 
Communication and 
understanding between the 
applicant and the approval 
authority is established. 
9.a PSAA 1 See 5.9 
2 
The means of compliance is 
proposed and agreement with 
the Plan for Software Aspects 
of Approval is obtained. 
9.b PSAA 1 See 5.9 
3 
Compliance substantiation is 
provided. 
9.c 
SAS 1 See 5.15 
SCI 1 See 5.15 
Table 46: Approval Liaison Process of AL 3 
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